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 Within the heterogeneous amalgam that constitutes “depression” exists dysthymia—a chronic, 
mild subtype that is rarely the sole focus of public discussion or academic research on the subject 
of depression. If depression in general is an experientially and linguistically ambiguous 
phenomenon, as is often claimed, then dysthymia can be considered especially ambiguous given 
that its chronic, low-grade symptoms are difficult to distinguish from one’s habitual self. 
Informed by Kenneth Burke’s views on the rhetorical productivity of ambiguity, this dissertation 
provides a rhetorical account of dysthymia’s ambiguity. It traces a rhetorical history of the 
conditions that led to dysthymia’s construction as a strategically ambiguous diagnostic entity in 
the DSM-III, as well as the conditions that led to dysthymia’s replacement with “Persistent 
Depressive Disorder” in the DSM-5. In addition to providing historical context, this dissertation 
rhetorically analyzes interactions in online health communities for dysthymia, identifying the 
ways in which dysthymia’s ambiguity functions as a rhetorical resource. Despite conventional 
wisdom suggesting that recent biopsychiatric explanations of depression have fully displaced 
previous psychoanalytic explanations, Chapter 2 of this dissertation observes that explanatory 
aspects of both paradigms blend together in dysthymia online health communities, which 
provides a useful strategy for negotiating matters of agency. Focusing on temporality, Chapter 3 
argues that the temporal perspectives present in online accounts of dysthymia are marked by 
temporal expansion rather than the temporal contraction often seen in accounts of chronic 
physical illness. In contrast to temporal contraction, which is thought to often bolster an 
v 
individual’s felt sense of agency in the present, this chapter argues that temporal expansion may 
tend to attenuate one’s felt sense of agency in the present. Chapter 4 explores online health 
community members’ widespread dissatisfaction with the label of dysthymia, most of which 
centers upon the disorder’s designation as “mild.” This chapter describes the rhetorical 
conundrum occasioned by being diagnosed with a “mild” or “high-functioning” mood disorder, 
and identifies the strategies used to challenge the aptness of “mild” as a descriptor for the 
subjective experience of dysthymia. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
Much has been said on the subject of how difficult it is to describe depression at the level of 
subjective experience. This difficulty, however, appears to fuel rather than foreclose attempts at 
description—one could take as evidence the surge of depression memoirs that began in the 1990s 
and shows no signs of abating. Depression memoirists, in what could be seen as a performative 
contradiction of sorts, routinely preface their memoirs with an acknowledgement that our 
language is not up to task of adequately capturing and conveying the subjective experience of 
depression. For example, William Styron (1990), an American author whose memoir is among 
the most widely cited within the genre, explains that, “Depression is a disorder of mood, so 
mysteriously painful and elusive in the way it becomes known to the self—to the mediating 
intellect—as to verge close to being beyond description” (p. 7, emphasis added).  
The difficulty of linguistically rendering depression pervades not only at the level of 
subjective experience, but also at the level of formal definition. Unlike narrators of depression, 
however, nosologists of depression—those who formalize the categories found within the pages 
of the Diagnostic and Statistic Manual of Mental Disorders—do not, as a matter of convention, 
acknowledge the difficulty of their task. Part of this difficulty stems from the simple fact that, 
throughout the history of psychiatry and across cultures, disagreement abounds as to which 
diagnostic criteria should be considered constitutive of depression. Furthermore, as 
phenomenologist Matthew Ratcliffe (2015) suggests, our formal definitions of depression house 
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within their blurry boundaries an impressively diverse range of human experience, which in turn, 
“exacerbates the problem of communicating and understanding experiences of depression” (p. 
3). Given this, Ratcliffe sees it as no surprise that, within psychiatry, “there is considerable 
disagreement institutionally over what depression is, where its boundaries lie, and what its 
subtypes are” (p 3). In a similar vein, sociologist Ilpo Helén (2007) finds that the trouble with 
defining depression has to do partly with the “blurred boundaries between sorrow, dejection, and 
depressive illness” (p. 150). The blurriness of these boundaries lead her to conclude that 
depression is “not an entity but an amalgam, characterized by ambiguity and contestation” (p. 
150).   
Within the ambiguous, heterogeneous amalgam that constitutes “depression” exists an 
exceedingly ambiguous subtype that is rarely the sole focus of public discussion or academic 
research on depression: so-called chronic mild depression, a disorder that went by the formal 
name of “Dysthymia” from the publication of the DSM-III in 1980 up until the publication of the 
DSM-5 in 2013, at which point it was relabeled “Persistent Depressive Disorder.”1 If depression 
in general is said to be an experientially and linguistically ambiguous phenomenon, this is 
arguably especially true of dysthymia, a diagnostic entity perched near the hazy border that 
separates “normality” from major affective disorders (Akiskal, 2001). A glance at the diagnostic 
criteria, copied below from the DSM-5 entry, does little to clarify matters. 
1 I mostly use the DSM-IV term “dysthymia” throughout this dissertation, for reasons I describe later in 
the subsection of the chapter titled “the problem of nosological instability.”   
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 What can be gleaned from the formal diagnostic criteria? The primary criterion, A, appears 
more or less tautological: chronic depression is defined by chronically depressed mood. 
Furthermore, there is a temporal vagueness embedded in this criterion: the “depressed mood” 
that characterizes the disorder is one that lasts for “most of the day,” and occurs “more days than 
Persistent Depressive Disorder (Dysthymia) 
Diagnostic Criteria 
300.4 (F34.1) 
This disorder represents a consolidation of DSM-IV-defined chronic major 
depressive disorder and dysthymic disorder. 
A. Depressed mood for most of the day, for more days than not, as indicated by
either subjective account or observation by others, for at least 2 years.
Note: In children and adolescents, mood can be irritable and duration must be at 
least 1 year. 
B. Presence, while depressed, of two (or more) of the following:
1. Poor appetite or overeating.
2. Insomnia or hypersomnia.
3. Low energy or fatigue.
4. Low self-esteem.
5. Poor concentration or difficulty making decisions.
6. Feelings of hopelessness.
C. During the 2-year period (1 year for children or adolescents) of the
disturbance, the individual has never been without the symptoms in Criteria A and
B for more than 2 months at a time.
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not” over the course of a two-year period. In short, one could argue that there is terminological 
ambiguity baked into this definition, and many mental health practitioners themselves would not 
object. Paul Fink (2010), a psychotherapist and professor of psychiatry, states that, “Dysthymic 
disorder is one of those diagnoses in the DSM-IV that seems to be characterized by ambiguity” 
(p. 14, emphasis added). 
While terminological ambiguity might seem likely to confound or hinder communication, 
the work of rhetorical theorist Kenneth Burke has emphasized that areas of ambiguity are 
particularly fruitful sites of inquiry for rhetoricians. These areas of ambiguity, Burke (1945) 
suggests, often function as “zones of transformation” wherein that which was once considered X 
(in this case, non-pathological mood states) comes to be understood as Y (symptoms of a clinical 
depression subtype). At a time when more and more people are flocking to the so-called “online 
couch” of Internet-based mental health information, one could regard online health communities 
for dysthymia as possible zones of transformation, or spaces in which the ambiguity of 
dysthymia gives rise to new understandings of one’s moods, one’s mental health status, one’s 
sense of self.  
“Ambiguity, Temporality, and Agency in Online Health Communities for Dysthymia” 
seeks to provide a rhetorical account of dysthymia’s ambiguity. It does so in two ways. First, it 
traces a rhetorically-inflected history of dysthymia as a diagnostic entity, contextualizing the 
conditions that led to its birth in the DSM-III, and exploring the conditions that preceded its 
death in the DSM-5. This history is woven together with a rhetorical analysis of interactions that 
unfolded in three dysthymia online health communities between the years of 2004 and 2014. 
Before describing the theoretical contexts and methodological approaches that inform this 
dissertation, I frame the central problem of dysthymia’s ambiguity, drawing on fictional 
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representations of chronic depression from television and literature. After doing so, I situate 
dysthymia’s ambiguity within the context of contemporary digital media, using insights from 
philosophy of science and rhetoric of medicine.  
1.1  WALTER WHITE, THE DEPRESSION PERSON, AND TWO SENSES OF 
‘INTERACTIVITY’ 
The television series Breaking Bad follows a man recently diagnosed with cancer, Walter White, 
as he transforms from a mild-mannered if slightly morose high school chemistry teacher into a 
prominent, violence-prone methamphetamine manufacturer. The show’s popularity surged as it 
reached its finale in 2013, and in the years since, cast and crew members have often been asked 
by interviewers to comment on the psychology of the show’s main character. In several of these 
interviews, Bryan Cranston, the actor who plays Walter White, was asked to identify the 
emotional “core” of his character and his character’s underlying motivations for entering a high-
risk world of violence and criminality. Cranston’s answer came as a surprise to some. Describing 
the difficulty of locating his character’s emotional and motivational core, he said, “First looking 
for it, I had the hardest time finding where Walter lived. Then in a conversation at dinner once, 
someone was talking about depression once, and I went, ‘Whoa, that’s where it is.’…Over the 
years, his entire adult life, he would just gloss over it, keep pushing it down.” Cranston remarked 
that, “Once I caught onto that, it informed everything” (Moaba, 2013). In a subsequent interview, 
Cranston stated that, had Walter White simply been prescribed an antidepressant, “it would have 
been a short series” (Tannenbaum, 2013). 
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In Cranston’s formulation, and in many accounts of depression circulating within both 
professional literature and public discourse, the problem of depression—in all its subtypes but 
particularly as its relates to its “mild” subtype, dysthymia—is framed as one of recognition and 
acknowledgement. The undergirding logic often seems to be that if people will simply stop 
“pushing depression down” or “glossing it over,” then they can pursue intervention and begin the 
process of reorienting their minds, their bodies, their lives. But framing the problem as one of 
mere acknowledgement or recognition obscures the complex communicative work that may 
often be involved in acquiring the label of “depression,” especially when that depression looks 
like, for instance, Walter White’s. Walter goes to work everyday. On the whole, he appears to 
have good relationships with family members. He does not appear to struggle with eating or 
sleeping. Those closest to him would likely describe his everyday mood states and behaviors as 
“stable.” Given all this, it is likely that, had Walter White been diagnosed, it would have been 
with dysthymia rather than Major Depressive Disorder, since the symptoms of the latter are 
thought to impede functionality in more obvious and outwardly observable ways. In short, 
Walter White’s “depression” is not recognizable to himself or those around him as depression.  
Mental health professionals writing on the topic of dysthymia often formulate the 
problem of dysthymia similarly to Cranston; that is, they frame it as a problem of recognizing 
what is already there. David Hellerstein, a professor of psychiatry at Columbia University, 
claims that, “Part of the problem is that many people mistake the symptoms for their personality. 
They may assume that they’re just pessimistic or self-conscious or moody. After struggling for 
so many years, people come to view the fog of depression as their normal functioning” 
(Tartakovsky, 2016). One might be tempted to ask, what differentiates a “pessimistic or self-
conscious or moody” person and a “dysthymic” person? How do some people come to 
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experience themselves as one kind or another, given that there is no blood test or brain scan that 
can distinguish pessimism, self-consciousness, or moodiness from dysthymia (and also given 
that pessimism, self-consciousness or moodiness are common experiential states)? David Foster 
Wallace—whose authorial legacy includes his own depression—wrote a short story titled simply, 
“The Depressed Person,” (1997) that can perhaps shed light.  
“The Depressed Person” is both the title of and name assigned to the main character in 
Wallace’s darkly humorous short story. He never gives his protagonist a first or last name, and 
that is perhaps because depression appears to be such a central part not only of who she 
understands herself to be, but also what she does. And it is the doing of her depression that 
Wallace meticulously details throughout the story. The Depressed Person, like Walter White, 
appears chronically unhappy, but is able to hold down a job despite it, and maintains 
relationships with others. That, however, is where the similarities end.  
The Depressed Person goes three days a week to a psychotherapist who prescribes 
several drugs to treat the depression, and specializes in an empathic, nonjudgmental form of 
therapy. In addition to prescribing a regimen of antidepressants, the therapist provides the 
Depressed Person with a particular vocabulary for relating to herself and others; for example, the 
Depressed Person’s half-dozen closest friends become known as her “Support System.” Since 
they are geographically scattered, the Depressed Person contacts at least one member of the 
“Support System” nightly via telephone. Since she is unable to describe the experience of 
depression itself, she settles for expressing its context, or as Wallace puts it, “the circumstances, 
both past and ongoing, which were somehow related to the pain, to its etiology and cause” (p. 
57). The recollection and description of contextual factors related to depression lend structure 
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and stability to the Depressed Persons depression narrative, a practice that is supported by 
writing in her therapist-endorsed “Feelings Journal.”  
 In short, one could say that it takes a lot of work—in concert with others—for the 
Depressed Person to experience herself as a chronically depressed person. In Wallace’s 
formulation, depression is not something that one merely “has” in the same way that one has 
books on a bookshelf or cups in a cupboard. Within the story, one can identify the following five 
ingredients for psychological self-invention that Nikolas Rose describes in his 1996 book, 
Inventing Ourselves: Psychology, Power, and Personhood: 1) a “pastoral technology” in the 
form of the empathic, confessional patient-therapist relationship; 2) an “authority” in the form of 
the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology, which has licensed the therapist; 3) “devices 
of meaning production” in the form of the vocabulary used between the patient and therapist 
(e.g. “Support System” and “Feelings Journal”); 4) “self-steering mechanisms,” which are 
practices done independently but under the care of therapist, including the nightly ritual of 
telephoning at least one member of the Support System; and 5) “intellectual techniques” in the 
form of writing in the “Feelings Journal,” which aids in the construction of depression 
autobiography. Importantly, there also economic resources involved: the therapy sessions cost 
$90 an hour, and frequent long distance phone calls are not inexpensive.  
 Clearly not every depressed person spends as much time probing her pain as the 
Depressed Person does, and clearly Wallace has exaggerated her characteristics for the purpose 
of social critique. But the story gets at something not often considered when it comes to 
depression: experiences of it are very much produced and mediated and rhetoricized; they are not 
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neutral, stable or inevitable.2 One reason that people do not simply “have” depression is because 
depression is an interactive classification.  
 The question of whether mental disorders are “real” or simply “social constructs” has 
been, and continues to be, a source of energetic debate.3  The question, at root, seems to be: do 
mental disorder categories represent organic, discrete, invariant disease entities, or, do they 
represent the products of socially coordinated activity, and little or nothing more? Philosopher of 
science Ian Hacking has provided fresh terms for thinking through this sort of question. As a 
replacement for the “real vs. socially constructed” binary that has framed so much debate about 
the ontology of mental illness, he proposes a new binary: “indifferent vs. interactive.” 4  It is 
important to note that these terms apply to types of classifications (not types of people or 
objects). Indifferent classifications are those that attach to entities that cannot become aware of 
their classification, and are thus unable to alter their attributes or behaviors in accordance with 
knowing the details of their classification. Hacking gives the example of plutonium: it is a 
                                                 
2 In a classic 1953 article, Becoming a Marihuana User, Howard S. Becker explains how something as 
seemingly straight-forward as first-time marijuana usage is a not a neutral or inevitable experience; it is 
mediated through experienced users, as well as their knowledge and techniques. He argues that first-time 
users have to be taught how to smoke in a way that produces effects, to recognize those effects, and to 
interpret those effects as pleasurable.  
3 The perspective that mental disorders represent “real” disease entities is sometimes referred to as the 
“medical naturalism” position. This position follows Emil Kraepelin, whose theories on mental disorder 
are largely credited with ushering in biopsychiatry. He argued that mental disorders represent disease 
entities every bit as organic and invariant as physical disease entities. The social constructionist account 
of mental illness is sometimes associated with the poststructural movement and its prominent theorists, 
Foucault and Derrida, the former of which argued (briefly put) that mental disorders are not the result of 
organic disease entities, but rather, the social activity of mental health practitioners.  
4 Hacking explains that claims about the “social constructedness of X” are, to him, unhelpful and 
imprecise. Most of these claims are intended to destabilize our notions of X as natural or inevitable 
(gender and race often come up as examples) and to demonstrate how contingent X actually is. But, 
according to Hacking, these claims do not always stipulate that what is socially constructed are the ideas 
about X (e.g. the ideas about gender and race) rather than X itself (the material existence of gendered and 
raced bodies). There is a difference between the social constructedness of things, and the social 
constructedness of classification regimes, and the meanings that get attached to these classifications. The 
rub, though, is that ideas about X can materially affect X and it is this rub that Hacking is trying to get at 
when he introduces his distinction between interactive and indifferent classifications. 
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human-created substance (and is potentially lethal) but it is wholly unaware of its classification 
and so it does not change in response to knowing how it has been classified. It is, in Hacking’s 
terms, completely indifferent to its classification.5  
 Unlike plutonium, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) is an interactive 
kind of classification. With ADHD, there is, in Hacking’s view, the possibility of an interaction 
between the classification of ADHD and those who are classified as having ADHD. Hacking 
explains how this interaction may occur, stating that, “Perhaps children diagnosed with ADHD 
are different from the children once called “fidgety”—in part because of theories held about 
them, and remedies put in place around their bad habits. Conversely, it may be that the resulting 
changes in the children have contributed to the evolution of ideas about problem children. This is 
an example of interaction”6 (p. 102). Hacking’s point is that, ultimately, an awareness of being 
classified in a certain way—such as, for example, “depressed,”—can change the way that people 
living under that label experience and orient themselves. Taken collectively, these changes at the 
level of individual experience can, in turn, initiate changes at the level of the classification 
                                                 
5  Some have proposed (like Mary Douglas, for instance) that interactive and indifferent kinds might exist 
as a continuum rather than a binary, an argument that Hacking appears to reject. Douglas (1986) gives the 
example of microbes. They adapt their behavior in response to our actions, becoming resistant to 
antibiotics and so on. But Hacking contends that they do not change their behaviors as a consequence of 
knowing how they’ve been classified. They are unaware of their classification. For him, they are an 
indifferent kind. 
6 Hacking also tackles “harder” psychiatric classifications, such as schizophrenia, “mental retardation,” 
and autism in which those classified have “communication problems” and are perceived as being less 
aware or unaware of how they are classified and thus, ostensibly do not interact with how they are 
classified. Hacking rejects this, saying that, in the example of autistic children, “Part of the answer is that 
they are in their own ways conscious, reflective…” and he goes on to further clarify that “…I do not mean 
only the self-conscious reaction of a single individual to how she is classified. I mean the consequences of 
being so classified for the whole class of individuals and other people with whom they are intimately 
connected” (1999, p.115). 
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itself—what Hacking calls a “looping effect.”7 Looping effects are one reason why psychiatric 
classifications are so unstable as compared to the classifications found within other scientific 
taxonomies: the objects of psychiatric classification are “moving targets.”  
 Hacking’s concept of interactivity helps bypass the well-trodden debate about the 
ontological reality of mental disorder. It also weakens the implication that mental disorder 
classifications are unidirectional—that is, constructed by experts and applied to passive 
recipients—an implication that Hacking finds lurking in many social constructionist framings of 
mental illness. These unidirectional social constructionist accounts often involve the claim that 
mental disorders are “invented” by some group of people with powerful interests, and are then 
foisted onto another group that more or less passively absorbs them. 
 Depression, in all its subtypes, would be an example of an interactive classification: 
people who are labeled “depressed” can become aware of being labeled as such, and this 
awareness can lead to changes at the level of one’s subjective experience. If enough people alter 
their behaviors in accordance with the knowledge that they are labeled “depressed,” it may lead 
to alterations at the level of the classification itself. Depression has become “interactive” in 
another sense of the term as well, one that by all indications is increasingly important to attend 
                                                 
7 The looping effect refers not only to changes in behavior; it can refer to changes in biology, too. 
Hacking provides an example of this “biolooping” using the classification of depression: “A person 
undertakes a certain regimen of behavioral modification, intended to diminish the symptoms and feelings 
of depression. Numerous kinds of behavior are reinforced, all of which run counter to the classification 
depressed. The patient starts to live in this new way. If the behavior modification works, then even our 
psychiatric understanding of depression changes. Yet simultaneously, by living in this way, adopting 
certain types of behavior, a certain chemical condition of the brain, thought to be correlated with 
depression, is alleviated. We have a dynamic working at the level of classification and at the level of 
biolooping,” (p. 1999, p. 123). 
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to: the digital media by which people increasingly gather, share, and subsequently shape public 
knowledge about depression.8    
 According to the widely cited 2012 Pew Internet Project Research Report, health-related 
information seeking is among the most popular online activities, nearly on par with online 
shopping or news readings. In this survey, 72 per cent of U.S. Internet users said that they have 
searched for information to identify a medical condition that they or someone else might have, 
and 18 per cent say the have gone online to find others who share their health concerns or 
conditions.9 Interestingly, the shortcoming that Hacking finds in social constructionist talk about 
mental disorder classifications—namely, the presumption of unidirectionality—is one that 
likewise plagues contemporary discourses about online health practices, at least according to 
rhetorician of medicine Judy Segal.   
 There are at least two ways of theorizing online health practices in terms of how these 
practices shape the subjectivities of users, according to Segal (2009). She calls them the 
“standard view” and the “rhetorical view,” respectively. According to her, the “standard view”, 
informs the majority of scholarly research across disciplines and public discourse on the subject 
of online health practices. In this view, both health information and the people seeking are 
conceptualized as stable entities: both retain their shape throughout and after the health-
                                                 
8 Len Manovich (2001) argues that all media are technically interactive. But here, I’m using the term 
“interactive” in the ways that it tends to be deployed in public discourse—to refer to digital technologies. 
For instance, the Wikipedia page for “interactive media” says that, “Interactive media normally refers to 
products and services on digital computer based systems which respond to the user’s actions by 
presenting content such as text, graphics, animation, video, audio, games, etc.” See: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interactive_media.  
9 Kivits (2006) suggests that there are two factors fueling the surge in online health practices. First, people 
are increasingly aware that their medical care providers are time-crunched in an era of commercialized 
health care. Second, people are interested in receiving and discussing “everyday” health information, as 
opposed to the technically-oriented health information one might expect to receive in a medical care 
context.  
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information seeking transaction. The only caveat to this is that, in some accounts, there is the 
implication or direct assertion that the health-information seeker comes away from the 
transaction better informed, and thus “empowered.”  Within this view, according to Segal, there 
tends to be a general equation of information with empowerment. The consumer who accesses 
the information needed to make medical decisions is empowered by the information, and is able 
to make informed decisions for themselves and/or others. When the health-information seekers 
are not empowered by the transaction, it has to do with the accuracy of the information: as long 
as the information is accurate, the consumer is empowered. Thus, the web-empowered consumer 
becomes so through the acquisition of information and the ability to discern accurate from 
inaccurate sources. In short, this process is conceptualized as a unidirectional one, according to 
Segal, in which “the Web informs the patient, well or badly…” (p. 359). According to Segal, this 
“standard view” leaves several important considerations unattended.  
 Segal encourages researches to adopt a “rhetorical view” of the relationship(s) among 
web users, health information, and the Internet. A good first step she suggests, would involve 
paying proportionate attention to each of the three sides of the “rhetorical triangle,” which 
consists of source, subject matter, and audience. The “standard” view tends to focus on the 
nature of the source—is it accurate, inaccurate, or somewhere between? It typically leaves the 
other two sides of the triangle—subject matter and audience—unattended. Turning attention 
toward the other elements of the rhetorical triangle reframes the process of health information 
seeking from a unidirectional process to a bidirectional process, in which “the Web makes the 
user and the user makes the Web too” (p. 359). The Web makes the user “by immersing her in 
information” that “casts an unimaginably wide net, and, at the same time, it may interrogate the 
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user directly with diagnostic checklists and hail her (that very person) as a patient” (p. 359).10 
The user also acts back on the Web, sometimes actively—for example, posting a comment to an 
online health community which becomes part of another person’s information seeking—and 
sometimes passively, as search engines typically organize information on the basis of which 
links are most frequently clicked.  
 If we were to adopt the sort of rhetorical view of Internet health information that Judy 
Segal encourages, we would see that it is not entirely obvious how to configure the rhetorical 
triangle as it pertains to the topic of this dissertation. First, there is uncertainty in terms of 
defining the subject matter: dysthymia. This uncertainty pervades on multiple fronts. First: what 
to call it? Should it go by the name dysthymia (the DSM-IV term), chronic mild depression (the 
colloquial, descriptive term that pops up in professional and public discourses alike), or 
Persistent Depressive Disorder (the DSM-5 term)? (Later in this chapter, I describe my reasons 
for using the first term, which mostly boil down to the fact that this is the term around which the 
online health communities studied here are organized.) Second: what is dysthymia, and where 
does the mild, chronic depression that characterizes it begin and “normal unhappiness” end? This 
is an ambiguity with which clinicians, nosologists, and people in online health communities all 
grapple. In terms of the “source” or “speaker,” should we assume that this role is inhabited by 
those who post in online health communities, or is that role more aptly assigned to the online 
health communities themselves, and/or the platforms that house them? Given that these online 
                                                 
10 Perhaps controversially, a key part of Segal’s argument is that, taking account of the context in which 
people search for online health information (including, for example, the user’s location, state of mind, 
time of day, etc.) might lead to the conclusion that the Web remakes the user in ways that do not render 
her a particularly good judge of information. In short, this context—which she imagines often involves a 
user who is isolated, perhaps in the middle of the night, searching for information about a problem that is 
uncertain in origin—creates opportunities for anxiety. As evidence for this position, she cites research 
pertaining to the phenomenon termed “cyberchondria,” which is defined by White and Horvitz (2009) as 
the exacerbation of health worries based on online searches for common symptoms.  
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health communities are organized around a DSM category, and given Hacking’s views on the 
interactive nature of psychiatric classifications, could the “source” also be considered the 
American Psychological Association itself? Lastly, who should be considered the “audience”: 
active members of the online health communities, or anyone who reads the publically viewable 
posts archived within these communities?   
Although in this case (and probably in most cases), there are multiple ways to plausibly 
configure the elements of the rhetorical triangle, it seems reasonable to suggest that the following 
elements of the rhetorical triangle are present in the context of online health communities for 
dysthymia: 1) an inherently unstable subject matter (the classification of dysthymia changes from 
one edition of the DSM to the next); 2) an inherently unstable “audience” (the label of 
dysthymia, as Hacking suggests, changes the way that those so-labeled experience themselves; 
and as Segal suggests, the Web remakes the user); and 3) primarily text-based communication 
media—online health communities—that are prone to flux (given that users continually remake 
these online spaces, both passively and actively).  
1.2 THEORETICAL AND TERMINOLOGICAL CONTEXT 
1.2.1  Why Health is More Than Health 
What are people doing when they talk about their health, physical or mental? This simple but 
enduring question lies at the heart of a number of overlapping fields of research in both the social 
sciences and humanities. Health communication, narrative medicine, the sociology of health and 
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illness, medical anthropology, and the rhetoric of medicine all have an interest in tackling this 
basic question. A thread of insight connecting these divergent fields is the shared understanding 
that when people talk about health, they are rarely talking only about health.  
 Despite its simplicity and import, the question of what people are doing when they talk 
about health and illness has only fairly recently become a focus of the fields of scholarship 
mentioned above. In the 1970s and 1980s, psychiatrist and medical anthropologist Arthur 
Kleinman (1986) helped popularize this research agenda through his work on the concept of 
“health beliefs.” In his anthropological work, he observed that different individuals and groups 
often have starkly differing views about health and illness. Research into “health beliefs” was 
considered a first step toward treating health-talk as more than mere information transfer 
(Franken, 2001). This research tried to identify how people define health, how they describe 
experiences of illness (a focus that would go on to become its own field of scholarship, narrative 
medicine), the sorts of differences that exist between “expert” and “lay” accounts of health and 
illness, how people think about avoiding disease, and how all of these different definitions, 
descriptions, and beliefs about health and illness differ across populations (Radley & Billig, 
2001).  
 While early research into the questions above has advanced a number of research 
agendas, one noted shortcoming is that the “health beliefs” model has tended to imply that health 
beliefs are fairly durable, and that they are individually constituted. The shift away from 
“beliefs” and toward “accounts” or “narratives” marks an interest in treating individuals’ ways of 
thinking and talking about health as fluid, as subject to continual revision as one’s life 
circumstances changes. In addition, this shift toward “accounts” or “narratives” has a decidedly 
more intersubjective flavor than the health beliefs model. As Radley and Billig (2001) state, 
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health accounts “articulate a person’s situation in the world, and indeed articulate that world, in 
which the individual will be held accountable to others (p. 222). Thus, they make that case that 
when one talks about one’s illness, they are accounting for oneself in relation to others.  
 Research into health accounts and narratives has generally attempted to underscore that 
no particular institution, domain, or discipline can claim to set the parameters of health talk—not 
clinicians, not medical researchers, not the Centers for Disease Control or World Health 
Organization. This is because, as sociologist Robert Crawford (2004; 2006) has argued, “health” 
has become a key metaphor in a health-conscious era, a metaphor that is embedded with layers 
of meaning that stand outside the realm of “health” per se (specifically, Crawford argues that 
health-talk is laden with moralism, and is a prime vehicle for advancing neoliberal logics). As he 
puts it, “[M]edical practice has never been able to contain the irrepressible proliferation of 
meanings associated with health…health is metaphorical, absorbing and express a range of 
meanings throughout culture” (p. 405). Crawford’s argument frames health-talk in ways that bear 
similarity to the rhetorical concept of “condensation symbols.” That is, health-talk could be 
considered a series of symbolic practices that have a high degree of “connectivity” to a range of 
other, seemingly far-flung symbols in the culture; condensation symbols condense and express 
those meanings, the interpretation of which varies based upon the context and audience (Kaufer 
& Carley, 1993).  
 Health-talk, then, might be considered a somewhat peculiar form of discourse: it is 
densely packed with cultural meanings, yet, at the same time, “health” itself is often represented 
as largely politically neutral or nonideological. This makes health, in Metzl’s (2010) words, a 
“desirable state” as well as a “prescribed state” and an “ideological position.” What makes 
health-talk such a power vehicle for values is how adept it is at concealing its moral and 
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ideological baggage. And yet, if one looks closely, one can identify some of the moral and 
ideological baggage lurking below the seemingly neutral, amoral surface. We can see this 
baggage, according to Metzl,  
 “every time we see someone smoking and reflexively say, ‘smoking is bad for 
your health’ when what we really mean is, ‘you are a bad person because you 
smoke.’ Or when we encounter someone whose body size we deem excessive and 
reflexively say, ‘obesity is bad for your health,’ when what we mean is not that 
this person might have some medical problem, but that they are lazy and weak of 
will…or when we see a woman bottle-feeding an infant and reflexively say, 
“breastfeeding is better for that child’s health,” when what we really mean is that 
the woman must be a bad parent.” (p. 2).   
Health-talk, in this view, tends to gloss over the moral and ideological assumptions embedded 
within it. One reason that health-talk tends to come freighted with moral and ideological baggage 
may be because, as Erving Goffman’s work on stigma has suggested, the recognition of “health” 
depends upon the construction and recognition of “unhealthy” others. Following Goffman’s 
insights, Crawford (2006) posits that health has come to operate as a central “dividing practice” 
in Western societies, given that it quietly produces and reinforces stratification between those 
considered well, and those considered unwell.11  
                                                 
11 Crawford (2006) describes the logic of health-based divisions as such: “Identity is a system of multiply 
layered differences that superimposes one ascribed quality upon another: I am who I am because I am 
healthy/I am healthy because of who I am; you are who you are because you are unhealthy/you are 
unhealthy because of who you are.” (p. 414). He goes on to point out that, “The proximity of sick friends 
and family members confound these strategies, and sympathy for the sick softens the judgment that 
people deserve the diseases they get. Nonetheless, the sick remain useful for positioning (as far as 
possible from the self) the abstracted qualities of disease (visual representations, risk categories, 
etiologies) and the imagined qualities of Otherness.” (p. 414). 
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 As will become clear in the chapters that follow, the theoretical context of this 
dissertation is informed by several of the interdisciplinary insights articulated above. For one, 
this dissertation assumes that communication about dysthymia expresses a range of meanings 
outside of “depression” per se. These meanings include, for example, notions of temporality, 
which are addressed in Chapter 3, as well as conceptions of normality, as explored in Chapter 4. 
In addition, this dissertation also assumes that the meanings of dysthymia are not constructed 
exclusively by the American Psychological Association, clinicians, researchers, mental health 
practitioners, or other “expert” voices. Just as “health” is not defined exclusively by “medicine,” 
mental health is not defined exclusively—perhaps not even primarily—by the assemblage of 
experts and practices that Nikolas Rose (1998) collectively refers to as the “psy” disciplines.12 
This is partly because these particular disciplines, he suggests, operate according to a principle of 
“generosity” that appears somewhat anomalous when contrasted against other professional 
bodies of knowledge. This principle of generosity is evidenced by the degree to which ‘psy’ has 
been, in Rose’s words, “happy, indeed eager, to ‘give itself away’—to lend its vocabularies, 
explanations, and types of judgment to other professional groups and to implant them within its 
                                                 
12 Rose (1998) describes his use of the term ‘psy’ throughout his work as follows: “Collectively I refer to 
the ways of thinking and acting brought into existence by these disciplines since the last half of the 
nineteenth century as ‘psy’ not because they form a monolithic or coherent bloc—quite the reverse—but 
because they have brought into existence a variety of new ways in which human beings have come to 
understand themselves and do things to themselves (p. 2).    
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clients” (p. 2-3). In doing so, ‘psy’ has been quite successful in establishing what Kelly (2014) 
calls a “common language”—a set of discourses with a high degree of cultural portability.13  
1.2.2 The Problem of Nosological Instability 
Writing this dissertation presented several linguistic dilemmas, thanks in part to the instability of 
psychiatric nosology. The first and most pressing dilemma was what to call the disorder that lies 
at the heart of this dissertation: the disorder’s DSM-IV term, “Dysthymia”, or the revised DSM-5 
term, Persistent Depressive Disorder (PDD)? There was also a third option: using the somewhat 
colloquial term, “chronic mild depression.” Though this third term never appeared in the DSM, it 
seems to be used almost interchangeably with the DSM terms in consumer literature and public 
discourse. “Chronic mild depression” has the benefit of being a descriptive, non-jargonistic term, 
and because of this, also has the benefit of possible durability; that is, this informal label is likely 
to remain in public usage even as the formal diagnostic terms shift.    
The choice, ultimately, was to use the term “dysthymia,” primarily because it is the term 
around which the online health communities analyzed here initially organized, and, importantly, 
it is the term around which they continue to organize despite the existence of the new DSM-5 
category PDD. It seems inevitable that in the future online health communities organized around 
the PDD label will emerge, but at the time this dissertation was drafted, none existed. The 
13 Kelly (2014) explains that, “While professional practices delimit speaker competence of the ‘common 
language’ to professional discourse communities, the social values interlinked with the discourse features 
promote circulation of the language across a range of social occasions such that many cultural members 
recognize, and, in some cases, are able to describe and mimic the feature of the language variety. As a 
result, the community of speakers expands; the ‘common language’ is taken up by speakers outside the 
psychiatric discourse community.” Kelly goes on to quote from a The New Yorker journalist (Spiegel, 
2005) who states that the paradigm-shifting DSM-III (the construction of which is a focus of Chapter 1 of 
this dissertation), “not only revolutionized the practice of psychiatry but gave people all over the United 
States a new language with which to interpret their daily experiences and tame the anarchy of their 
emotional lives (p. 56, as quoted by Kelly, [2014], p. 175).  
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continued activity of online health communities for “dysthymia” (rather than PDD) reveals an 
incongruity between the professional discourses of psychiatry as codified in the DSM, and public 
discourses pertaining to psychiatry. This incongruity lends credence to Charland’s (2004) 
suggestion that, “Psychiatric labels may no longer solely under the control of psychiatry” in no 
small part because, “the Internet provides a medium where iatrogenic labels can be kept alive by 
consumers even though they have been psychiatrically abolished by the medical establishment” 
(p. 38-39). Interestingly, while researching this dissertation I found indications that mental health 
practitioners also seem to participate in keeping the DSM-IV term dysthymia alive. While 
reading through discussion threads in these communities, I encountered a number of posts in 
which the author reported receiving a fresh diagnosis of dysthymia as recently as 2015, a full two 
years after the DSM-5 term, PDD, replaced dysthymia.  
 The discrepancy between DSM-5 terminology and the language of preexisting online 
health communities at first seemed a potential obstacle to researching this dissertation. However, 
this discrepancy eventually grew into an area of inquiry in its own right, partially forming the 
subject of the Chapter 4. During my analysis, I was intrigued to discover that a recurring topic of 
discussion in online health communities was frustration with the label of dysthymia and the 
characterization of the disorder as “mild” when compared to Major Depressive Disorder (MDD). 
Some even claim to have been misdiagnosed on the grounds that their experience could not 
possibly square with the descriptors of  “mild” or “less severe.” (It was interesting, then, to note 
how the DSM-5 diagnosis, PDD, merges chronic cases of MDD [previously considered a 
categorical anomaly, since MDD, along with all other affective disorders, are defined as 
episodic] with preexisting cases of dysthymia. Several participants in the online health 
communities studied here noted that PDD’s aggregation of chronic MDD with dysthymia might 
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serve to eliminate a perceived “depression hierarchy,” in which the suffering associated with 
MDD is thought to exceed the suffering associated with dysthymia.  
 The second terminological dilemma this dissertation presented was how to refer to people 
diagnosed with dysthymia (whether informally self-diagnosed or formally diagnosed by a 
practitioner). Certain ways of referring to these people, it seemed to me, implied a reification or 
unqualified acceptance of the psychiatric labels themselves. As Ratcliffe (2015) suggests, it may 
be “naïve and dogmatic to assume the legitimacy of a diagnostic category from the outset” and to 
“accept that a distinctive kind of experience is uniquely associated with it” (p. 3). The terms 
“dysthymic,” “dysthymia sufferer,” and even the people-first term, “people with dysthymia” all 
have the potential to suggest an unqualified acceptance of the epistemological legitimacy of the 
diagnosis. While I did not want to lend credence to reductionist biomedical-realist accounts of 
dysthymia, I also did not want to fall into the trap that Schaffner and Tabb (2015) term 
“taxonomic nihilism”—a perspective on mental disorder that explicitly rejects the possibility of 
any organic/physiological contribution to psychiatric symptoms, and which has been criticized as 
a contemporary instantiation of mind-body dualism.  
 While attempting to skirt both biomedical reductionism and taxonomic nihilism, I found 
that my orientation to mental disorder might be described as a soft form of social 
constructionism, sometimes called “critical realism” (Pilgrim & Bentall, 1999) which would hold 
that psychiatric diagnostic categories are subject to flux on the basis of social, political, and 
economic realities. This does not imply that psychiatric symptoms have no possible organic 
component; this is a position that simply reiterates the symbolic interactionist axiom that that all 
objects, situations, and events acquire their meanings through processes of interpretation 
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(Blumer, 1969). These meanings do not inhere within the objects, situations, and events 
themselves.  
After grappling with these linguistic considerations, I landed on two primary terms that I 
use throughout the dissertation to refer to people in these online health communities, depending 
on the context provided in their posts: “people diagnosed with dysthymia,” and “people who 
identify with the label of dysthymia,” or, alternately, “people considering the label of 
dysthymia.” These terms have been chosen to foreground the communicative action involved in 
understanding oneself via psychiatric terminology.  
1.2.3 Contextualizing Online Health Communities as Sites of Practice 
This dissertation approaches online health communities as sites of practice.  In the context of 
ethnographic studies, the “practice” approach aims at providing richly detailed explanations of 
how social groups cohere and maintain their coherence. While “community” is a word that tends 
to imply warmth or tight linkages, the “practice” approach defines any grouping with shared 
engagement in a project as a community of practice. According to Nancy Baym (2000), one of 
the pioneers of online community research, “a community’s structures are instantiated and 
recreated in habitual and recurrent ways of acting or practices (p. 23, original italics). While an 
online community may include a formal description about its purpose and guidelines for 
engagement, it is only through an examination of the community’s actual everyday practices that 
one gains insight into the community (Giles & Newbold, 2013).  
Since engagement in online communities is often characterized by “disembodiment” (to 
the extent that users are not typically visible to one another), language practices have been a 
central focus in practice-oriented studies of online communities. As Baym puts it, “language 
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practices are microcosms of the communities in which they are used” (2000, p. 23). A focus on 
language practices within online health communities can give insight into a community’s general 
belief structures, its shared values, and its subjects of tension or conflict. In short, the language 
activities of a community have much to reveal about the community as a whole.14 Baym quotes 
literary theorist Bakhtin (1981) to argue for the importance of attending to the linguistic choices 
of online community members: “All words have a ‘taste’ of a profession, genre, a tendency, a 
party, a particular work, a particular person, a generation, an age group, a day and hour. Each 
word tastes of the context and contexts in which it has lived its socially charged life; all words 
and forms are populated by intentions. Contextual overtones (generic, tendentious, 
individualistic) are inevitable in the word” (p. 293).  
This dissertation approaches online health communities for dysthymia as sites of practice 
within the sense of the term described above; that is, it approaches them as communities 
constituted through their patterned ways of speaking, acting, and sense making. This last 
component—sense making—is a particularly complex and important practice in online health 
communities for dysthymia. As Karp (1994) explains, “Chronic emotional illness poses 
especially difficult problems for sense-making because the source of the problem is unclear and 
the course is uncertain” (p. 26). Further complicating matters is the fact that many users of online 
health communities for dysthymia are not (yet) formally diagnosed. For some users in these 
online health communities, they must grapple with the fact that dysthymia itself is an unclear 
14 According to ethnographic researcher Kathy Charmaz (2006), researchers are well served by 
approaching language activities as somewhat dilemmatic; the less problematic language use seems to the 
researcher, the more difficult it will be to uncover insights with which to build theory. For example, she 
suggests identifying and examining “in vivo codes” (“in vivo” is a Latin term that translates as “within-
the-living”)—special phrases that are used seemingly unproblematically by speakers and are sometimes 
wellsprings of insight. She gives the example of “making a comeback”—a phrase used widely and 
seemingly unproblematically by chronic illness sufferers. She argues that this phrase actually condenses 
and diffuses significant meanings about health and illness shared by many of the chronically ill.  
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diagnostic entity, and that it is likewise unclear whether they could be aptly described as (and 
diagnosed as) “dysthymic.”  
To confront these uncertainties, one practice that many not-yet formally diagnosed users 
engage in involves the construction of lengthy self-introductory posts in which they articulate 
their lived circumstances and wonder aloud whether (or, in some cases, confidently assert that) 
the label of dysthymia “fits” their experience. These introductory posts can be considered one of 
the sorts of communicative practices through which online health communities cohere—a 
patterned way of acting. These introductory posts could also be considered “practice” in another 
sense of the word: an early attempt at practicing the inhabitation of a particular illness identity. 
As Strauss (1959) explains, inhabiting an illness identity entails a transformation of sorts. As he 
puts it, “In transformation of identities a person becomes something other than he or she was” (p. 
92). For the not-yet formally diagnosed, these introductory posts might present a means for 
“practicing” this new identity, a sort of warm-up rhetorical performance in front of disembodied 
community members that one engages in before “performing” this new identity in other social 
contexts that might include one’s friends, family members, or health care practitioners.  
1.3 SITUATION IN SCHOLARSHIP 
1.3.1 Rhetoric of Medicine 
That there is a rhetorical component present in scientific discourse is now a less bold claim than 
it once was. According to Segal (2009), it was the gradual acceptance of this claim that 
eventually paved the way for scholars of rhetoric to begin exploring the relationship between 
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rhetoric and medicine. Early work within the field of rhetoric of science focused largely on 
rhetoric within science. For example, common objects of inquiry for early rhetoricians of science 
included texts produced by scientists or within scientific establishments; the metaphors, 
narratives, and genres therein were especially common foci. One early example of this sort of 
work came from Charles Bazerman (1988), who set out to explore and identify the rhetorical 
conventions that typify the genre of the scientific research report.  
Later, the field broadened its focus beyond rhetoric within science to include the 
rhetorical relationship between scientific and public discourses. In a widely cited example of 
such work, Jeanne Fahnestock (1998) explored how scientific information undergoes a sort of 
rhetorical transformation as it travels from technical contexts (e.g. the research report) to popular 
contexts (e.g. the popular science article). This transformation, she argued, entails a shift from a 
forensic (investigative) framing to an epideictic (celebratory) framing, with important caveats 
and qualifications tending to slip away in the process.  
In general, rhetorical scholarship on the relationship between scientific and public 
discourses emphasizes less that there are rhetorical components present in scientific activity, and 
focuses more on how those rhetorical components themselves can, at times, be generative of 
scientific knowledge. In her work on a genre of scientific monographs that she calls 
“inspirational interdisciplinary monographs,” Leah Ceccarelli’s (2001) argues that some 
scientist-authors (namely Dobzhansky and Schrödinger) have employed rhetorical strategies that 
are at least partly responsible for fostering novel collaborations between rival scientific fields 
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that were not previously on speaking terms.15 In a similar vein, Deirdre McCloskey (1998) has 
argued that when economists fail to acknowledge the rhetoricity of their field, the actual 
scientific quality of their work has a tendency to suffer.  
 Work within the rhetoric of science subfield paved the way for rhetoric of medicine, and 
rhetoric of medicine scholars have taken many of the above interests as a starting point. Their 
foci have followed a similar trajectory to rhetoric of science scholarship, starting with official 
biomedical texts (i.e. rhetoric within medicine), and later branching outward to include the texts 
and practices of publics, and relationships between medicine and public discourses. For example, 
Martha Solomon (1985) performed a Burkean rhetorical analysis based on published medical 
reports of the Tuskegee syphilis experiments, aiming to identify what role the authors’ rhetorical 
choices may have played in obscuring the study’s obvious ethical issues, and allowing the study 
to continue without objection.16 Several decades later, Lisa Keränen (2007) studied how “patient 
preferences worksheets”—documents that ask patients and their caregivers to specify which 
technical interventions they would like to receive or decline in the context of end-of-life care—
operate as a rhetorical boundary objects, ostensibly inducing cooperation among competing 
social worlds, including the vernacular world of patients, the technical world of doctors, and the 
institutional world of administrators (though Keränen finds that, ultimately, the worksheet 
mostly serves the purposes of the latter party).  
                                                 
15 Ceccarelli (2001) points to Dobzhanky’s 1937 Genetics and the Origin of Species, which played a role 
in catalyzing the field of evolutionary biology and Schrödinger’s 1944 What is Life, which played a role 
in forming molecular biology. She also explores Edward O. Wilson’s attempt to form a field of 
sociobiology with his 1998 text Consilience, and explores why this attempt largely fell flat.  
16 Solomon (1985) concluded that the medical reports alternately framed the study’s black male 
participants as the “scene” upon which disease played out, as well as the “agency” by which the study’s 
authors sought new knowledge. Taken together, this framing dehumanized the men in the study, and in 
turn “emphasized the discontinuities between them and the physicians reading the journals” (p. 233).  
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 Rhetoric of medicine scholars are particularly interested in rhetorically-charged 
interactions between patients and their physicians at a time when medical authority is said to be 
in flux. Judy Segal (2005), considered a pioneer of the field, has explored the rhetorical 
predicament of hypochondria: the hypochondriac patient cannot persuade her physician that she 
is ill, and the physician cannot persuade the patients that she is well. More recently, “neuro-talk” 
has become an especially common object of attention, with Jordyn Jack even suggesting that a 
new subfield—“neurorhetorics’—be created in order to explore how the proliferation of 
neuroscientific discourses is reshaping public policy, as well as fundamental understandings of 
what it means to be human.  
 In a recent special issue of the Journal of Medical Humanities, Lisa Keränen (2014) 
opined that, “[I]n an era punctuated by persistent calls for “public participation,” “patient 
participation,” or “user involvement” in biomedical and health processes, we need to assess the 
multiple ways that publics already interface with biomedical and health knowledge formation, 
contestation, decision making, and practices” (103). In doing so, she suggests, rhetoric of 
medicine and medical humanities scholars can get a stronger grasp on the ways in which publics 
shape the contours of health and medical practices.  
 Rhetoric of medicine scholarship has touched on the subject of depression. Our 
understandings of what depression is and what it is like to be depressed are formed primarily 
through the language we use to describe and diagnose it. For that reason, it is said to be a 
diagnostic phenomenon fully saturated by language (Emmons, 2010). It is not surprising, then, 
that scholars of rhetoric and communication have explored how depression is discursively 
rendered and rhetoricized by patients, experts, and publics.  Katherine Pryal (2010), for example, 
has performed a rhetorical analysis, supported by insights from disability studies, an 
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autobiographical genre that she terms the “mood memoir.” In doing so, she collected and 
analyzed memoirs from several prominent public figures with Major Depressive Disorder to 
identify the rhetorical conventions employed therein, arguing that these conventions increased 
opportunities for the rhetorical participation of a population (those with mental disorders) that 
has historically been excluded from public forms of rhetorical engagement. In doing so, she 
echoes rhetorician Carolyn Miller’s (1984) claim that genre itself can constitute a form of social 
action.  
 Like Pryal’s genre analysis mentioned above, Jenell Johnson’s (2010) study of depression 
texts is informed by a blend of rhetorical theory and disability theory. Johnson analyzed the 
proliferation of texts—interview transcripts, press conference coverage, and news publications—
that cropped up in the wake of a political controversy known as the “Eagleton Affair.” At the 
center of the controversy was 1972 Vice Presidential candidate Terry Eagleton, who was asked 
to leave the McGovern Presidential campaign after it surfaced that he had been hospitalized more 
than once for Major Depressive Disorder. Through a rhetorical analysis of these texts, Jenell 
argues that stigma attaches to those with mental disorders in ways that produce an invisible but 
rhetorically disabling effect she calls “kakoethos” or bad character.  
 Rhetorical explorations of depression discourse are often critical of psychiatric 
knowledge, and seem to be operating from the sort of antipsychiatry position articulated by 
Thomas Szaz. Szaz—himself a psychiatrist with a psychoanalytic bent—is the author of a well-
known book, The Myth of Mental Illness (1961). A central argument in this book is that “mental” 
is ultimately a metaphor for the physical brain, and metaphors are not reflective of reality. (This 
is not just a rhetorical claim; it is also an ontological one.) As a metaphor, he argues, the 
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linguistic packaging of “mental” illness relieves diagnosticians of the need to provide evidence 
of physical corroboration for their diagnoses.  
 Operating from an arguably Szazian perspective, rhetorician Richard Vatz (2006) 
examined the rhetorical dynamics of Doug Duncan’s gubernatorial campaign in Maryland. 
Duncan had been performing well in the polls, and appeared a viable candidate, but dropped out 
of the race unexpectedly due to a diagnosis of depression. Because it was framed in the language 
of mental disorder, Vatz argues, there was no public pushback, and no one questioned the 
possible ulterior motives for the suspension of his campaign. From Vatz’s perspective, this was 
problematic because it is evidence that the public has uncritically incorporated psychiatric logics 
and vocabularies, with the consequence of infantilizing and de-responsibilizing subjects. In his 
view, problematic choices or behaviors fall beyond scrutiny when accounted for with the logic 
and language of mental disorder.  
 While Vatz is concerned that psychiatric rhetoric de-responsibilizes subjects, additional 
rhetorical scholarship on depression manifests the opposite concern: that the discourses of 
depression responsibilize subjects in accordance with neoliberal modes of governance. As one 
would imagine, this work draws heavily on Foucauldian insights on the productive nature of 
power. This scholarship is marked by concern for the ways in which depression functions as a 
gendered and gendering disorder, producing docile female bodies that eagerly and responsibly 
engage in self-governance. For example, Nicole Hurt (2007) rhetorically analyzed news-media 
coverage on the subject of depression, arguing that it tends to position women’s bodies as 
volatile and naturally inferior to men’s by, for example, continually emphasizing the “protective 
effect” of testosterone against depression. While this may be true, she argues that the continual 
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emphasis on the role of the hormonal supplants consideration of the social, economic, and 
political factors that may contribute to women’s disproportionate unhappiness.  
 Kimberly Emmons’ (2010) critical rhetorical analysis of a broad corpus of depression 
texts from 1995-2005 (including news stories, depression-oriented websites, direct-to-consumer 
ads, etc.) reaches a conclusion similar to Hurt’s: the dominant discourses of depression coheres 
into patterns that construct the sufferer as female. She argues that the language used to describe 
symptoms—for example, “excessive weepiness”—primes the public to think of depression as a 
femininely-coded illness. Like Pryal (2010), Emmons attends to the social functions of genres, in 
particular the genre of the “self-diagnostic quiz” for depression. She argues that these quizzes 
encourage a form of self-monitoring that she calls “self-doctoring”—a practice that entails 
interpreting one’s experience through the terms made available by Western biopsychiatry. Self-
doctoring, in her view, “orchestrates the submission of the self to medical and chemical 
interventions” (p. 159). In place of self-doctoring, she offers the alternative of “rhetorical self-
care,” which she sees as a rhetorical practice that involves a dialogic interaction between the 
patient and the discourses of medicine. Self-care involves the patient becoming something of a 
rhetorical critic of medical discourses, which Emmons believes will open patients’ rhetorical 
choices and allow them to construct a more complex identity in relation to the categories of 
health and illness.  
 Ann Cvetkovich (2012), a professor of English and Women’s and Gender Studies, has 
written a book on the subject of depression that resonates with the work of rhetorical critics 
mentioned above. Though her work is informed by affect theory rather than rhetorical theory, her 
argument echoes the shape of arguments produced by Emmons (2010) and Hurt (2007). Her 
book is part cultural critique and part memoir, and is intended to counter what she considers to 
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be a wave of “mainstream” depression memoirs that uncritically accept the terminology and 
logic of Western biomedicine, and, in her view ultimately endorse pharmaceutical intervention. 
She opens her book with an apologia (incidentally, a generic convention that Pryal [2010] 
identified in her analysis of “mood memoirs”) in which she discloses her motivations for writing 
a scholarly text about depression in the first-person. She states, “This is my version of a Prozac 
memoir, bad connotations included. But I want to write it precisely because I don’t believe in 
Prozac. No, I think it’s a scam…discussions about the biochemical causes of depression might be 
plausible, but I find them trivial…A drug that masks the symptoms of a response to a fucked-up 
world or fucked-up life doesn’t tell me anything” (p. 15). She goes on to interrogate the linkages 
between political realities and affective responses to those realities, concluding, similarly to Hurt 
(2007) and Emmons (2010), that, by framing depression as a medical disease we fail to account 
for the ways in which social and cultural conditions cultivate the bad “public feelings” we call 
depression. Her advice for depressed people is not to accept the neurochemical narrative of 
depression’s etiology, but to “keep moving” and “help people”—advice that, to some, “smacks 
of moralizing” (Zambreno, 2013).  
1.3.2 Sociology of Health and Illness and Medical Anthropology 
Sociologists of health and illness share many guiding assumptions and interests with rhetoricians 
of medicine. Sociologists of health and illness assume that “health” is not an objectively 
definable or measurable property like, for instance, height. The same holds true for “madness” or 
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“mental illness,” as Foucault famously argued.17 Rather, sociologists take “health” and its 
corresponding category of “illness” to be a historically, culturally, and geographically shifting 
package of symbols, metaphors, and practices. Sociologists of health and illness are particularly 
interested in the ways that health and illness are socially defined and enacted across space and 
time, and how these definitions and enactments are carried out through concrete practices and 
processes. For this reason, sociologists often attend more to institutional practices than do 
rhetoricians, whose tendency is to focus more on discursive practices.  
 Because of this abiding interest in concrete practices, sociologists of health and illness 
often conduct their research within the actual physical settings that house the 
objects/discourses/practices that interest them. Anselm Strauss, who pioneered research with 
Juliet Corbin (1988) on the practices by which chronic physical illnesses are managed, developed 
an adaptable approach called “grounded theory,” which has been influential within the field. This 
approach, in Baszanger’s (1998) words, acknowledges that “people’s processes for defining 
situations…precede the researcher’s entry into the field” and thus, “the researcher must work in 
the actual environments in which the actions occur, in ‘natural’ situations, to analytically relate 
participants’ perspectives to the environments through which they emerge” (p. 354). This 
approach also emphasizes the importance of facilitating emergence by not predetermining 
research questions or the modes of analysis in advance and by remaining interpretively flexible 
throughout the research process.  
                                                 
17 Foucault’s work has always been difficult to place, and the question of whether his books belong on the 
shelves that house philosophy, sociology, or literary criticism texts has no firm answer. The case could be 
made, however, that his hugely influential tomes Madness and Civilization (1964) and the Birth of the 
Clinic (1963) belong alongside other prominent texts within the sociology of health and illness. In 
Madness and Civilization, Foucault shows how there is no single, stable thing known as “madness”—just 
different ways of defining/confining the “mad” across time and space. In the latter, he famously coined 
the phrase “the medical gaze,” which he considered a new way of constructing an organizing knowledge 
about the body in the context of research medicine. 
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  Peter Conrad has arguably become one of the field’s most prominent sociologists of 
health and illness. His critique of “the medicalization of society” (2005) argues that many of the 
realms and activities of everyday life that used to be thought of as “normal” or “expected” or 
perhaps even “natural” (all loaded terms, of course), are increasingly being folded into the 
jurisdiction of medicine. While sociologist Eliot Freidson (1970) identified medicine as one of 
the most autonomous professions, Conrad says that the medicalization of society should not be 
solely, or even primarily, attributed to the activities of medical practitioners. Instead, 
advancements in biotechnology, the broader push toward the commercialization of healthcare, 
and the desires of “consumers” themselves must be accounted for as prime contributors to 
medicalization processes.  
 Emily Martin (2007) and Annemarie Mol (2002) work within an adjacent field, medical 
anthropology. Their work has provided “praxiographically” thick descriptions of two subjects of 
interest: the cultural meanings of bipolar disorder, and the clinical management of 
atherosclerosis, respectively. Martin’s work shows that, as bipolar diagnoses have skyrocketed, 
public attention has tended to focus on the disorder’s depressive episodes, but not its manic 
episodes. This might make sense, she thinks, considering that depression is related to 
unproductivity and mania to productivity; thus, she reads the cultural symbols that attach to 
bipolar disorder within the context of an advanced capitalist society that has a vested interest in 
maintaining the economic productivity of its members. Meanwhile, based on her research of the 
practices by which atherosclerosis is diagnosed and managed, Mol argues that there no single 
thing callled “atherosclerosis.” Rather, there are multiple ontologies of atherosclerosis that come 
into being based on the ways that the disease is “enacted” across different sites of practice. 
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Atherosclerosis, she suggests, is one thing in the physician’s office, another in the surgical ward, 
and another still in the laboratory.   
 Like atherosclerosis, depression has also been defined as multiple in both ontological and 
epistemological terms. Focusing on diagnosis and treatment of depression in Finnish medical 
practice, sociologist Ilpo Helén (2007) contends that treatment of depression is complicated by 
the fact that depression is a “multiple object.” She states that, “Depression as a mental disorder is 
a composite of parallel but divergent facts and definitions due to the dispersion of professional 
and public settings where mental health is discussed and taken care of” (p. 150). Ilka Kangas 
(2001) also a sociologist, echoes Helén’s (2007) formulation of depression as multiple, stating 
that, “Whereas the etiology and causes of depression are contested and complex within the field 
of disciplines, the lay explanations, perceptions, and theories likewise express this multiplicity 
and reflection” (p. 89). In a similar vein, anthropologist Joseph Dumit (2003) has argued that 
even the most “objective” components of depression—specifically, visual images of brain scans 
suggestive of depression—leave space for a multiplicity of interpretations. He concludes that 
there is far more flexibility to negotiate so-called “received-facts” (such as brain scans 
interpreted by clinicians) about the “objective-self” (the material brain and body) than one might 
think, stating that, “Even in the face of received-facts about ourselves such as brain images, there 
is room for negotiation and redefinition” (p. 44).  
 Renata Kokanovic et al. (2013) explore the multiplicity of ways in which primary care 
patients diagnosed with depression redefine and negotiate the meanings of their diagnosed 
illness. Given the shift toward patient-centeredness—an approach to medical care that 
emphasizes heterogeneity—Kokanovic et al. argue that understanding the divergent ways in 
which people think and talk through depression is a particularly salient aim. They identify three 
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ways in which primary care patients think and talk about depression: through explanatory 
models, through explanatory maps, and through illness narratives. Patients using explanatory 
models tend to utilize a single-cause logic that identifies “chemical imbalances” as the 
underlying etiology of depression.18 Patients using explanatory maps tend to convey uncertainty 
about the cause(s) of depression, often discussing multiple possible causes at once, going from 
one to the next in a meandering fashion. Patients using illness narratives situate their illness 
within the context of their social and personal life circumstances. Patients in primary care 
settings, the authors conclude, frequently blend elements of all three together in an effort to 
contextualize their depression diagnoses.  
1.3.3 Narrative Medicine 
Narrative medicine is an interdisciplinary field in which one finds the work of sociologists of 
health and illness, such as Arthur Frank, medical anthropologists, such as Arthur Kleinman, and 
rhetoricians of medicine, such as Judy Segal. Narrative medicine is a field built on the 
recognition that narratives are, in Kenneth Burke’s (1941) words, “equipment for living” (p. 
293). We live with stories and through them, these authors suggest. They serve as both “a mode 
of reasoning and a mode of representation” (Richardson, 1990, p. 132). As a mode of reasoning, 
narratives help make sense of the complex and fluid relationship between ourselves and the 
world around us. As a mode of representation, we use narratives to relay our understandings to 
others. This field frequently acknowledges that narratives have a strong rhetorical element: we 
18 The authors explain that “models” for conceptualizing illness have largely fallen out of favor in 
sociology, given that they are static, tend to emphasize singular causes, and convey health beliefs as fixed 
rather than flexible.  
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use them to persuade ourselves of the kind of people we are, and we use them to relay this 
understanding to others in a fashion that (we hope) they will find persuasive. Walter Fisher 
(1984) argues that narratives are just as persuasive as a strong logical argument, if not more so, a 
claim which pushes back against some social scientific views of humans as rational decision 
makers. This does not imply that all narratives are persuasive, of course; some will lack what 
Fisher calls “narrative fidelity” and, as a result, will fail to “ring true” to an audience.  
 The field of narrative medicine gained strong momentum in the 1990s, thanks in no small 
part to the efforts of bioethicists and physicians who believe that narrative competence is a 
crucial component of quality doctoring. The prominence of patient narratives has been 
considered a means for rebalancing the quantitative impulses of Western biomedicine with an 
impulse that is more humanistic (Keränen, 2014). Physician Rita Charon (2006), for example, 
argues that doctors must learn to listen to patients’ narratives as intently as they listen to 
descriptions of their symptoms; doing so, she suggests, would increase the quality of medical 
care that physicians are able to deliver to their patients. Taking patient narratives seriously does 
not only increase the quality of medical care, as scholars within the field suggest. For many, it 
can also serve a therapeutic function; Arthur Kleinman (1988) and Arthur Frank (1996) have 
both claimed that an emphasis on these narratives place patients back into the narrative centers of 
their own experiences.  
 At a time when patient narratives are increasingly celebrated for their medical and 
therapeutic functions, it is important to note that patients do not fashion their narratives of illness 
out of thin air; they draw on dominant narrative frameworks. Frank (1995) typologizes three 
such frameworks in his widely cited book, The Wounded Storyteller. The first framework houses 
what he calls “restitution narratives,” which tend to detail the author’s journey from illness back 
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to health, ultimately emphasizing the restorability of health. The second framework comprises 
what Frank terms “quest narratives,” which are similar to restitution narratives, but tend to 
emphasize the changes one undergoes in the face of suffering (insights gained, skins thickened, 
appreciation for life enhanced, etc.) rather than the restorability of health. The third and final 
framework includes what Frank labels “chaos narratives.” These are the rarest narrative form, 
according to Frank. Chaos narratives are devoid of typical narrative structure and coherence; 
they signal pain and confusion, and are often uncomfortable for audiences, who sometimes 
subtly nudge the speaker to reformulate their story within one of the other two frameworks.  
 An appreciation for patient narratives might well help to humanize medical practice, but 
they are not a panacea, so cautions Judy Segal (2005). She notes the way that mainstream 
narratives of breast cancer (sometimes referred to as “pathographies”) serve a particular 
epideictic function, as they consistently celebrate and reaffirm certain cultural values. Commonly 
reaffirmed values in these particular narratives include unrelenting optimism, good humor, and 
courage in the midst of struggle—sometimes, she notes, the embraced value seems to be that of 
struggle itself. Not only do illness narratives serve an epideictic function, Segal argues, so too 
does the wide-scale embrace of illness narratives in and of itself. The continually reaffirmed 
value is that of narrative coherence, she argues, and this might not always be empowering for 
patients or conducive to quality medial care. When patients feel enjoined to construct a coherent 
story of their illness, Segal notes, they may feel constrained from understanding their illness in 
other, non-narrative ways. In addition, she worries about the extent to which the championing of 
personal narratives of illness is potentially depoliticizing, given that their focus is on individual 
experiences of illness rather than, for example, structural causes of illness.   
 
39 
1.4  METHODS 
Online health communities are characterized by a blend of stability and fluidity, and the methods 
that this dissertation uses to analyze interactions in these communities are blended as well. The 
stability of online communities stems from the fact that they house what is essentially an archive 
of messages: one can typically search specific topics, authors, or messages posted, both from the 
recent and distant past. In this sense, the context for interaction is shaped prior to a new user’s 
entrance: whether creating a new thread or responding to an existing one, the user cannot simply 
repeat or ignore what already been said (Segal, 2009). The fluidity of these communities stem 
from the fact that, each time a new post appears, the context for interaction is reshaped going 
forward, becoming part of what the next incoming user finds.  
This dissertation utilizes generative rhetorical criticism, coupled with methodological 
insights from grounded theory approaches to interpretive textual analysis. Because this 
dissertation regards online health interactions as instances of persuasive discourse—with the 
power to shape and reshape the perspectives of those who post and encounter them—generative 
rhetorical criticism was chosen with the hopes of providing an account of the persuasive element 
present in these texts. The volume of textual data analyzed here motivated the choice of 
grounded theory as a methodological complement, since grounded theory offers a systematic 
method for working through text, line-by-line. These two methods furnish the researcher with 
flexible sets of methodological principles rather than firm procedural prescriptions, and are well 
suited to one another because both “focus on words, phrases, and sentences as units of analysis” 
(Gardner, 2011, p. 292).  
Generative rhetorical criticism is an adaptable approach that does not begin with a pre-
formed question or unit of analysis. Rather, it begins with encountering a “curious” text or 
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collection of texts that intrigue the critic, though at this point the critic is likely unable to 
articulate precisely what it is about the text that intrigues them. The critic then engages in 
“broad-brush coding” that involves observing and recording the major features of the artifact(s); 
“major” features are those that appear with the greatest frequency or strongest intensity (Foss, 
2004). After observing these so-called major features, the critic develops a coding process (for 
instance, grouping similar-seeming things together into categories) that will aid in the process of 
interpretation. Ideally, this coding process ends up being quite generative in and of itself: by 
organizing and naming categories in a particular way, the critic gains insight into the persuasive 
function(s) of the texts at hand.  
 In addition to generative rhetorical criticism, this dissertation derives methodological 
insights from grounded theory approaches to interpretive textual analysis. Like generative 
rhetorical criticism, grounded theory aims at facilitating emergence throughout the research 
process. Researchers do not impose rigid preexisting questions or theoretical structures on the 
data they study; instead they work through their data inductively, “coding” for recurring thematic 
concepts, gathering new data as needed, and refining thematic codes as appropriate. During this 
process, the research question or problem is continually refined, with the ultimate aim of 
developing an original theory that richly contextualizes the social phenomenon at hand.  
 Though both grounded theorists and generative rhetorical critics try not to form inflexible 
questions or preconceived notions about their data, they do not approach their data empty-
handed. They inevitably bring their own ways of seeing with them, including their “guiding 
interests, sensitizing concepts, and disciplinary perspectives” (Charmaz, 2006, p. 30).  Kenneth 
Burke (1966) might have collectively termed these interests, concepts, and perspectives a 
“terministic screen,” which he defines as a sort of grid of intelligibility that is, “composed of 
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terms through which humans perceive the world, and that directs attention away from some 
interpretations and toward others” (p. 45). Ideally, a terministic screen functions more as a point 
of departure than a strict line of demarcation in the context of interpretive analysis. Furthermore, 
neither grounded theorists nor generative rhetorical critics imply that the analysis process 
somehow makes the meaning of texts “transparent”; they are enjoined to view these meanings as 
situated. Thus, both methods stress that theorists/critics are obliged to be reflexive about what 
they see, and how they see it.  
1.4.1 Data Collection  
The data analyzed in this dissertation consist of extant texts. Unlike elicited texts, the researcher 
plays no role in the construction of extant texts. Researchers examine extant texts “as data to 
address their research questions although these texts were produced for other—often very 
different—purposes” (Charmaz, 2006, p. 6). Researchers sometimes prefer to work with extant 
texts because collecting these texts is less obtrusive when compared to elicited texts. This is 
especially true of extant Internet-based texts, which are easily accessible and unobtrusively 
gathered. While extant Internet-based texts have the advantage of accessibility, they bring them 
methodological and ethical concerns that are as-of-yet unsettled in qualitative Internet research 
scholarship.  
The methodological concerns regarding the study of extant Internet-based texts have to 
do primarily with questions of contexts, or, more specifically, the common lack of context. 
Whereas researchers working with elicited texts typically have in-depth knowledge of their 
participants’ social identities (age, socioeconomic status, racial and ethnic background, gender, 
geographic location, and so on), Internet-based texts generally come with this social information, 
and even when it is provided or implied, the researcher has no foolproof way of ascertaining its 
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accuracy. For a rhetorical critic, the fact that these posts typically appear without social 
information (age, geography, gender, racial background, etc.) arguably contributes to the 
rhetoricity of the posts themselves. Put another way, the “disembodied” nature of these posts 
need not be considered a detriment to the study, but could be regarded instead as an aspect of the 
posts’ rhetorical character. In fact, it is possible that the lack of socially identifying information 
actually increases the identifiability of such posts because readers may be able to “see 
themselves” in other users’ descriptions of experience regardless of whether their social 
identities match up similarly to the author’s. 
 In addition to methodological concerns, there are also ethical concerns regarding the use 
of extant Internet-based texts in academic research. Several concepts are key to understanding 
the debate about the use of these texts in academic research. The first concept is that of a “human 
subject”—a term that has a long history in discussions of research ethics, and which originated in 
medical research contexts, not humanities or social science research contexts. As scholars 
writing on behalf of the Association of Internet Researchers (AoIR) point out, the term has 
frequently “been criticized for being ill-suited to models of inquiry that follow non-biomedical 
procedures for interacting with people or don’t interact directly with people at all, for example, 
studying published texts” (Markham & Buchanan, 2012, p. 6).  When researchers analyze pre-
existing, publically viewable discourse online, it could be argued that they are interacting with 
“data” or “discourse” but not with “human subjects” per se.  
 The second relevant concept in the world of Internet-based research ethics has to do with 
the distinction between public and private, a distinction that becomes particularly germane when 
researchers work with “open-access” texts, as I do in this dissertation. (“Open-access” typically 
refers to content that is not password protected.) While it has long been legally permissible for 
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researchers to observe others’ “public behavior” without announcing their presence as 
researchers, questions continue to be raised about whether it is ethically permissible to do so in 
Internet-based contexts. In a 2013 document outlining recommendations for best research 
practices, the US Secretary Advisory Committee on Human Research Protections (SACHRP) 
explains that researchers’ observations of “public behavior” have long been excluded from 
regulatory oversight of any kind, which raises the question of what counts as “public behavior” 
in Internet-based contexts. The SACHRP explains that “public behavior” should exclude any 
behavior that a person reasonably expects not to be observed or recorded; they suggest that 
posting in an open-access forum counts as public behavior, especially because archived posts are 
ipso facto recorded. Overall, the general consensus is that open, non-password protected forums 
are public spaces and should be contextualized as such in the context of academic research 
(Gronning, 2015).  
 Despite the fact that observation of public behavior is excluded from institutional 
oversight, researchers using open-access Internet-based texts are obliged to engage with the third 
relevant concept, which is “harm.” It is generally accepted that researchers have the obligation 
not to engage in research that poses substantial harm to others, and that they ought to do what 
they can to minimize the possibility of harm. Gronning (2015) explains that competing 
obligations are often at play when conceptualizing harm in academic research. On the one hand, 
the researcher has an ethical obligation not to engage in research activity that is likely to cause 
harm to subjects. On the other hand, the researcher has a social and institutional obligation to 
produce strong research that advances knowledge. Given these competing obligations, some 
researchers using publically available Internet texts take the precautionary step of announcing 
their presence in discussion forums or other online spaces. Others go even further and seek 
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informed consent from discussion forum participants when it is feasible to do so.  Such 
approaches seek to minimize harm by erring on the side of transparency. However, the 
“transparency” approach is not without possible harm: as Gronning (2015) explains, a 
researcher’s announcement of presence and purpose can induce anxiety and disrupt ongoing 
social norms in the online contexts they seek to study. Thus, a researcher has to assess the 
likelihood and magnitude of harm caused by announcing one’s presence, as well as the 
likelihood and magnitude of harm caused by not announcing one’s presence.  
 The decision about whether or not to announce one’s presence and/or seek informed 
consent is ultimately contextual and depends upon consideration of a number of factors including 
the online community’s general perceptions of privacy, its stated rules for engagement, and the 
researcher’s aims (Eysenbach & Till, 2001; Garcia et al., 2009; Giles & Newbold, 2011). It can 
be difficult to ascertain whether a community thinks of its activity as unfolding in a “private 
room” or a “public space,” but a few factors suggest that the community might think of itself 
more as a “private room”: the requirement of registration/membership to view content, a very 
limited number of members, and codified group norms that signal an expectation of privacy 
(Eysenbach & Till, 2001). Some sites’ terms of use specifically state that researchers are not 
welcome to lurk. The online communities selected for inclusion in this dissertation exhibited 
none of these cues. However, one community, PsychForums.com, stated in its terms of service 
that all content on the site should be considered in the same regard as Letters to the Editor, for 
which the newspaper owns the copyright.  
 Furthermore, Giles and Newbold (2011) suggest that the decision of whether to announce 
one’s presence and/or seek informed consent should be based, to some extent, on the aims of the 
researcher. If the researcher is invested in advocating for a particular group, and thus intends to 
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speak “on behalf” of this group in some way, then the researcher may feel more obliged to 
announce her presence. If the researcher’s aim is to merely make broad observations about 
discursive trends, then the ethical concerns associated with not announcing one’s presence may 
be less prominent when weighed against the methodological concerns associated with 
announcing one’s presence, including, most pressingly, the potential disruption of the group’s 
ongoing communicative practices.    
   This dissertation analyzed preexisting open-access Internet texts (in this case, non-
password protected posts in publically viewable online health communities), a research activity 
understood to be exempt from institutional oversight. However, I could have opted to announce 
my presence or seek informed consent, which I debated doing. In the end, I did not announce my 
presence as a researcher, and I did not seek informed consent. This decision had to do mostly 
with the infeasibility of tracking down the authors of the analyzed posts. At the time of data 
collection, I set my temporal boundaries to include posts from a ten-year period spanning from 
2005-2015. Given that the majority of included posts were at least several years old by the time 
of data collection, seeking informed consent would have been very difficult, if not impossible. 
This problem was especially pressing given that most community members were inactive by the 
time I observed their postings.  
 While this dissertation project is exempted from institutional oversight given that it 
analyzes pre-existing, open-access texts, I still considered the possibility of harm. The SACHRP 
(2013) guidelines for ethical research recommend that the researcher consider both the likelihood 
and magnitude of harm posed by their research project. For example a high-magnitude harm, 
such as the revelation of personally identifying information that could lead to identify theft, 
criminal or civil liability, should be cause for concern even if the probability of occurrence is 
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low. This dissertation arguably poses a low probability of harm. First, all users’ information had 
been anonymized by online health communities in which users participated, thus posing minimal 
risk for personally identifying information. Second, I took additional steps to increase 
anonymity, including not revealing usernames or the URLs of posts, though the inclusion of both 
are recommended by APA citation guidelines. It bears mentioning that one of the three online 
health communities from which data was gathered is no longer visible; it underwent a “freeze” in 
2015 and posts are no longer accessible. With regard to the two other online health communities 
from which data was gathered, I copied and pasted long blocks of quoted text from included 
posts into a Google search engine to ascertain whether doing so leads back to the original URLs. 
This search experiment failed to link copied text back to the original posts.  
 In conceptualizing the methods of this dissertation, I considered the ethical concerns 
discussed above from a rhetorical perspective. A rhetorical critic might argue that all open-access 
Internet texts fall squarely in the space of public discourse and all instances of public discourse 
are potentially persuasive (Segal, 2009). These texts do not emerge out of this air; they are 
fashioned out of available cultural knowledge and thus offer insight into the particularities of that 
cultural knowledge. Furthermore, a rhetorician might treat the accounts of illness that circulate in 
online health communities not only as descriptive accounts (that answer the question of what it is 
like to live under a particular diagnosis) but also as prescriptive accounts (that answer the 
question of how one ought to live under a particular diagnosis). Such texts, then, are not simply 
amenable to rhetorical criticism, their persuasive potential calls for it, especially at a time when 
evermore people seek and shape health information online.   
 The data analyzed in this dissertation consist of publically viewable, extant Internet texts 
found in three online health communities organized around the category of dysthymia. These 
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communities were identified through an open search for the terms “dysthymia” and “group.” 
Any sites produced by this search that had password-protected content, or that required site 
membership to view posts, were excluded. (Sites were not excluded if they required site 
membership to add a new post, however.) Thus, all data analyzed in this dissertation falls 
squarely within the public domain. These three communities are housed at PsychForums.com, 
MDJunction.com, and ExperienceProject.com. A brief description of each follows below. 
 The first site, PsychForums.com describes itself as a “Psychology and Mental Health 
Forum.” At the bottom of its home page, the following statistics are listed: 185,314 members, 
171,085 total topics, and 2,020,212 total posts. This site houses multiple subforums organized 
around the following categories: General, Abuse, Anxiety, Developmental, Cognitive, 
Dissociative, Eating, Factitious, Impulse-Control, Mood, Personality, Psychotic, Sexual, Sleep, 
Somatoform, Addictions, Therapy, and General Health. Within the category of “Mood” one finds 
four forums: Bipolar Disorder, Seasonal Affective Disorder, Clinical Depression and Postpartum 
Depression. The “Clinical Depression” forum is where one finds the subforum for Dysthymia 
(which, as of 2018, still goes by its DSM-IV term rather than the DSM-5 term PDD). Its linkage 
to any official sponsors is not evident. There are no visible sidebar advertisements at the present 
time (2018), though there is a link to donate, and a link to advertise on the site. On the site, one 
finds a page that lists the “Forum Rules.” One section of the rule page states that the following 
are prohibited: “Posts that advise any member or people in general not to take medication 
prescribed by a licensed physician or not to follow any other advice given by a licensed 
physician or other mental health professional; Posts that attempt to diagnose any member or to 
dispute a diagnosis given to a member by a qualified mental health professional; presenting 
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yourself or your opinions in any kind of professional capacity.” Despite these admonitions, I 
found that it is common practice for users to suggest diagnoses to another.  
 The second site, MDJunction.com, describes itself as “a meeting place for people who 
deal with health challenges.” The site’s “About” page states that it was created in 2006, and is 
now home to more than 800 online support groups that were visited by more than 16,000,000 
people in the last year. A bit of information about the site’s genesis is included: “We were 
inspired to start a Patient Empowering Network by Dalia Eliezer, a strong and unique woman 
who touched us with her vigorous fight against breast cancer. Her story and the supporting 
family beside her have brought MDJunction to life.” Clicking on the “Support Topics” page will 
take you to a list of 27 topics ranging from skin and hair, to women’s health, to infectious 
diseases. “Dysthymia” can be found among the 104 subtopics listed under the category “Mental 
Health.” The page for dysthymia is described as “a community of patients, family members, and 
friends dedicated to dealing with Dysthymia, together.” Like the first site, this site shows no 
evidence of sponsorship ties and there are no visible advertisements.  
 The last site, ExperienceProject.com stands in contrast to the former two. Unlike the two 
above, this particular site was not exclusively organized around issues pertaining to physical and 
mental health. The site, which describes its purpose as “social networking,” states that it was 
initially created as an online community for people with multiple sclerosis, but soon expanded to 
include other diseases, and from there, branched out to include various social experiences (like 
divorce, for example). The site’s Facebook page claims that over 70 million “experiences” have 
been shared on the site between its creation in 2007 and its “freeze” in 2016. At that point, it was 
announced that the site was taking a break in order to “figure out a future path forward.” Logins 
were frozen, and no new memberships could be created. Up until March of 2018, the site and all 
  49 
its related content remained visible, but at present (April 2018) the site’s URL redirects users to a 
mostly blank page explaining that the site is currently “taking a break”. Luckily, data collection 
and analysis for this dissertation had been completed well before the site underwent its 
supposedly temporary “freeze.”   
 Data collection occurred between December of 2014 and June of 2015. In the process of 
collection, I elected to sample posts from the ten-year period that spans from 2005-2015. That 
some of these posts are now more than a decade old, and that one of the sites that housed them 
now appears defunct, need not be considered a limitation of the study. Rather, part of the value 
of this analysis is that it offers insight into the particularities of a specific period in time—a 
period that is on the heels of several particularly salient cultural and pharmacological 
developments. For one, the 1990s—proclaimed by then-President George H.W. Bush as the 
“Decade of the Brain—ushered in a new scientific and cultural interest in all things “neuro,” that 
shows no signs of abating. Secondly, the first selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor—Prozac 
(fluoxetine)—was approved for the treatment of depression in 1987, and generic versions 
became available in 2001. The result, according to Horwitz & Wakefield (2007) was a 
pharmaceutical and cultural sea change. Public discussion of depression surged during this time 
period (Emmons, 2010), and so too, of course, did prescriptions for antidepressants. Lastly, 
online communities in general, and online health communities in particular, moved into 
mainstream Internet culture during this time.  
 This textual corpus gathered from these communities, from between 2004-2014, totals 
86,246 words, consisting of 469 posts (including both thread-initiating posts and replies), 
50 
authored by 207 unique posters.19 Each line of this textual data was subjected to line-by-line 
coding between the months of June 2015 to September 2015. During this time, three broad 
themes emerged that later formed the chapter structure of this dissertation, and which is 
previewed below.  
1.5  CHAPTER PREVIEWS 
Chapter 2, “Ambiguity, Agency, and the Fitting Room,” begins by providing a brief rhetorical 
history of the construction of dysthymia as diagnostic classification in the context of the years 
leading up to the publication of the 1980 DSM-III. In doing so, this chapter departs from 
rhetorical scholarship on the relationship between depression and ambiguity, which has tended to 
identify the pharmaceutical industry as the primary engine driving depression’s definitional 
ambiguity (Emmons, 2010; Segal, 2005). This chapter suggests that, in the case of dysthymia, 
strategic definitional ambiguity was useful for smoothing the institutional tensions between 
biological psychiatrists and psychoanalysts that had flared throughout the construction of the 
paradigm-shifting DSM-III.  
This chapter then examines how dysthymia’s definitional ambiguity is harnessed as a 
rhetorical resource in the context of online health interactions. In doing so, it finds that elements 
of psychoanalytic and biopsychiatric explanations of dysthymia blend together in these online 
health interactions. This blending of paradigms provides a useful strategy for navigating the 
19 APA citation guidelines for Online Forums/Discussion Board postings recommend including the 
author’s user name, title of message, date, and URL where the message is archived. In this dissertation, I 
have omitted user names and the URLs. I have included the title of the message, the date, and the site to 
which the message was posted (not the URL where the message is archived).  
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subject of agency as it pertains to questions of dysthymia’s causality and treatment. Using 
Kenneth Burke’s conceptual pairing of symbolic action/nonsymbolic motion, this section of the 
chapter observes that when people frame dysthymia’s causality in psychoanalytic terms, they 
tend to renounce individual agency, and when they frame dysthymia’s treatment in 
biopsychiatric terms, they tend to reclaim individual agency. 
 Lastly, this chapter offers the metaphor of “fitting rooms” for conceptualizing online 
health communities in which the informal self-diagnosis of dysthymia appears to be a common 
aim. Rather than metaphorizing these spaces as “waiting rooms”—in which people bide their 
time until they can visit a mental health practitioner and obtain formal diagnosis—this chapter 
suggests that they might function more akin to “fitting rooms.” This metaphor is apt for several 
reasons, the first being online health community members’ frequent mentions of how well they 
“fit” into the label of dysthymia, or, alternately, how well the label of dysthymia “fit” them. 
Additional reasons for suggesting this metaphor include the fact that online health community 
members, like patrons of clothing store fitting rooms, often tried on more than one diagnostic 
label, solicited feedback from others about how well the labels “fit,” and also appeared not to 
want to leave the fitting room “empty-handed” (that is, without a presumed diagnosis). The 
chapter concludes by suggesting that this particular metaphor may be especially apt in an era of 
commercialized health care, wherein mental health diagnoses are likened to commodities 
(Esposito & Perez, 2014).  
 Chapter 3, “Coming to Terms with Temporality,” contributes to the body of scholarship 
that addresses the temporal dimensions of chronic illness accounts. While this body of literature 
has thus far focused primarily on the temporal dimensions of accounts of chronic physical 
illness, this chapter suggests that it is likewise important to attend to the temporalizing of chronic 
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mental illness accounts. After pulling from several bodies of literature to establish the claim that 
ways of thinking about time guide the construction of illness narratives and conceptualizations of 
agency therein, this chapter examines the temporalizing of accounts of dysthymia in online 
health communities.  
 This chapter finds that people in online health communities do not describe the subjective 
experience of dysthymia as particularly problematic in the immediate present; rather, they often 
explain that dysthymia’s intolerability stems from recollecting the ways in which the disorder 
has tainted one’s past, and from anticipating the ways in which it will continue to taint one’s 
future. In short, this chapter suggests that the temporal perspectives that structure online accounts 
of dysthymia are marked by temporal expansion, rather than the temporal contraction (e.g. 
“living one day at a time”) that has been observed in accounts of chronic physical illness 
(Charmaz, 1992). This chapter dubs these temporally expansive accounts “panoramic temporal 
perspectives.”   
 This chapter goes on to suggest that panoramic temporal perspectives have a certain 
utility in dysthymia online health communities, given that these stretched-out temporal 
perspectives enable a process relevant to the communities’ aims, which this chapter terms 
“retrospective identification.” This chapter defines retrospective identification as a process 
through which the onset of dysthymia and contextual features related to its onset are identified. 
Through this process, things that one previously considered “just part of my personality”—say, 
gloominess or pessimism—are recontextualized and appropriated as evidence of chronic mood 
disorder. After describing how the past is configured in panoramic temporal accounts, the 
chapter turns to the question of how panoramic temporal perspectives seem to shape 
understandings of the future. While the sort of temporal contraction found in chronic physical 
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illness accounts tend to confer a sense of agency in the face of uncertain future (Charmaz, 1992; 
2006), this chapter considers that panoramic temporal perspectives may function in the inverse: 
that is, they might have the effect of attenuating the an author’s felt sense of agency as it pertains 
to the future. 
 Chapter 4, “The Trouble with “Mild” Depression and the Contraction of Normality,” 
contextualizes the DSM-5 revision process that resulted in dysthymia’s label death and 
replacement with a freshly crafted diagnosis, Persistent Depressive Disorder (PDD). This 
revision process was unique in that the American Psychological Association, for the first time in 
its history, invited the “general public” to view and comment on its diagnostic criteria drafts. 
This chapter situated this unprecedented move by putting into conversation two contrasting 
perspectives—one from a rhetorician of medicine and one from a philosopher of science. The 
former suggests that the public played no meaningful role in the revision process, since the APA 
crafted the “subject positions” for the general public to inhabit (thus, the APA was producing its 
own feedback rather than discovering the public’s); the latter suggests that the general public had 
already been playing a non-trivial role in all DSM revision processes due to the interactive, 
looping nature of psychiatric classifications.  
 After contextualizing the DSM-5 revision process, this chapter explores community 
responses to the “label death” of dysthymia, and finds that its death was regarded favorably. This 
was not surprising given how frequently and intensely community members voiced 
dissatisfaction with the label of dysthymia in their posts. Much of this dissatisfaction, the chapter 
finds, stems from the disorder’s designation as “mild,” especially when compared against its 
nosological counterpart, Major Depressive Disorder. This section of the chapter contemplates 
how being diagnosed with a “mild” mood disorder occasions a rhetorical dilemma of sorts: if 
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individuals do not emphasize the severity of their symptoms, they risk being interpreted by 
others as “normal” people, yet if they overemphasize their symptoms, they risk being perceived 
as malingerers, prone to hyperbolic descriptions of suffering.  
 This chapter goes on to identify several strategies that people in online health 
communities employ that seem to contend with the rhetorical dilemma described above. The first 
involves reframing individual success as something that occurs because of, rather than despite, 
dysthymia (the logic being that work/school/etc. give people a means to distract themselves from 
their symptoms). The second strategy involves highlighting the features of dysthymia that make 
it uniquely intolerable, including, in particular, its liminality (given that it is conceptually situated 
in between “normality” and major affective disorder). This liminality, users agued, limits 
opportunities for support and understanding, both from people with more “severe” mood 
disorders, and from those without mood disorders. The third strategy involves deploying 
particularly narrow conceptions of “normal,” such that “normal” becomes more sharply distinct 
from the experience of dysthymia. The chapter ends by meditating upon the possible 
implications entailed by contractions of normality, and points to indications that contractions in 
the meanings of normality are not confined to dysthymia online health communities.  
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2.0  AMBIGUITY, AGENCY, AND THE FITTING ROOM 
[I]nstead of considering it our task to “dispose of” any ambiguity by merely
disclosing the fact that it is an ambiguity, we rather consider it our task to study
and clarify the resources of ambiguity. For in the course of this work, we shall
deal with many kinds of transformation—and it is in the areas of ambiguity that
transformation takes place; in fact, without such areas, transformation would be
impossible.
–Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives
Throughout the 19th century, lucidity and precision were regarded as hallmarks of superior 
spoken and written expression. Ambiguity, that quality of language that resists clarity and grants 
“multiple plausible interpretations or explanations” was therefore seen as a stylistic flaw to be 
avoided or remedied (Olson, 2001, p. 26). Attitudes toward ambiguity warmed in the 20th 
century, especially for those whose rhetorical sensibilities skewed sophistic, including, notably, 
Kenneth Burke. Burke viewed ambiguity—in both its symbolic and experiential forms—not as 
undesirable but as an inevitable, unresolvable aspect of human life that takes center stage when 
paradoxes in lived experience give rise to, and are mirrored by, paradoxes in language (or vice 
versa). One such paradox that held Burke’s fascination was what he called the “ambiguity of 
substance.” This paradox concerns the most basic function of language—naming—and its nature 
is reflected in our paradoxical usage of term “substance” itself. Burke noted that when the 
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“substance” of a thing is the subject (another member of the “sub” word family) of discussion, 
the discussion typically centers on the qualities considered most essential or intrinsic to the 
thing; these qualities are what make the thing itself and not something else. And yet in an 
etymologically traceable and literal sense “substance” denotes the contextual, extrinsic elements 
that underlie and are supportive of the thing: the thing’s sub-stance. For Burke, every human 
attempt to define a substance, to enclose it, to trace its borders, involves a simultaneous and 
subtle shifting of focus onto that which the thing is not.20 This “unresolvable ambiguity” stems 
from the fact that “no two things or acts or situations are exactly alike,” and that each object, act, 
or situation stands as both “a part of” and “apart from” its broader context (Burke, 1945, p. xix).  
 While the human preoccupation with categorizing is thought to reveal a desire to clarify 
the ambiguities that permeate human experience, Burke believed that the resolution of 
                                                 
20 Burke is not the only or first to observe that no substance can be considered “in itself.” He notes that, 
for Spinoza, “each single object in the universe is “defined” (determined, limited, bounded) by the others 
things that surround it,” (1945, p. 25). Given the contextual character of language, it has been argued that 
every act of definition entails negation, because to designate what something is, is to simultaneously 
designate what it is not. Parallels have been drawn between Burke’s approach to the ambiguity of 
substance and Derrida’s work on what he called the “undecideability” of language. McClure and Cabral 
(2009) explain that, for Derrida, undecideability does not stem from the ambiguity or instability of any 
single term in a language, but rather stems from the totality of our language systems, and the way that 
each signifier within this system finds its meaning through its connection to/difference from other terms. 
If any given term only acquires meaning through its difference from other terms, then there is no stable 
groundwork signifier from which to pin down the precise meanings of other terms, just a mass of 
“irreducible otherness” that “prevents any totalizing or idealizing within the system” (p. 27). Where 
Burke’s work departs from Spinoza’s or Derrida’s is that its focus is on the pragmatic and rhetorical 
implications of ambiguity; he was fascinated by how ambiguity motivates and shapes the rhetorical 
processes by which humans come to form (and reform) their understandings of reality.  
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ambiguity, even if possible, would be undesirable. 21  This is because it is partly the impossibility 
of escaping ambiguity, in all its forms, that fuels rhetorical invention: if subjects under 
deliberation manifested crisply in shades of black and white rather than muddy greys, what need 
would there be for persuasion in the first place? Furthermore, since no two individuals interpret 
or respond to symbols in precisely the same way, the argument has been made that “all symbolic 
strategies, however subtly, trade on ambiguity to perform persuasive work” (Olson, 2001, p. 29). 
Thus, having taken as given the necessity of ambiguity for rhetoric, Burke (1945) avowed that 
what rhetoricians want “is not terms that avoid ambiguity, but terms that clearly reveal the 
strategic spots at which ambiguities necessarily arise...Instead of considering it our task to 
dispose of any ambiguity by merely disclosing the fact that it is an ambiguity, we consider it our 
task to study and clarity the resources of ambiguity. For in the course of this work we shall deal 
with many kinds of transformation—and it is in the areas of ambiguity that transformation takes 
place” (p. xvii-xix). Rhetoricians, then, seek not necessarily to merely identify and/or reduce 
ambiguity where it exists, but to contemplate how ambiguity is harnessed as a generative 
rhetorical resource.  
 It is the rhetorical productivity of ambiguity that makes depression, or, more specifically, 
the discourses that seek to define it, a compelling topic of inquiry for rhetoricians of medicine. 
So prevalent and pliable are these discourses that some have come to regard depression “not as 
                                                 
21 Categorization—the cognitive and/or formal act of grouping things together on the basis of perceived 
similarities—has generally been a topic that falls to psychology (not rhetoric), where it has been theorized 
as a fundamental cognitive process that springs from a biological imperative. Social psychologist Michael 
Billig (1996), however, treats categorization and its less frequently discussed counterpart, 
particularization, not only as matters of cognition but as matters of rhetoric. He suggests that these two 
forms of thought—categorization and particularization—“provide the basic outlines of argumentative 
forms” (p.6) and that our choices about when to categorize (and which category to select) and when to 
particularize (and on the basis of which characteristic/s) are not infrequently matters of “deeply felt 
controversy” (p. 138).   
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an entity but an amalgam, characterized by ambiguity and contestation” (Helén, 2007). In 
experiential terms, it has been said that depression troubles the subject’s capacity for language 
and eludes description (this may seem counterintuitive, given the profusion of depression 
memoirs from the 1990s onward 22), while on a practical level, clinicians, as well as critics of 
psychiatry, frequently acknowledge that no remotely clear line exists that can be called upon to 
definitively separate what might be called “normal sadness” from what ought to be approached 
as a treatable disorder (Horwitz and Wakefield, 2007). The line designed to separate normality 
from pathology is especially blurred when applied to the “mild” depression subtype, dysthymia, 
which has been said to “occupy a position between normality and major affective disorders” 
(Akiskal, 2001, 28). Furthermore, noted American psychiatrist Hagop Akiskal (1997), has noted 
that, because of dysthymia’s chronic and minor symptoms (relative to Major Depressive 
Disorder), there is “difficulty in separating low-grade depressives from their habitual selves” and 
so, for these low-grade depressives, “life disruptions and difficulties due to depression were not 
easily separable from events in their lives” (p. 2).   
 One might think that the field of psychiatry, which has for some time been striving to 
model itself after the epistemic protocols of Western biomedicine, would seek to clarify the 
definitional ambiguity of depression, especially its “mild” subtype, in order to forge a clearer and 
firmer distinction between nonpathological states of sadness and clinically treatable depression. 
Rhetoric of medicine scholars, operating mostly from critical positions, have pointed to the 
thriving psycho-pharmaceutical industry as the primary engine driving depression’s definitional 
ambiguity. As Emmons (2010) sees it, ambiguous descriptions of depression in both clinical and 
                                                 
22 A few high profile examples of the 1990s depression autobiography trend include psychologist Kay 
Redfield Jamison’s (1995) An Unquiet Mind: A Memoir of Mood and Madness; novelist William Styron’s 
(1990) Darkness Visible: A Memoir of Madness; and journalist Elizabeth Wurtzel’s (1994) Prozac 
Nation.  
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public discourses would at first glance “seem to counter the needs of biomedicine, where a 
precise definition would more accurately align with targeted pharmaceutical interventions” (p. 
63-64). But, she goes on, it quickly becomes clear that “a strategic imprecision does more work 
that definitive definitions ever could in the service of encouraging pharmaceutical intervention” 
(p. 64). In this view, the strategically imprecise language that suffuses depression discourses—
fuzzy categorical definitions, the merging of symptoms with disorder, the public portrayal of 
depression as simultaneously exceptional and mundane—can be traced, at least in large part, to 
the pharmaceutical industry and the broader biopsychiatry paradigm that has normalized 
psychopharmacologic treatments for the problem(s) called depression.  
 If even trained clinicians have difficulty distinguishing between normal sadness and 
clinical depression, one wonders how so-called laypersons go about making this distinction. In 
an age of online health, wherein diagnostic criteria for mental disorders is widely and rapidly 
accessible, the question becomes especially salient. As a growing body of scholarship suggests, 
online health communities increasingly function as spaces in which these sorts of distinctions are 
made (Charland, 2004; Giles, 2014; Giles and Newbold, 2011). These communities, then, can 
plausibly regarded as spaces abuzz with rhetorical activity, what Burke might have called “zones 
of transformation” in which something that was previously regarded as A comes to be 
understood as B. The informal self-diagnosis of a mental disorder is certainly an instance of one 
such transformation, in the sense that something which was previously regarded as one thing—a 
generally pessimistic outlook, say—is rhetorically reconfigured into something else, such as, in 
this case, a mood disorder symptom.   
 In contrast to the rhetorics of patient education and empowerment that pervade general 
discussions of online health phenomena, the topic of internet-aided self-diagnosis tends to be 
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discussed in skeptical or cautionary tones, especially as it pertains to mental disorders.23  For 
instance, a few top entries produced by a Google search for the term “self-diagnosis” include 
“The Dangers of Self-Diagnosis” on the Psychology Today website (Pillay, 2010); “The Dangers 
of Using Google to Self-Diagnose” from Women’s Health Magazine online (Abassi, 2015); and 
“Self-diagnosis on Internet not always good practice” from the Harvard Gazette site (Miller, 
2015). The general thesis of these articles seems to be that online health information, for which 
the public has an ever-expanding appetite, feeds into so-called “cyberchondria”—the digital 
version of hypochondria.24 
 Skepticism likewise runs through the (for now, sparse) rhetorical scholarship on the 
subject of self-diagnosing depression. Focusing on the linguistic and experiential ambiguity of 
hypochondria, Segal (2008) paints a picture of self-diagnostic transformation that involves 
rhetoricizing one kind of ambiguous disorder—in this case, hypochondria—as another, 
depression. She lays out the transformational scene as follows:  
                                                 
23 The move toward “patient empowerment” seen in scholarly literature and various public health 
campaigns is very much linked with the move toward defining patients as consumers—of health services, 
of course, but especially of information. In a widely cited article, “The importance of patient 
empowerment in health system reform,” Leonie Segal (1998) articulates what it might mean to consider 
patients as consumers: “Consumers require more than information to contribute effectively to decisions 
about their own health. Consumers also require confidence and competence to act on information and a 
capacity to influence the services they access. This requires an understanding of their own health…and 
acceptance of responsibility for decisions about their own health care. Consumers need to become 
empowered” (p. 31). The flipside of patient empowerment, it seems, is responsibility and, as Crawford 
(2004) points out, this push toward patient responsibility has likely been mobilized to service a variety of 
political and economic agendas, including, for instance employers’ desire to shift a greater proportion of 
health care costs to their employees.  
24 White and Horwitz (2008) are typically credited with coining the term in their research article entitled, 
“Cybercondria: Studies in the escalation of medical concerns in web search.” In their research, the authors 
found that web search engines return content about rare, severe conditions based on searches for “likely 
innocuous symptoms” and that this phenomenon escalates the intensity of searchers’ medical concerns. 
Though this widely cited research article helped popularize the term, “cyberchondriac” (a portmanteau of 
“cyber” and “hypochondriac”) appeared as early as 2001, in the United Kingdom publication, The 
Independent, in an article whose title asked, “Are you a cybercondriac?”    
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 What follows is a rhetorical account using the example of depression as part of the 
process of “making” the hypochondriac—one who becomes attached, in this case, 
to a diagnosis of mental illness. The story presented is by now familiar. Diagnostic 
information, arguably too available, is presented in such a way as to make self-
diagnosis irresistible. You (any you) feel unusually miserable, maybe inexplicably 
bleak and sad. You read the Zoloft advertisement in People Magazine and do the 
checklist for depression; maybe you record the mnemonic that comes with the 
checklist so you don’t forget how you quality for the diagnosis. Your sadness has 
been translated by the ad into the language of a disorder with a disease 
classification. You go to your doctor, as the ad suggests you do, and with the 
diagnosis in hand—in search of confirmation and also a prescription for this 
disease that is both created and treated by the drug available for it (p. 83-84).   
In this account, pharmaceutical agents are the engines propelling the self-diagnostic 
transformation: they “created” the disease, their advertisement translated the reader’s sadness 
into the vocabulary of depression, and their prescription is the culminating event that cements the 
self-diagnoser’s new subjectivity as “depressed person.” The role of the reader in this account is 
nominal, as conveyed through usage of the passive voice (e.g. “Your sadness has been translated 
by the ad.”)  
 Emmons (2010) considers the self-diagnosis of depression through a lens similar to 
Segal’s—as an act grounded firmly within the biopsychiatric paradigm, with pharmaceutical 
agents constituting the truly active agents of the process. She opens her 2010 book, Black Dogs 
and Blue Words: Depression and Gender in the Age of Self-Care,” by meditating upon a then-
recent New Yorker cartoon. This cartoon depicts a woman hunched over a computer keyboard in 
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what is presumably a home office (a kitchen is just out of frame) with her back to a male 
companion who poses a question that captions the image: “How’s the self-diagnosis coming?” 
For Emmons, “The vignette is funny because it so succinctly captures the migration of medical 
authority from doctor’s office to individual, computer-mediated reflection” (p. 2). As a result of 
this migration, “[T]exts—presumably the self-diagnostic quizzes readily available on consumer 
Web sites—mediate her “expert” and “patient” identities. The cartoon displays a growing 
reliance on interactions between isolated individuals and the texts that construct health and 
illness. The woman’s companion does not look at her as he passes; there is no indication that she 
is in dialogue with anyone else; her self-diagnosis is a monological practice” (p. 2-3).   
 This chapter departs from these rhetorical perspectives on the ambiguity of depression, 
and does so by making three key moves. First, it traces a brief, rhetorically-inflected history of 
dysthymia as a diagnostic classification. It argues that the disorder’s blurry definitional borders 
can indeed be understood as a form of strategic imprecision, but suggests that the imprecision 
originally served a purpose in addition to that which is often imagined (i.e. the pharmaceutical 
industry’s interest in expanding the populations to whom a depression diagnosis could plausibly 
be applied). Specifically, this chapter advances the claim that dysthymia was constructed in a 
strategically ambiguous way partly to smooth tensions between adherents to a fading paradigm, 
the psychoanalytic tradition, and those paving the way for the soon-to-be hegemonic paradigm, 
biopsychiatry. Because dysthymia was originally conceived as a “minor” complement to Major 
Depressive Disorder—an affective disorder rooted firmly within the parameters of 
biopsychiatry—it had a similar enough nosological character that biological psychiatrists  felt 
comfortable diagnosing it. At the same time, because dysthymia was defined as “chronic,” it was 
in alignment with the views of psychoanalysts who considered their persistently malcontent 
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patients to not merely “have” depression but to essentially “be” depressives. Thus, dysthymia 
was a comprehensible diagnostic entity from within the context of either paradigm, and it was 
considered amenable to treatment from either paradigm in the form of antidepressant 
medications, and/or long-term psychotherapy, respectively.  
 After contextualizing the ambiguous construction of dysthymia, this chapter shifts focus 
to the subject of how this ambiguous diagnostic entity is defined and informally self-diagnosed 
in online health interactions. Despite the conventional wisdom that psychoanalytic vocabularies 
have largely been abandoned in favor of biopsychiatric explanations for mental disorders, this 
chapter observes that aspects of both of the above paradigms—psychoanalytic and 
biopsychiatric—blend together, providing a useful strategy for negotiating agency as it pertains 
to matters causality and treatment. Here, Kenneth Burke’s conceptual pairing of symbolic 
action/nonsymbolic motion is used as a theoretical lens through which to view these discussions 
about causality and treatment, and their entailed implications for understandings of agency. In 
doing so, this chapter notes that when psychoanalytic explanations of dysthymia’s causality are 
offered, causality is often framed as a matter of motion—of that which lies beyond the symbolic 
control or influence of the individual. Matters of treatment, however, are rhetoricized as 
symbolically meaningful, agentive action. This rhetorical strategy, it is suggested, navigates the 
symbolic agency/nonsymbolic motion dialectic by resisting totalizing vocabularies that would 
position dysthymia as a matter of pure motion (that which is not amenable to symbolic 
intervention) or pure symbolic action (that which is amenable to symbolic intervention).   
 Finally, this chapter offers a metaphor—the “fitting room”—for conceptualizing online 
health interactions in which informal self-diagnosis appears to be the aim. While I had 
previously assumed that these spaces function akin to “waiting rooms”—where patients bide 
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their time until they can be formally diagnosed by a practitioner—this chapter posits that they 
function more akin to fitting rooms, wherein people “try on” different diagnostic labels, assess 
how well they fit, and solicit feedback from others before taking further action. This metaphor 
was initially born from the recognition that language related to diagnostic “fit” was consistently 
deployed in these online health interactions: people regularly deliberated how well the label of 
dysthymia “fit” them or, alternately, how well they “fit into” the label of dysthymia. Like 
consumers in clothing store fitting rooms, the patrons of online health communities were apt to 
try on more than one diagnostic label, solicit feedback from others about how well the label fit, 
sometimes having other labels suggested to them. Perhaps the most important similarity, 
however, is that people appear not to want to leave the metaphorical fitting room empty-handed. 
This metaphor is perhaps becoming especially appropriate considering the era of 
commercialized, “consumer-driven” health care in which we are said to now exist.  
2.1 DYSTHYMIA IN THE DSM-III: THE BIRTH OF A STRATEGICALLY 
IMPRECISE CLASSIFICATION 
It may be tempting to regard the definitional ambiguity of dysthymia—the so-called “midpoint” 
between normality and major affective disorder—as a phenomenon produced and maintained 
primarily or solely because blurred definitional boundaries align smoothly with pharmaceutical 
agendas that seek to expand the population to which the classification can be applied. While 
certainly a plausible view, this chapter suggests that it is incomplete. To fully appreciate the 
rhetorical flexibility of dysthymia as a diagnostic entity, it is useful to take account of the 
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institutional conditions and constraints under which the classification was initially crafted prior 
to its debut in the pages of the DSM-III in 1980. Taking account of these conditions and 
constraints suggests that dysthymia can indeed be understood as a form of strategic imprecision, 
however, the aim of the strategy was not (only) the marketing of antidepressants, but (also) the 
soothing of intraprofessional tensions simmering within the American Psychological Association 
(APA) prior to the publication of the path breaking DSM-III.  
 While historical accounts of psychiatry and development of its so-called bible—the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders—vary based on who is doing the 
accounting, virtually all flag the publication of the DSM-III as an unmistakable shifting of 
paradigms.25 And as is customary of paradigm shifts, there was no shortage of conflict within the 
APA during this time, with tensions flaring between flag-bearers of the emerging paradigm and 
loyalists to the fading paradigm. In this case, the emerging paradigm was that of biopsychiatry, 
an approach to mental disorder that was a return to, or an extension upon, the views of German 
psychiatrist Emil Kraepelin, which had come to prominence in the beginning of the 20th century. 
In Kraepelin’s view, mental illnesses were not unlike physical illnesses: both, according to him, 
have discrete, invariant, and discoverable biological bases, as well as observably consistent 
trajectories. Furthermore, he operated from the perspective that the classification of these origins 
and trajectories constitutes a legitimate area of scientific research in its own right (McCarthy & 
Gerring, 1994).  
                                                 
25 As many authors, including McCarthy and Gerring (1994), note, the field of psychiatry was suffering a 
rhetorical crisis prior to the publication of the DSM-III: a lack of diagnostic reliability. Putting it simply, 
“diagnostic reliability” refers the likelihood of different practitioners coming to the same diagnosis based 
on a given patient’s symptoms. The changes made to the DSM-III revision, intended to address this issue, 
ended up being far more extensive than anyone had expected. But in attempting to address the rhetorical 
crisis of low diagnostic reliability, the field faced a new potential rhetorical crisis: if the DSM shifted so 
radically from the second to the third edition (with the third edition undermining much of the content of 
the second) then how could either edition (or later editions) be seen as credible knowledge?  
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 Kraepelin and other biological psychiatrists  believed that it was crucial to classify the 
trajectories of different mental disorders in order to base treatment protocols upon them. And so, 
a return to so-called “Kraepelinian” theory meant that the classification of disorders (based on 
clinical observation) took on a newly exigent weight during this time. This push toward 
classification aligned psychiatry’s priorities more closely with those of biomedicine. (Not to 
mention, a freshly revised version of the International Statistical Classification of Diseases and 
Related Health Problems (ICD) appeared in 1968, adding some additional pressure for 
psychiatry to produce its own diagnostically reliable text.) In addition to a keen emphasis on 
classification, biomedicine and biopsychiatry share key philosophical underpinnings in terms of 
their views on patients, disease, and the relationship between the two. Like the biomedical model 
of medicine that views physical illness as a departure from the body’s “standard” mode of 
function, biopsychiatry regards the symptoms of mental disorders an interruption in the “normal” 
course of life (Greco, 1993). The goal of treatment is thus restorative in nature and calls for little 
or no attention to the individual’s life course prior to the onset of illness. These philosophical 
underpinnings are very much at odds with those of the previous psychiatric paradigm, which had 
been built upon the foundation of psychoanalytic theory.  
 The ascendancy of the biopsychiatric paradigm came, of course, at the expense of the 
former paradigm, which had grown out of the psychoanalytic (sometimes referred to as  
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“psychodynamic” or “psychotherapeutic”) tradition.26  This psychoanalytic paradigm had 
enjoyed a hegemonic hold on psychiatry for the several decades leading up the DSM-III, 
spreading its palpable Freudian influence throughout the pages of the DSM-II and, to a lesser 
extent, DSM-I (Shorter, 2008).27 The symptoms that characterize mental disorders, according to 
psychoanalytic theory, arise on the basis of psychic conflicts bubbling about within the 
unconscious.28 The resolution of such conflicts, many of which are presumed to be deeply-rooted 
in early childhood experience, are the overarching goal of psychoanalytic treatment models that 
have collectively been dubbed the “talking cure.” The talking cure is premised upon the 
assumption that patients “know more about what has caused their symptoms than they 
consciously think” and that, through various discursive practices, including, for example, free 
association, patients can recollect the onset and probable “cause” of their symptoms which in 
turn ameliorates their symptoms and suffering (Sharpe & Faulkner, 2014, p. 4). Unlike 
biopsychiatry, which regards the onset of mental disorder as a discontinuity, the psychoanalytic 
                                                 
26 The terms “psychoanalysis” and “psychodynamic therapy” tend to be used interchangeably and while 
they are related, they are distinct. The former term is most closely associated with the ideas of Sigmund 
Freud, who was not the only theorist of psychoanalysis but was probably the most prolific. 
Psychodynamic therapies grew out of the Freudian psychoanalytic tradition. They are similar in their 
theoretical underpinnings but diverge in practice, one of the most obvious divergences being therapy 
frequency and duration: psychoanalytic therapy tends to be based on more frequent appointments 
(typically, several per week) spread out over a longer of duration of time as compared to psychodynamic 
therapy.  
27 While Freudian theory does not exert as much influence on psychiatry today as it once did, it continues 
to animate the public imagination, especially as they pertain to notions of the human “mind”. Gibbons 
(2014) explains that it is often overlooked “how key Freudian ideas became widely shared beliefs about 
the mind, entering the realm of doxa…these ideas continue to exert an often-surreptitious influence even 
today” (p. 432).  
28 Freud’s “unconscious” refers to a tripartite structure that forms the psyche. The structure consists of 
three forces necessitating balance: the id (an impulsive, animalistic drive that is biologically inscribed), 
the superego (which adheres to rules and norms and is regulated by society’s force on the individual 
mind) and the ego (which attempts to bridge the adversarial relationship between the former two). Freud 
deemed his notion of the unconscious—which suggests that human behavior is guided by forces and 
motives that lie below the level of consciousness—as one of the three great blows to human narcissism, 
the other two of which resulted from the Copernican revolution and Darwin’s theory of evolution 
respectively.  
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approach regards the onset of mental disorder as “logically continuous with the normal life of the 
individual and consistent with personal attributes” (Greco, 1993, p. 359). In short, the 
psychoanalytic approach to mental disorder calls for attention to the individual’s life prior to the 
onset of symptoms. The excavation of the past thus takes on symbolic significance that puts it at 
odds with the biopsychiatry paradigm, which, like the biomedical model of Western medicine, 
views illness as a discontinuity or divergence from one’s “standard” mode of function.   
 As is clear from a basic sketch of these two psychiatric traditions, their respective 
approaches to mental disorder—theoretically and practically—are not easily reconcilable. 
Despite these two paradigms’ philosophical incompatibilities, and despite the fact the majority of 
the DSM-III task force “despised” psychoanalysis, Robert Spitzer, as head of the DSM-III task 
force, reportedly felt a sense of responsibility for fostering some sort of rapprochement between 
adherents to these rival schools of thought (Shorter, 2015). Initially, Spitzer thought that 
peppering the Freudian term “neurotic” throughout the pages of the DSM-III would be adequate 
appeasement for the psychoanalysts. 29  But, apparently, this proved an inadequate compromise, 
as, “the psychoanalysts held out for something more than a bunch of vague references to neurosis 
strewn throughout the text” (Shorter, 2013, 138). Some other rhetorical salve would thus have to 
be formulated.    
 After having drafted what was to become “Major Depressive Disorder,” task force 
members felt that the classification logically called for a “Minor Depressive Disorder” 
complement. These two forms of depression would not only be distinguished in terms of 
                                                 
29 Freud theorized that mental health results when the three components of the unconscious are balanced 
and in harmony with external reality. When this delicate balance is disturbed, mental disorder befalls the 
individual, the form of which depends upon the mechanism used to contend with the imbalance. Neurosis 
results when the ego stays in external reality and silences the id, via repression. If one were to instead 
reject external reality and succumb to the id via disavowal, psychosis would result  (Sharpe & Faulkner, 
2008).  
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severity, but in terms of temporality: major depression, like other affective disorders, would be 
episodic while its minor counterpart would be chronic.30  Each of several variations of the 
drafted category “Minor Depression” were poorly received by psychoanalysts who recognized 
that this category would completely subsume one of their most commonly deployed diagnostic 
entities: neurotic depression. Following this poor reception, the proposed category of “Minor 
Depression,” was eliminated, though in discussing the elimination, Spitzer did not publicly 
foreground psychoanalysts’ concerns. He instead focused the issue of third party payment, 
claiming that a so-called “minor” depressive disorder was a rhetorically doomed classification 
that failed to capture how “devastating” the disorder’s effects could be, and its implementation 
would thus be “inviting disaster in so far as third party payment would be concerned” (as quoted 
by Shorter, 2008, p. 161).  
 And so, the DSM-III task force began the process of crafting a new diagnostic entity that 
would take its place, and they landed on the term “dysthymia.” Spitzer apparently found the term 
in a psychiatric dictionary, and was struck by its simplicity and descriptiveness (thymia translates 
as “mood” and dys as generally “bad”), qualities that he claimed were not so much necessary for 
the clinician or researcher, but were owed to the public. In a rhetorically significant move, he 
parenthetically placed the phrase “neurotic depression” after dysthymia in a nod of deference to 
the psychoanalyst contingent. This “capitulation” to “political pressure” (in the words of 
colleagues) has since been deemed the “neurotic peace treaty” (Shorter, 2008). By most 
                                                 
30 One particularly impactful side effect of this drafting was that all non-chronic instances of depression 
hereafter fell within the confines of a major affective disorder.  
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accounts, this gesture went a long way toward soothing the psychoanalysts’ concerns of 
complete displacement by the DSM-III.31  
 With Freudian roots peering out from inside those parentheses, the psychoanalysts could 
see that the diagnostic classification of dysthymia was compatible in other ways with their 
previously beloved neurotic depression. Because it was defined as chronic in nature (there had 
been discussions of using the less psychoanalyst-friendly term “intermittent” instead) dysthymia 
conformed to the sensibilities of psychoanalysts who considered these persistently gloomy 
patients not to merely “have” depression but to essentially “be” depressives. Furthermore, since 
the disorder was considered low-grade in terms of its symptom severity, pharmacologic 
interventions did not necessarily need to be the first-resort option for treatment; 
psychotherapeutic treatments could be tried first, whether as a standalone or as a complement to 
antidepressants. Of course, given that it would be a sort of nosological cousin to Major 
Depressive Disorder—the DSM-III classification that, more than any other, signaled the sharp 
turn toward biopsychiatry—dysthymia would be amenable to treatment from practitioners with 
backgrounds in biopsychiatry as well (Wakefield & Horwitz, 2007). In short, Spitzer and the 
DSM-III task force, guided by the operating principle of inclusivity, shaped a depressive 
diagnostic entity that was comprehensible and treatable within the confines of these two distinct 
psychiatric schools of thought.  
                                                 
31 Shorter explains how laden with politics the DSM-III revision process was: “As their work got 
underway, the task force was fully aware of the massive resistance that awaited them from various 
quarters, and so the fruit of their efforts, DSM-III, was not really a scientific document but a political 
one.” 157. The principle criterion that guided Spitzer more than any other was inclusivity. Spitzer stated 
that, “If any group of clinicians had a diagnosis that they thought was very important, with few 
exceptions, we would include it. That’s the only way to make it acceptable to everyone. If we had just 
said, okay the Washington U group only recognizes 16 categories so we’ll have 16 categories in the DSM-
III’ that would be ridiculous. We had to decide at every point: what do we do with the analysts who want 
‘narcissistic’? What do we do with the veterans who want ‘PTSD’? And the solution was ‘we’ll include 
it’” (as quoted by Shorter, 2008, p. 157).  
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2.2 DEFINING DYSTHYMIA ONLINE: CAUSATION, TREATMENT, AND THE 
QUESTION OF AGENCY 
Robert Spitzer and the DSM-III task force likely could not have foreseen that, in the future, 
information about their arduously crafted diagnostic criteria would come to be acquired as 
frequently (and far more rapidly) in the home office (or laptop, or smartphone) as the doctor’s 
office. The ambiguity of dysthymia, maintained at least in part to quell intraprofessional tension, 
can now be harnessed as a rhetorical resource in the context of online health communities 
populated by rhetors seeking to understand what dysthymia is, whether the label “fits” them, and 
how it is impacting their moods, their experiences, their identities. Keeping in view dysthymia’s 
history as an ambiguous diagnostic entity brings into sharper focus how aspects of both 
paradigms—the psychoanalytic and biopsychiatric—mingle and blend in online health 
communities for dysthymia, and can be drawn up flexibly, in particular when discussion 
implicates the fraught question of agency.  In this section, an observed rhetorical trend of 
particular interest (perhaps because it at first seems counterintuitive) is that, when matters 
pertaining to causality were framed in psychoanalytic terms, the notion of individual agency was 
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renounced and when matters pertaining to treatment were framed in biopsychiatric terms, 
individual agency was reclaimed.32  
“Etiology” derives from the Greek term aitiologia; “aitia” denotes “cause” or 
“responsibility” and it is not only the preoccupation of nosologists. Solomon (2001) notes that, 
“After enduring diagnosis [of depression], most people seek causation, despite the fact that 
knowing why you are sick has no immediate bearing on treating the sickness” (p. 20). While 
identifying the “cause” of depression might not have an immediate bearing on treatment, the felt 
entanglement between causality and responsibility sheds light on why the pondering of 
underlying causes is such a common step after diagnosis. That a formal diagnosis of depression 
prompts reflection about possible causes has been fairly well established (Kangas, 2001; Karp, 
1996; Renata et al., 2013). However, this chapter finds that causation-seeking also tends to be a 
preoccupation for the not-yet diagnosed. For those who appear uncertain about whether 
dysthymia constitutes an appropriate diagnosis, identifying a possible “cause” can ostensibly 
reduce this uncertainty and strengthen the conviction that the diagnosis would be appropriate. It 
is not unusual for people to blend together aspects of both paradigms when searching for 
causation.   
                                                 
32 The subject of “agency” generates debates across the social science and humanities; thus, a complete 
recounting of each field’s treatment of the topic is beyond the scope of this dissertation. In the field of 
rhetoric, “traditionalist” theories of agency foreground the concepts of individual voice, intentionality, 
and choice; rhetorical agency is exercised when an individual’s persuasive efforts are aligned with her 
intentions, when she is “in charge” of her own rhetoric (which may or may not achieve the desired effect). 
More recent work on the subject of rhetorical agency tends to focus on the relationship between the agent, 
the agent’s broader context, and the constraints therein. For a summary of rhetorical scholarship on the 
subject of agency as it pertains to science and technical communication, see a recent article by Walsh 
(2016), entitled “The Great Chain of Being: Manifesto on the Problem of Agency in Science 
Communication.”  
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 (2014, June 9). Do I have Chronic Dysthymia? Message posted to 
http://psychforums.com/dysthymia. 
I recently stumbled across this website while doing some research and think 
its a great place to talk about things alot of people without mood disorders 
wouldn't understand. 
The past few years I have felt real depression. And I have done almost 
everything in my power to heal it. I have eaten mostly fruits and veggies, 
exercised regularly, slept 9 hours per night, cut gluten, tried supplements and 
even hormone replacement therapy. Even meditation didn't help me get 
happy, it just helped me stop thinking.  
Sometimes I think, this has to be my life circumstance! "Its because I'm not 
socializing enough", or "because I'm not with the man of my dreams." The 
excuses go on and on... 
But other days I think, there is no reason for me to be sad. I have a beautiful 
dog, a great boyfriend, a vegetable garden, and pursuing the career of my 
dreams. There is no reason for me to be sad right now.  
My mom has Bipolar 2, and she is pretty much an expert on the subject. She 
has sworn I have chronic dysthymia, saying that I have been sad/moody since 
I was 13. This was also the year I stopped cheerleading and got bullied in 
highschool. So its hard to tell whats really going on with me. 
(2014, June 10). Re: Do I have Chronic Dysthymia? Message posted to 
http://psychoforums.com/dysthymia  
Two things jump out at me from your discourse. 
1. Mum is Bi-polar so genes are at work here.
2. A bullying event at thirteen that was powerful enough for you to remember
it.
Whats wrong with you I cannot say, but if you read my stuff posted here you
will find we have similar symptoms, and I don't really know whats wrong
with me either, which I think is also part of the self-doubt and continual
questioning that is part of it.
I manage by managing. I have avoided situations and relationships that cause
stress and can trigger an episode of full blown depression. Experience has
shown I cannot adequately handle things that most ordinary folk deal with, I
just go to pieces.
If it is Dysthymia then you are stuck with it. Sounds like you have managed to
build a good life for yourself despite it and I congratulate you, the challenge
now is not to let the way you feel destroy it all because that's what tends to
happen, no one likes being around a sad and/or grumpy person.
Meds made me a zombie too and effectively snuffed out my brain power
when I most needed it, so now I don't touch them ever.
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In this causation-seeking post, we see explanatory aspects from both paradigms blending 
together—a traumatic childhood event and “genes”— to (seemingly) strengthen the case that 
dysthymia is an appropriate diagnosis for the poster. In fact, the respondent reconfigures the 
poster’s expressed uncertainty into further evidence of dysthymia since “continual questioning” 
is “part of [dysthymia]”. 
Both paradigms have cemented in public consciousness the notion that an “imbalance” 
lies at the heart of depressive disorders. Where the paradigms diverge is in theorizing of what, 
precisely, the imbalance consists and how to resolve it. The psychoanalytic paradigm posits that 
the symptoms of mental disorder result from an imbalance of unconscious motives and forces. 
For those with mental disorders, it is theorized, there is failure to reconcile the basic unconscious 
conflicts that pop up throughout the process of human maturation; it is further theorized that this 
failure is explicable in light of the person’s formative experiences, particularly with caregivers. 
In 1911, Freud’s pupil Karl Abraham offered an enduring psychoanalytic theory of depression’s 
etiology in which he posited, in short, that the unconscious imbalance occurs when a depressed 
person suffers loss or rejection and then assumes that the world is hostile to him/her, and so s/he 
develops hostility toward the world, focusing sharply on all its flaw and faults. However, the 
depressed person is unable to express this hostility outwardly, so the hostility is rerouted inward, 
taking aim at the self (Sharpe & Faulkner, 2008).  
From within the biopsychiatric paradigm, the answer to the question of depression’s 
etiology is to be found in neurochemistry.33 Neurotransmitters—chemicals that help neurons 
“communicate”—have become particularly salient in public discourses about the cause of 
33 In the 1950s, a major source of controversy concerned whether mental disorders were the result of 
electrical or chemical imbalances in the brain. The success of electroconvulsive therapy during this time 
had convinced many that the root of the imbalance was electrical; once psychopharmacologic treatments 
became the treatment standard, the conventional wisdom shifted accordingly.  
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depression. After it was discovered that antidepressants affect levels of the neurotransmitter 
serotonin in the brain, the term “neurotransmitter” became a central part of the public vocabulary 
about what depression is and what causes it. Anti-stigma campaigns in particular seized on this 
piece of (now-outmoded) neuroscientific knowledge, ostensibly because they thought that it 
would help to decouple depression from questions about the agency of the individual.34 As 
Solomon (2001), puts it, “The word chemical seems to assuage the feelings of responsibility 
people have for the stressed-out discontent of not liking their jobs, worrying about getting old, 
failing at love, hating their families. There is a pleasant freedom from guilt that has been attached 
to chemical. If your brain is predisposed to depression, you need not blame yourself for it” (p. 
21). An example of the “chemical” explanation is invoked follows below. (I noted that these 
chemical explanations of dysthymia tended to be drawn upon more often by people who were 
counseling others—usually people new to the community—on the nature of dysthymia, rather 
than people describing their own experiences with dysthymia.)   
34  For years, serotonin imbalance has been considered a major contributing factor to the development of 
depression in humans. This theory has been bolstered by the fact that the most commonly prescribed 
antidepressants, SSRIs, affect levels of serotonin in the brain and thus appear to ameliorate depression 
symptoms by increasing serotonin. Several studies, some of which have made public news, have 
challenged the serotonin-imbalance theory of depression.  In one such study, called a “breakthrough” by 
popular media, mice were genetically altered, rendering them incapable of producing serotonin. In this 
study, the mice with no serotonin were not more inclined toward depressive behaviors than their 
serotonin-producing counterparts. Mice with and without serotonin also responded similarly to 
antidepressant therapy, suggesting that serotonin may play a lesser role in the development of depression 
than previously thought. While this study has been fairly well publicized, picked up by New York Daily 
News, for instance, this “news” is hardly new. For many years, mental health professionals and 
researchers have criticized the serotonin imbalance theory as oversimplified.  
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From a rhetorical perspective, discussions centering on dysthymia’s causality and 
treatment are rich because of how intertwined they are with notions of agency. Kenneth Burke’s 
conceptual pairing of symbolic action/nonsymbolic motion is a useful theoretical lens through 
which to view these discussions about causality and treatment, and their implications for 
understandings of agency. Burke’s dialectic captures a fundamental distinction that we make 
about the sorts of occurrences that shape our lives. Briefly put, the difference is between those 
occurrences that we consider symbolically meaningful, which are positioned within the realm of 
“symbolic action,” and those that we do not, which are positioned within the realm of 
“nonsymbolic motion.” The latter is the realm of that we regard as determined, as that which 
stands stubbornly outside the realm of human agency.35 This realm would include, for example, 
sheer physical motions that occur without voluntary human action: waves crashing, wind 
35 For Burke (1978) the human condition is characterized by a desire for freedom from motion. To this 
end, humans are endlessly preoccupied with transforming the world of motion into phenomena that are 
amenable to symbolic action.  
(2010, April 5). Re: know I should just wait for the dr… Message posted to 
http://psychforums.com/dysthymia.  
You're right; meds are a serious thing. I also think that you're correct in the 
sense that the right diagnosis can help you get better meds. 
The problem, though is that every person is different, so sometimes finding the 
right cocktail takes time...and withdrawal...and lots and lots of patience. But 
once that's found, you're usually good to go. Maybe some minor adjustments. 
Your neurochemistry is not your fault and nothing to feel bad about. It might 
be frustrating, but there is a high chance that you will get the correct meds. 
Especially since you mentioned being more specific with your therapist. 
Communication is a must..  
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blowing, hearts beating, lungs filling with air.36 These are not seen as symbolically agentive acts 
in and of themselves, but various symbolic meanings can nonetheless attach to them. For 
example, one has no hand in choosing the physical characteristics of one’s cranium, but that did 
not stop the growth of an entire field (phrenology) dedicated to uncovering the characterological 
attributes that these physical qualities symbolized.  
The realm of symbolic action, in contrast to nonsymbolic motion, consists of that which 
is considered agentive and symbolically meaningful, and can be symbolically readjusted in 
accordance with our communicative and rhetorical capacities: all of our communicative actions, 
our choice of words, our interpretations of others’ actions. The tension between symbolic action 
and nonsymbolic motion fascinated Burke, because he considered this tension so enigmatic, so 
fundamental to rhetorical constructions of reality and, importantly, so rhetorically manipulable. 
That is to say, whether an occurrence is positioned within the realm of the symbolically 
meaningful or the nonsymbolically determined is not always as obvious as might be assumed; 
these matters are continually up for debate and such debates are often impassioned. For example, 
French and Brown (2011) show how the issue of obesity is rife with debate over whether body 
shape and size should be interpreted via vocabularies that foreground symbolic action or 
nonsymbolic motion. Those that favor the former, they argue, take body shape and size to be 
physical qualities that symbolize the embodied, intentional choices of the individual (e.g. 
willpower or lack thereof, health consciousness or lack thereof, the acceptance or refusal of 
social mores). In this view, individuals’ symbolic actions can, and should, be called upon 
overtake the nonsymbolic motion of the individual’s body. There is another camp of rhetors, 
36 It is important to note that Burke does not simply offer the symbolic action/nonsymbolic motion 
distinction as a way for distinguishing between the mind and the body, or the natural and the social, but, 
as Crable (2003) has put it, “His terminology describes the process by which these distinctions emerge” 
(p. 125).  
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however, who favor treating obesity as a matter of nonsymbolic motion, often putting forth the 
“set-point theory” to make their case: the set-point theory posits that the body, thanks to a 
predetermined metabolic rate, has a general weight “setpoint” from which it may fluctuate on the 
basis of an individual’s efforts to manipulate it but to which it will generally return despite these 
efforts. This theory suggests that intentional actions taken on the part of the individual (symbolic 
action) are, in general, not enough to overtake involuntary (non-agentive) nonsymbolic motion.   
Explanations that frame dysthymia in purely chemical terms, which vaulted to 
prominence in the context of an advancing biopsychiatry paradigm, take the question of causality 
and drop it neatly into the confined realm of nonsymbolic motion, where questions pertaining to 
symbolic action and more importantly, agency do not apply. Health communication scholarship 
suggests that tendency to stress the chemical components of mental disorder above any possible 
others (i.e., to utilize motion-heavy vocabularies) has become stronger in recent decades, and is 
especially noticeable in efforts to loosen the entrenched distinction between physical disease and 
mental disorder (Barr & Rose, 2008; Kokanovic et al., 2007). The preservation of this distinction 
is thought to be stigmatizing, as it implies that physical diseases are a matter of motion while 
mental disorders are a matter of action. And so, attempts are made to use terms that foreground 
the motion of depression, relegating action to the background. Interestingly, in some ways, the 
opposite process occurs with respect to physical illnesses, notably cancer. That is, there are 
efforts made to reframe the experience of cancer in ways that elevate action above motion. The 
“battle” metaphor of illness—which is associated most strongly with cancer—is one example of 
such efforts.37 The “battle” metaphor is ostensibly intended to empower the sufferer in the face 
37 Metaphors for illness have in recent decades fallen under increased scrutiny, especially since Sontag 
(1978, 1989) drew attention to their prevalence and unintended consequences, chief among them the 
implication that individuals bear a sense of moral responsibility for their illnesses.      
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of what appears to be pure, unrelenting motion—the uncontrolled proliferation of abnormal cells. 
The battle metaphor reframes this uncontrollable motion, nudging it closer to the realm of human 
agency.  
In discussion of depressive disorders, metaphors are often called upon to perform the 
inverse of the battle metaphor: to reframe a phenomenon historically linked to the realm of 
symbolic action—mental illness—and to reposition it within the realm of nonsymbolic motion. 
One especially well-trodden metaphor that has been drawn upon to drive this transformation is 
the “depression is to diabetes as antidepressants are to insulin” analogy.38 This analogy has 
historically been deployed to induce medication compliance in patients that might otherwise be 
resistant to the idea of antidepressant medication (McMullen & Sigurdson, 2014). One reason 
that people cite for not wanting to take antidepressants is that doing so somehow constitutes 
“cheating.” There is a sense that a problem amenable to symbolic action (depression) should not 
be treated via nonsymbolic motion (antidepressant). Or, as Solomon (2001) has framed this 
dilemma, “The conflict between psychodynamic therapy and medication is ultimately a conflict 
on moral grounds; we tend categorically to assume that if the problem is responsive to 
psychotherapeutic dialogue, it is a problem you should be able to overcome with simple rigor, 
while a problem responsive to the ingestion of chemicals is not your fault and requires no rigor 
of you” (p. 102). An example of this dilemma in action follows below, as a poster describes a 
38 Despite continued widespread usage, this analogy has come under scrutiny both in terms of its accuracy 
and its usefulness. McMullen and Sigurdson (2014) unravel this analogy by pointing out that: 1) there is 
no test for depression, whereas diabetes is easily diagnosed via glucose testing; 2) how antidepressants 
work (and indeed, whether they work) is not well understood whereas the function of synthetic insulin is; 
3) depression can improve without treatment whereas diabetes cannot and 4) it is unclear whether the
target of this analogy is type 1 or type 2 diabetes and the implications would differ accordingly.
Furthermore, patients themselves seem to often be disheartened by this analogy which seems to suggest
that (especially if this analogy is understood to refer to type 1 diabetes) depression will be a lifelong
affliction requiring ongoing usage of medication.
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thought process that pits the sense that antidepressants as “cheating” against a desire for the 
expedient effects that medication might offer.  
The sort of ambivalence about antidepressants permeating the post above is not uncommon. 
Scholarship on the subject has been fairly consistent in pointing to the ambivalence and flux that 
characterizes people’s attitudes toward their antidepressants (Barr & Rose, 2008; Grime & 
Pollock, 2002; Karp, 2004). As Barr and Rose (2008) summarize this ambivalence, “On the one 
hand, people wanted to continue taking antidepressants if it kept their symptoms away and yet 
simultaneously felt that they were ‘weaker’ for needing to say on drugs and desired to ‘sort 
themselves out’ without recourse to medicine,” (p. 953). “Sorting oneself out,” it seems, is 
perceived as something that is accomplished through the application of concerted symbolic 
action, not impassive motion.  
(2008, October 1). I need advice. Message posted to 
http://psychforums.com/dysthymia.  
My question is this:  
-- How safe are antidepressants? I used to be completely opposed, thinking that I 
can just alter my thought processes, and through the power of plasticity, change 
my outlook. But I keep finding myself thinking of the same things over and over. 
I can live with this -- everyone needs to have a bad day now and then, but I think 
it is affecting my social life. While I don't enjoy sitting in isolation, it almost 
always feels better to me than being around other people -- I'm simply losing 
interest in other people.  
My largest fear is that I take anti-depressants, feel better, and then suffer 
withdrawal when I try to stop them. Can anyone recommend an antidepressant 
with the lowest rate of withdrawal symptoms?  
My delema is that I feel I would be cheating, or taking the easy way out of this, 
instead of just accepting myself.  
81 
It is possible that the need to negotiate the symbolic agency/nonsymbolic motion dialectic 
is felt especially keenly when discussing dysthymia (as opposed to, say, MDD) because its 
symptoms are chronic and mild, and as Akiskal (1997, 2001) has noted, difficult to disentangle 
from the broader concept of “personality.” One rhetorical strategy for negotiating the dialectic is 
to frame causality as a matter of motion—as that which lies outside the agency of the 
individual—and to frame treatment as a matter of symbolic action, as a matter of agency. This 
strategy sidesteps reductive vocabularies that would locate dysthymia entirely within the realm 
of motion or exclusively within the realm of action. It also enables individuals to deal flexibly 
with the question of agency: agency is renounced as it pertains to causality, and reclaimed as it 
pertains to treatment. Interestingly, when explanations of causality are framed in psychoanalytic 
terms (terms that one might assume are suggestive of action more so than motion) the need to 
renounce agency seemed especially pronounced. For example, see below.  
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Classic tenets of the psychoanalytic explanation of mental symptoms are invoked above. This 
poster claims to have “wanted to be perfect” in order to create distance from an “inner self that 
was damaged” that s/he did not want “others to see” and did not even want to see him/herself. 
This builds from the psychoanalytic tenet that unconscious conflicts and the failure to resolve 
them (for example, “being in denial and thinking if I just ignored my problem enough it would 
go away”) cause the symptoms that characterize mental disorder. The psychoanalytic explanation 
for mental symptoms might appear to lie closer to the realm of symbolic action than motion, 
given that unconscious conflicts are thought to carry heavy symbolic weight and that the 
resolution of symptoms is predicated upon the resolution of conflicts through intensive symbolic 
intervention guided by an analyst. (Burke [1969] once asked, “What could be more profoundly 
rhetorical” than psychoanalytic theory [p. 37]). Perhaps it is the whiff of symbolic action 
emanating from psychoanalytic explanations of causality that prompts the strong renunciations 
(2012, December 25). Re: Maybe someone can help me out. Message posted to 
http://psychforums.com/dysthymia.  
Things kind of feel like they are getting better. My biggest issue in the past 
was that I was very guilty about feeling this way. I'd get even more depressed 
when I couldn't pull myself out of it or just flip a switch in my head and be 
happy. I compared myself to others way too much. I really hated myself, but I 
wouldn't admit it because expressing how I felt really deep down inside hurt. 
But lately I've been seeing that I've just been afflicted with these problems and 
they aren't my fault. I shouldn't beat myself up so much about problems that I 
really don't have much control over. I've been a lot more comfortable just 
expressing my emotions instead of bottling them up because I saw them as a 
flaw in my character.  
My insurance is changing again, but once it does I'm going to be visiting a 
psychiatrist. One of my biggest issues I believe is my perfectionist mentality. I 
wanted to be perfect, which is an impossible thing to do. And the only reason I 
wanted to be perfect was to distance myself far away from my inner self that 
was damaged and I didn't want others to see that, I didn't even want to see it. 
I've spent a long time being in denial and thinking if I just ignored my problem 
enough it would go away. 
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of agency phrased above: being “afflicted with problems” that “aren’t my fault” and that “I don’t 
have much control over.” Given that these problems are not controllable by the individual, it 
would be unreasonable to expect a person to “pull myself out of it” or “flip a switch.” These two 
metaphors—“pull myself out of it” and “flip a switch”—are conceptually similar to another 
metaphor that recurs commonly throughout online interactions: the metaphor of “snapping out of 
it” which is invoked to underscore how unrealistic it is to expect that an individual could pull off 
such a feat. These metaphors are, at root, concerned with agency, and more specifically with its 
renunciation.  
Symbolic action is reclaimed, perhaps paradoxically, when discussions turn to the matter 
of psychopharmacologic treatment. While antidepressant medication would seem a likely 
candidate for placement within the realm of simple biological motion—the molecules in the 
medication alter the behavior of molecules in the brain without intentional, agentive action on 
the part of the medication-taker—in online interactions it was rarely positioned in this way. 
Posters frequently caution others against viewing antidepressants as a “magic bullet” or “magic 
pills” that resolve the problem of dysthymia through simple physiological motion (as posited by 
the widespread “depression is to diabetes as antidepressants is to insulin” analogy). One poster, 
responding to another user who wonders whether s/he might have dysthymia, succinctly captures 
what appears to be a prevalent sentiment:  
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In this post, the problem of dysthymia has its origins in the brain, but the treatment of this 
problem “require[s] more than raw chemical support” in order to be effective. Treatment, then, is 
not treated as a simple matter of motion: there is agency at work here. In many posts, this point is 
underlined through repeated references to magic and miracles, with posters counseling one 
another to expect neither when embarking on an antidepressant regimen. Below, a poster 
responds to a question about whether dysthymia appears to be accurate diagnosis for the original 
poster. The poster responds in the affirmative (suggesting that, yes, dysthymia appears to be an 
accurate descriptor) and then offers the following perspective on antidepressant medication.  
(2012, September 18). Re: Maybe someone can help me out. Message posted 
to http://psychforums.com/dysthymia.  
Hey, 
It's more likely you want a psychiatrist/psychologist(therapist) pairing. Usually 
psychiatrists make diagnoses. - But avoid one who just prescribes drugs. In my 
experience, at least, struggles arising out of the brain require more than raw 
chemical support if they're truly going to be healed. 
(2011, December 10). Re: Maybe I have dysthymia… Message posted to 
http://psychforums.com/dysthymia. 
A point to note: Whatever medication you receive, it will not be a magic pill 
that will make you start to jump for joy each morning. So, while I do believe 
that going to a doctor is positive, please don't expect miracles to happen - they 
never do. Getting through this will involve a long process of changing the 
habits in your life that are making you feel depressed. 
If I were in your situation, I would list the problems - as you see them - and 
then prioritise them. You mention work, for example. If you feel that it is a 
major source of your sadness, then make a concerted effort to find a new job. 
Start by updating your CV/Résumé and then email it to employers. Finding a 
new job can actually be exciting. 
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This post pushes back against the supposition that antidepressants solve the problem of 
depression in the same way motion-based way that insulin solves the problem of diabetes. 
According to this poster, one should not expect the medication to work either quickly or 
dramatically. Instead, “getting through” dysthymia entails a “long process” of habit-reformation 
and expenditure of effort to chip away at the contextual factors that exacerbate dysthymia. 
Symbolic action—purposeful, agentive effort—is considered a meaningful and necessary part of 
the process of improving dysthymia symptoms. Antidepressants and the biological motion they 
represent are thought of as having a role to play in treatment, but this role is supporting in scope. 
The starring role is thought to belong to the individual agent and is performed via symbolically 
meaningful interventions.  
In the post above and in similar posts where the prudence of incorporating an antidepressant 
regimen into one’s life is deliberated, the poster makes a point to temper their hopes for the 
efficacy of antidepressant medication. “Magic pills” are neither expected nor desired. The 
expressed hope is a modest one: that the medication will establish a “slightly better frame of 
(2011, December 11). Re: Maybe I have dysthymia… Message posted to 
http://psychforums.com/dysthymia. 
I don't expect or even want a "magic pill." I'm just hoping that if I get some 
sort of medication it will put me in a somewhat better frame of mind so I can 
deal with the issues that are making me depressed. I'm just caught in a vicious 
cycle right now. Unfortunately, due to social anxiety, finding a job is not 
exciting. Starting a new job might be, but the road to get there I expect to be 
torturous. 
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mind” that enables “dealing with the issues that are making me depressed.” In these sorts of 
discussions, people seem to be implicitly recirculating the contemporary psychotherapeutic 
adage that “antidepressants help those that help themselves”—an adage that foregrounds the role 
of individual striving, which is complemented by, but not caused by, antidepressants. While it is 
clear that talking about antidepressant medication is a rhetorical matter, it could be argued that 
taking medication can in some sense be understood as a rhetorical act in itself. In establishing a 
medication regimen, one is at the same time establishing an explanation for the discontent whose 
“root cause” might otherwise be inexplicable (dysthymia); doing so also declares that the nature 
of that discontent lies somewhat beyond the realm of one’s own agency. To take medication 
could be seen as an act that declares one’s discontent (at least partly) the product of nonsymbolic 
motion. And yet, in discussions of treatment, posters frequently underscore the role of individual 
agency and action in the treatment of dysthymia.  
Overall, it appears that one strategy drawn upon to navigate the action/motion dialectic is 
to renounce agency as it pertains to the causality—to position it beyond the scope of individual 
control—and to reclaim agency as it pertains to dysthymia’s treatment.39  Coming down too 
forcefully on one side or the other of Burke’s symbolic action/nonsymbolic motion dialectic 
could guide rhetors toward vocabularies with largely undesirable implications: if dysthymia is to 
be considered exclusively within the realm of symbolic action, then there is a clear risk of 
wading into the stigmatizing territory known as “victim-blaming”; conversely, if dysthymia is 
39 While researching this dissertation, I observed a University of Pittsburgh Medical Center (UPMC) 
advertising campaign that seems to be premised on this precise rhetorical strategy: renouncing individual 
agency as it pertains to causality and then reclaiming agency where treatment is concerned. The campaign 
is built on patients’ relaying their illness narratives, always ending with the slogan: “I didn’t choose 
_____ (for instance, a brain hemorrhage, cancer, or some other ailment) but I did choose UPMC.” 
Agency, in this formulation, is renounced with regard to the illness, and then reclaimed via choosing 
healthcare providers.  
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construed as a matter of sheer motion, a picture is painted of a hopeless situation with a helpless 
protagonist. By renouncing agency vis-à-vis causality and seizing agency vis-à-vis treatment, 
one avoids the rhetorical excesses and unwelcome implications that could result from coming 
down exclusively on either side of the symbolic agency/nonsymbolic motion divide.  At a time 
when “patient agency” and “patient empowerment” have become buzzwords in discourses of 
health and illness, attention has been focused primarily on how agency is seized by patients, 
which both reflects and contributes to a growing tendency to regard health and illness as matters 
of symbolic action.40 Given this tendency, rhetoricians of medicine might begin to inquire into 
the inverse: how is agency resisted or renounced in matters of health and illness? 
2.3 THE FITTING ROOM: “GETTING INTO” DIAGNOSIS 
The section above has examined online discussions that work to define dysthymia, and has 
considered how these definitions are intertwined with the complicated matter of agency. As has 
been suggested, these acts of definition center often on the question of causality—where does 
dysthymia come from?—and treatment—how is this disorder to be managed? Aspects of both the 
psychoanalytic paradigm and the biopsychiatric paradigm animate such discussions. When 
considering dysthymia’s rhetorical role within the DSM-III—the fact that it was, in effect, a 
“compromise” disorder—it is perhaps unsurprising that aspects of both paradigms underpin 
40 Sociologist Robert Crawford refers to a similar phenomenon that he calls “healthism” and defines as 
the “striking moralization” of contemporary health-talk. Monica Greco (1993) suggests that the 
moralizing qualities of contemporary health discourses work to instill in subjects a “duty to be well.”  
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discussions about what dysthymia is and how to treat it. Having established dysthymia’s strategic 
ambiguity within the context of DSM-III and how this ambiguity is harnessed in contemporary 
online discourses about dysthymia, attention will briefly now turn to another piece of history 
from the DSM-III. This component of the DSM-III has been called its most significant 
contribution to Western psychiatry: the “Feighner” criteria, or the concept of utilizing diagnostic 
criteria in the form of itemized symptom lists to guide both psychiatric classification and 
diagnosis.  
Within the psychoanalytic tradition, diagnosis did not play an especially significant role 
in treatment. Some analysts even thought that presenting patients with a formal diagnosis could 
damage their therapeutic work together. However, as the biopsychiatric revolution gathered 
momentum, diagnosis took on unprecedented significance. For a field that was trying more and 
more to contour itself into the shape of an empirically grounded science, weak diagnostic 
reliability was psychiatry’s Achilles’ heel. Prior to the DSM-III, the likelihood of two 
practitioners agreeing on a given patient’s diagnosis was said to be barely better than chance 
(Kendler, 2010). This was, as McCarthy and Gerring (1994) point out, a major rhetorical 
problem for a field that was struggling to be seen as a legitimate scientific endeavor, modeled 
after and equally valid to Western biomedicine.    
Within this context—a field struggling to strengthen its diagnostic reliability—an 
important paper entered into the fray in 1972, written by John Feighner and other researchers at 
Washington University titled “Diagnostic criteria for use in psychiatric research.” The aim of the 
paper was to codify diagnostic criteria for 15 mental disorders, including what would eventually 
become Major Depressive Disorder. The paper affirmed the Kraepelinian tenets that mental 
disorders should have firm definitions, and that these definitions should be built upon itemized 
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symptom lists and exclusionary criteria (Kendler et al., 2010). These itemized lists came to be 
known as the “Feighner criteria.”  
The Feighner criteria were not formulated necessarily for practitioners but for 
researchers, as they were “an attempt to relive researchers of the multiplicity of different 
imprecise definitions then in use and thus to make possible more cumulative, comparable, and 
reproducible research” (Horwitz & Wakefield, 2007 p. 91). But the Feighner criteria had its 
biggest impact on clinical diagnosis, as diagnosis thereafter hinged upon patients manifesting a 
minimum number of symptoms from the list. As Shorter (2015) puts it, “The main innovation of 
the DSM-III was not the architectonics of the diagnosis, but in the Feighner “diagnostic criteria,” 
the list of symptoms a patient would require in order to “get into” the diagnosis, as the 
expression went” (p. 62). Once the Feighner criteria were adopted as the organizational blueprint 
for DSM-III, definitions of mental disorders became, in essence, equivalent to their symptoms. 
A Psychiatric Times article, published in 2010, metaphorizes the Feighner criteria as 
“fishing nets” and nosologists as fishermen, since, “Fishermen, like nosologists, want to capture 
not just any fish” (Sadler, 2010). Because fishermen want to catch “not just any fish,” fishing 
nets are constructed to be simultaneously inclusionary and exclusionary—to lock certain fish in, 
and allow others out. In the same way, the ideal diagnostic category is built in such a way that 
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the appropriate patients easily “fit into” a diagnosis while at the same time ushering others out by 
way of, primarily, exclusionary criteria.41  
In theory, it stands to reason that, like fishing nets, diagnostic criteria operate as intended 
when their subjects are not acutely aware of them. If fish became aware of the details and 
placement of fishing nets, they would be better equipped to avoid them; the same could be true 
of patients and diagnostic criteria. Since the diagnostic criteria are, for the most part, based on 
patient-reported symptoms rather than externally observable signs, a patient wishing to evade a 
particular diagnosis could merely neglect to report certain symptoms in order to avoid a 
particular diagnosis. 42 However, thanks to developments in communication media, as well as the 
successes of the consumer health movement—which demanded perhaps above all greater 
accessibility of health information—diagnostic criteria for various mental disorders are a mere 
Google search away.43 The metaphorical patient-fish now knows where the net is cast, what it 
looks like, and most interestingly, appears to want to be caught. 
When embarking on this research project, I initially thought that, for the undiagnosed, 
online mental health communities likely functioned as digital waiting rooms, frequented by 
41 Exclusionary criteria are intended to steer certain kinds of patients out of a given diagnosis. For 
example, the DSM-IV listed bereavement (stipulated as the loss of a loved one within the past two 
months) an exclusionary criterion for Major Depressive Disorder diagnoses. This criterion was supposed 
to prevent the misdiagnosis of “normal grief” as clinical depression. Controversially, DSM-V (2013) has 
removed this bereavement exclusion, claiming that the exclusion gave the false impression that grief 
somehow had a protective effect against depression and caused clinicians to overlook some number of 
depressed patients. See: 
http://www.dsm5.org/Documents/Bereavement%20Exclusion%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf.  
42 This does not hold true for all mental disorders. For instance, some of the symptoms of schizophrenia 
are often externally observed rather than patient-reported.  
43 The “consumer health movement” refers to the number of advocacy groups that coalesced during the 
1970s, most of which were organized around the themes of accessibility (of information) and 
empowerment. The women’s heath movement played a significant role in shaping the organizing 
rhetorics of these groups. As Kline (2005) explains, “Education and self-help were central strategies…In 
the process, ordinary women transformed themselves from passive patients to active consumers, building 
feminist coalitions centered on patients’ rights, disability rights, and reproductive rights” (p. 82).  
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people biding their time until they could get the appropriate authority to perform diagnosis. But I 
have come to think that these communities function more like digital fitting rooms, in which one 
can try “getting into” a diagnosis and solicit feedback from others about how well the label 
“fits.” This metaphor first occurred to me because of the persistence of discussions referencing 
the degree of “fit” between the individual and the symptom profile of dysthymia. Some posts 
convey a high degree of certainty about the appropriateness of the fit, with users claiming that 
the psychodiagnostic label “fits me like a glove.” Other posters express their uncertainty by 
describing which aspects of the label seem to fit them and which do not. Another slight variation 
of the “fit” phrasing occurs when posters describe how “I fit it” (where the “it” refers to the 
diagnostic category of dysthymia). The difference between these two phrasings is subtle, but also 
meaningful as they imply different views on the relationship between the patient and the 
disorder. In one instance, the disorder “fits” the patient and in the other, the patient “fits” the 
disorder.  
The “I fit it” phrasing maps more smoothly onto the original logic of the Feighner 
criteria, constructed as a screen that allowed certain patients in and filtered others out. The 
patients who “got into” diagnosis, as the expression went in psychiatry, were the ones who met 
the minimum number of “required” symptoms. When one states that they “fit” into the diagnosis, 
it could be argued that the individual is operating from a biomedical perspective on the 
relationship between patient and disease, in which the patient is regarded as an instance of a 
given disease category. This perspective emphasizes the universality of disease characteristics—
one of four central assumptions underlying Western biomedicine (Mishler, 2002)—over the 
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individual characteristics of the patient presenting with the disease. 44 According to some, this 
perspective regarding the presumed universality of disease characteristics is weakening, as 
medical practice is undergoing an “epistemological shift…from doctor-centered to patient-
centered care” (Kokanovic et al., 2013, p. 116). One consequence of this shift is an emphasis on 
patient heterogeneity, which has meant that, “Patients are no longer considered as specific 
instances of a disease to be locally negotiated” (May et al., 2006, p. 1024-1025). Nonetheless, an 
example of the “I fit it” phrasing—which conforms more closely to the view of patient as 
instance of disease—follows below.  
44 Misher (2002) claims that four underlying assumptions about health, bodies, and illness govern the 
model that has come to be called “biomedicine.” First, disease represents a divergence from the body’s 
standard, measurable mode of function. Second, diseases result from specific causes, the origins of which 
are scientifically discoverable. Third, diseases have universal features in terms of their symptoms. Lastly, 
physicians ideally operate as agents of science.    
(2005, December 28). I know I don’t have this…advice?? Message posted to 
http://psychforums.com/dysthymia. 
More specifically, I'd like to know if your moods can switch rapidly. Can you 
have a longterm undercurrent of mild/severe depression, yet daily fluctuate 
between being unable to get out of bed and complete routine tasks, then feel a 
rush of energy and euphoria that leads to rapid, excited talking; routinely 
sprinting up to six miles; and being the "life of the party," while sober? Or 
feeling the psychomotor retardation symptoms while feeling utterly euphoric 
and optimistic about your life?  
I know that I DO fit many (or all) of the basic criteria (chronic fatigue, 
overeating, hypersomnia, etc) but I don't meet the following: "Individuals 
experiencing Dysthymic Disorder generally experience little or no pleasure in 
their lives. They see life instead, as gloomy and sad. If you are experiencing 
Dysthymic Disorder it may seem like you have been depressed your whole 
life; never knowing a time when you were happy, content, or excited."  
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As this post shows, the specific diagnostic criteria for dysthymia, and whether or not the user  
“meets them” is the focus; little information is provided about the details of the poster’s personal 
experience with dysthymia. In short, the details of the category are emphasized over the 
experiences of the individual.  
The opposite phrasing occurred with greater frequency throughout the posts that I 
observed. That is, phrasing that involved some variation of “it fits me” rather than “I fit it” 
(again, “it” being the diagnostic category of dysthymia). In this case, it could be argued that the 
unique experiences of the individual are emphasized above the universal characteristics of the 
diagnostic category. In such instances, the diagnostic label is being deployed in a way that 
particularizes the self; the label becomes a layer of personal identity. Admittedly, the difference 
between these two phrasings is subtle. However, it is the difference between positioning oneself 
within the confines of a category, and using a category to particularize the self. Examples of the 
“It fits me” phrasing follow below:  
In instances of “it fits me” phrasing, details of the poster’s personal experience are often 
included, such as in the above post wherein details about the individual’s middle school 
experiences and challenges with friendships are referenced. A second example follows.  
(2007, May 30). So…I have dysthymia. Message posted to 
http://psychforums.com/dysthymia. 
I've long suspected that I've had dysthymia, ever since I read about it on 
wikipedia. The description on the site fit me like a glove. I haven't experienced 
pure joy or happiness for a long time now. I've had a few episodes of major 
depression in my life, coupled with the dysthymia. I don't remember much 
about middle school, except taunts, bullying, and "friends" making my life a 
living hell. 
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In these posts, the category of dysthymia fits the self, rather than the self fitting into the category 
of dysthymia. Other possible “fits” are considered, which is part of the reason I began to view 
online health communities as “fitting rooms” for the not-yet diagnosed. While posters often 
discuss the reasons that dysthymia is a good fit as a diagnostic label, many are inclined to focus 
on the reasons why the label might not fit. When I initially began researching dysthymia and the 
process of self-diagnosing it, I assumed that, because dysthymia is a “subthreshold” mood 
disorder (a state that is not “normal” but is less pathological than a major affective disorder) that 
people self-diagnosing it would be very confident in their diagnosis: because of its vague 
symptoms, it would not be difficult for people to “see themselves” in the list of symptoms. But it 
seems to me now that the same broad, elastic diagnostic criteria that makes it easy to “see 
oneself” in the label, are perhaps equally likely to invite uncertainty on the part of the self-
diagnoser. Perhaps the broader the diagnostic criteria, the more likely people will be to focus on 
the ways in which their experiences diverge from the criteria. For a brief example, see below.  
(2012, July 8). Re: I am new to all of this. Message posted to 
http://MDJunction.com/dysthymia. 
I have never been on medication, just received my first dose of Prozac today 
and will start tomorrow taking those. I am awaiting further diagnosis with a 
psych in the coming months. I honestly never thought of bipolar being a 
option, but now that I have looked into it, Bipolar II/Cyclothymia might be a 
good fit and at the pre-screening I had today I remember the doctor mentioning 
cyclothymia as a possibility. Personally I still go wit the assumption of 
Dysthymia because I feel it fits better, but I will take anything at this point, and 
am very thankful to you for pointing this out for me.  
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For people considering dysthymia as a potential diagnosis, and perhaps for people considering  
the appropriateness of other “subthreshold” mood disorders, the sense of being “in-between” 
diagnoses appears common. In some posts, the poster focuses more on the reasons why 
dysthymia might not be an appropriate diagnosis as opposed to the reasons that it might be 
appropriate. In these sorts of posts, though, it is important to note that the poster appears not to 
deliberate whether they have dysthymia or no mental disorder at all; rather, they contemplate 
whether they have dysthymia and/or some other mental disorder. When posters disclose the 
ways in which their experiences might be at odds with the diagnostic criteria for dysthymia, 
these divergences are often accounted for by referencing the possibility of other disorders—
whether as sole diagnoses, or as “comorbid” (i.e., co-occurring) disorders. 
Interestingly, Giles and Newbold (2013) have pointed out how the issue of comorbidity, 
when disclosed in online health communities, threatens the coherence of the illness identity 
around which the community is formed. They state, “Comorbidity—the existence of two or more 
diagnoses in the same individual—is a frequent phenomenon in mental health practice, it 
threatens the acquisition of a coherent online identity such as “bipolar” or “aspie” (p.482).  In the 
communities studied here, this did not appear to be a concern. It is possibe that because of its 
ambiguity diagnostic profile (when compared especially to its counterpart, MDD), dysthymia 
does not invite concerns about coherence in online health communities; the concern is more 
(2012, April 2). Re: Definition, Symptoms, Causes & Treatment. Message 
posted to http://psychforums.com/dysthymia. 
I've got a question about dysthymia.. can someone have this and feel 
emotionless? and be easily irritable? because most other things fit. I feel 
like I'm between everything, diagnosis-wise 
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about proving the existence of a disorder (any disorder—as one user states, “I will take anything 
at this point”) in a person who might otherwise appear non-disordered.  
The ubiquity of language pertaining to “fit” is what initially led me to consider that online health 
communities for mental disorders might function more akin to “fitting rooms” than “waiting 
rooms.” Though, the more I read through postings, the more the metaphor seemed apt. People in 
(2010, April 1). I know I should just wait for the dr… Message posted to 
http://psychforums.com/dysthymia. 
That said, I don't meet the requirements for major depression right now (I have 
in the past) and I have been dealing with this thinking back, probably since 10-
12. Its only gotten worse, it seems, especially over this past year, when my
symptoms have skyrocketed. Even my hubby says they have. I have self injury
issues, and I have had social issues as far back as 5-6, when I used to let
friends walk all over me and wouldnt stand up to them, and it has only gotten
worse to the point that soemtimes I get afraid to even talk to people. Other
times its nto so much of a problem. Still, whatever this is, its been around a
long time and it only sometimes seems to be as deep as moderate-major
depression. Like I can still function readily, just not without feelign like I want
to rip someones throat out frequently, or not without snappign at people for
even so much as looking at me wrong. Unless I am havign soem of my joyful
periods, then you cant get me down.
I guess dysthymia fits me better because of the length of time I have been 
dealign with it, but I am not always down... 
seriously, i dont think I fit into any category, yet fit into them all.  
(2010, April 3). Re: I know I should just wait for the dr… Message posted to 
http://psychforums.com/dysthymia. 
Like I said in the other posts, check into cyclothymia. 
These angry outbursts can be difficult to separate from bipolar...I think that if 
you think really hard and find a root cause for something (like the anger, which 
appears to stem from social issues rather than a mental illness), then you'll be 
able to find a more accurate diagnosis together with your therapist. 
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these spaces try on diagnostic labels, and like clothing, assess the fit—too loose? too long?—
before deciding whether to proceed with the “purchase.” People deliberating a diagnosis, like 
those deliberating a clothing purchase, not only focus on how well the label fits, but the ways in 
which the label fits poorly. Soliciting feedback from others helps to allay concerns, or to 
intensify them. This process seems to bear little similarity to the processes of self-diagnosis that 
Segal (2005) and Emmons (2010) imagine, as outlined earlier in the chapter. Segal, for example, 
suggests that diagnostic information, “arguably too available” (p. 83), when discovered by a 
person feeling “unusually miserable,” translates sadness into the vocabulary of disorder, which in 
turn spurs a self diagnosis that propels them to their doctors’ offices to request diagnosis and, 
more importantly, a prescription for antidepressants. Emmons, likewise, views the process of 
self-diagnosis as a monological one, wherein people construct health and illness identities in 
isolated interactions with texts. Both accounts seem to suggest that people are quickly and 
wholly persuaded about the appropriateness of the fit between diagnostic criteria and their 
“symptoms.” And yet, as this section shows, uncertainty about the appropriateness of fit was a 
common theme of posts, often followed up with solicitation for feedback from others.  
Another similarity between the clothing store fitting room and the online health 
community fitting room is that, in general, people seem not to want to leave empty-handed. That 
is, no one appears to leave the community persuaded that they are not suffering from any form of 
mental disorder. This became especially apparent to me when, for reasons unrelated to this 
dissertation, I began visiting an online health community for a particular type of 
precancer/cancer. In this community, the posts from people diagnosed with precancer vastly 
outnumbered the posts from those diagnosed with cancer (much to the chagrin of those in the 
community with cancer diagnoses who described feeling pushed out of the community by those 
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with lesser diagnoses). One reason for this asymmetry is undoubtedly because people are 
diagnosed with precancer in far greater numbers than cancer. But it seemed to me possible that 
the uncertainty attached to precancer motivates these posts: precancer occupies a liminal space 
between cancer and non-cancer, in much the same way that dysthymia is thought to mark a 
“midpoint” between normal happiness and major depression. In any case, I noticed that anxious 
precancer posters who wondered whether they had undiagnosed cancer (rather than simply 
precancer) seemed to be following a procedure similar to dysthymia posters: describing 
symptoms, offering a possible diagnosis to account for one’s symptoms—undiagnosed cancer (as 
opposed to mere precancer)—and requesting feedback from others about the likelihood that the 
self-diagnosis was correct. However, in the precancer/cancer community, the posters appeared to 
be seeking assurance that the label did not fit, that the explanation of cancer was not a good fit 
for their symptoms. The precancer posters wanted to leave the community empty-handed, 
unburdened of the suspected diagnosis. In dysthymia communities, the opposite seems to be the 
case. People seek assurance that they have a suspected diagnosis, they seek assurance that the 
label seems to be a good fit. And when the label is deemed ill fitting, other possibilities are 
broached by the poster or offered up by the other posters who chime in. Again, they seem not to 
want to leave empty-handed; in the words of a poster above “I still go wit[h] the assumption of 
Dysthymia because I feel it fits better, but I will take anything at this point” (italics added).  
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2.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has woven together a brief history of dysthymia’s construction as an ambiguous 
diagnostic classification with observations about how this definitional ambiguity is harness as a 
rhetorical resource in dysthymia online health communities. The historical context recounted 
within this chapter suggests that dysthymia’s definitional ambiguity was not (only) a strategy for 
expanding the population to which a depressive disorder could be applied; this definitional 
vagueness was (also) intended to smooth tensions simmering between psychoanalysts and 
biological psychiatrists during production of the paradigm-shifting DSM-III. Robert Spitzer, head 
of the DSM-III task force and epistemological diplomat, oversaw the construction of dysthymia 
as a “borderline” depressive diagnostic entity that honored aspects of both paradigms. 
Specifically, dysthymia was fashioned as a “minor” or “mild” complement to Major Depressive 
Disorder— considered a hallmark disorder of the biopsychiatric paradigm that would go on to be 
diagnosed twice as often—but that notably diverged from its better-known nosological cousin in 
terms of temporality. Because dysthymia was defined as chronic (whereas all other affective 
disorders were considered episodic) it aligned with the sensibilities of psychoanalysts who 
considered such patients not to merely “have” depression but to essentially “be” depressives, and 
thus potential candidates for long-term talk therapy.  
Next, this chapter turned attention to interactions in online health communities, exploring 
how explanatory aspects from both psychiatry paradigms—the psychoanalytic and the 
biopsychiatric—blend together in online discussions centered on dysthymia’s causality and 
treatment. This section of the chapter employed Kenneth Burke’s conceptual pairing of symbolic 
action/nonsymbolic motion as a theoretical lens through which to observe discussions of 
causality, treatment, and agency in online health communities.  In doing so, it suggested that the 
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contemporary biomedical/biopsychiatric explanation of dysthymia (which emphasizes its  
neurochemistry) positions the disorder within the realm of “nonsymbolic motion”—Kenneth 
Burke’s term for the realm of the determined, that which resists linguistic influence or other 
forms of symbolic intervention. The psychoanalytic explanation of depression, however, 
conceptualizes depression as a manifestation of inner conflicts bubbling away within the 
unconscious, which need to be symbolically rendered in order to attain resolution; this account 
positions dysthymia somewhere within the realm of symbolic action—that which can be 
intentionally altered by symbolic engagement. In short, it would seem that the psychoanalytic 
account of dysthymia implicates individual agency as it pertains to dysthymia, and that the 
biopsychiatric account dispels individual agency as it pertains to dysthymia.  
Contrary to what might be expected, this chapter found that when psychoanalytic 
explanations of dysthymia’s causality were invoked, individual agency tended to be renounced, 
and when antidepressants (championed by the biomedical paradigm) were discussed as a method 
of treatment, individual agency tended to be reclaimed. This rhetorical strategy navigates the 
symbolic agency/nonsymbolic motion dialectic by resisting totalizing vocabularies that would 
locate dysthymia exclusively within the realm of motion or exclusively within the realm of 
symbolic action. To locate dysthymia squarely within the realm of motion would have the 
benefit of perhaps obviating questions about responsibility for one’s illness, but might have the 
undesirable side effect of leaving one with the uneasy sense that they are simply at the mercy of 
the body. On the other hand, to locate dysthymia squarely within the realm of symbolic action 
would grant that individual striving is potentially efficacious in the management of one’s illness, 
but might have the potential side effect of framing the existence of the illness itself as a matter of 
voluntary action, as an expression of one’s will (or lack thereof). As “patient agency” and 
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“patient empowerment” increasingly permeate health discourses, it will likely be important for 
rhetoricians to not only inquire into the rhetorical strategies that patients employ to claim agency, 
but also the strategies they use to renounce it. Perhaps such inquiries will turn up strategies 
similar to the one observed in this chapter: the renunciation of agency as it pertains to causality 
and the reclamation of agency as it pertains to treatment.  
Lastly, this chapter offered a metaphor for thinking about online health community 
interactions in which informal self-diagnosis seems a frequent aim: the fitting room. This section 
of the chapter recounted an important historical morsel from the DSM-III revision context: the 
1972 “Feighner criteria”—a paper credited with mainstreaming the usage of operationalized 
diagnostic criteria in psychiatric classification and diagnosis. The Feighner criteria helped 
establish contemporary diagnostic processes in which patients must manifest a minimum number 
of symptoms from itemized lists in order to “get into diagnosis,” as the expression went. At the 
time the Feighner criteria were adopted into widespread psychiatric usage, researchers probably 
did not imagine that in a few short decades, these itemized symptom lists would be as widely and 
easily accessible as the Internet and direct-to-consumer advertising has made them. This has led 
to concerns that individuals wishing to be diagnosed with a given mental disorder will simply 
memorize the diagnostic criteria and parrot it back to practitioners who will have no choice but 
to allow the patient to “get into” that diagnosis. An assumption underlying these concerns is that 
people wishing to “get into” diagnosis act with certainty that their self-selected diagnosis is the 
correct one. This is an assumption that I began researching with, and for this reason, I supposed 
that dysthymia online health communities probably functioned akin to waiting rooms: spaces 
where people simply bide their time as they await formal diagnosis. 
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  Instead, this chapter posited that online health communities for dysthymia function more 
like metaphorical “fitting rooms,” as spaces wherein people “get into” or “try on” diagnostic 
labels, assess the appropriateness of the fit, and solicit feedback from others before taking further 
action (such as, for example, stating their intention to pursue formal diagnosis). This metaphor 
was initially born out of noticing the frequency of references to diagnostic “fitness” throughout 
the communities: people often deliberated about how well the label of dysthymia “fit them” or, 
alternately phrased, how well they “fit into” the label of dysthymia. Beyond this ubiquitous 
language of fitness, people in the metaphorical fitting room act in other ways that are similar to 
patrons in clothing store fitting rooms: they solicit feedback from others about how well the label 
fits, often try on more than one label, and perhaps most strikingly, appear not to want to leave 
room empty-handed. (In the words of one poster, “I will take anything at this point.”) The fitting 
room metaphor may be especially appropriate considering the era of so-called “consumer-
driven” healthcare in which we are said to have entered. While in the past, scholars have focused 
on the injustices visited upon populations who are disproportionately ushered into depression 
diagnoses (Charland, 2004; Hurt, 2007), it is possible that in our contemporary context of 
consumer-driven health care, diagnostic injustice will be thought to occur primarily when people 








3.0  COMING TO TERMS WITH TEMPORALITY 
Like physical pain that becomes chronic, [mild depression] is miserable not so 
much because it is intolerable in the moment as because it is intolerable to have 
known it in the moments gone and to look forward only to knowing it in the 
moments to come. The present tense of mild depression envisages no alleviation 
because it feels like knowledge.  
—Andrew Solomon, 2001 
While drafting this chapter in 2016, the findings of a new study, published in the Journal of 
Psychopharmacology, made their way into popular science media coverage. With its somewhat 
cumbersome title, “Decreased mental time travel to the past correlates with default-mode 
network disintegration under lysergic acid diethylamide,” the study offered evidence that the 
ingestion of lysergic acid diethylamide (better known in its acronym form, LSD) appeared to 
improve depression symptoms in the study’s participants. The authors did not attribute this 
therapeutic effect to LSD’s widely known and much fabled propensity to alter sensory 
perceptions; rather, they hypothesized that this benefit stems largely from the drug’s potential to 
alter how people think about time. The implication of the study, then, is that certain ways of 
thinking about time are intertwined somehow with the subjective experience of depression, 
including specifically one particular way of temporalizing that the study dubs “mental time 
travel.” The authors define this phenomenon as the “ability of humans to mentally project 
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themselves backwards and forwards in time, to recollect aspects of past autobiographical 
episodes or imagined future experiences” (Speth et al., 2016, p. 344). According to the study, a 
predilection for so-called mental time travel, as measured by fMRI technology, was 
disproportionately identified in the brains of people diagnosed with depression and subsequently 
diminished post LSD-consumption, alongside the severity of depression symptoms. This study 
immediately caught my attention because its findings—though arrived at via radically different 
methods and with radically different objects of inquiry—resonated with what, at the time, were 
shaping up to be the central claims offered by this chapter.  
 In the broadest terms, this chapter argues for the importance of attending to the temporal 
dimensions of subjective accounts of dysthymia.45 This claim stems from an observation made 
during the initial analysis of the online health communities studied here: subjective accounts of 
dysthymia frequently formulate the problematic experience of dysthymia in ways that seem 
deeply rooted in particular perspectives on time. This chapter first examines how, in a practical 
way, the temporalizing of dysthymia accounts in online health communities enables practices of 
informal self-diagnosis—a common communicative aim of online mental health communities in 
general (Giles, 2011). This chapter terms one such practice “retrospective identification.” On a 
45 With the exception of the literature review, I mostly use the term “account” rather than “narrative” 
because it has, to my ear, a slightly more befitting rhetorical undertone, although narrative would be an 
accurate description of the content of the posts in online health communities studied here. While 
“narrative” is generally defined as the relaying of causally related events, an “account” could be 
considered a particular sort of narrative, one that renders the author “accountable” to a given audience in a 
given context. As Radley and Billig (1996) suggest, “accounts are always produced in situations and they 
gain their meaning from the rhetorical activities of those situations” (p. 224). Such accounts are neither 
stable nor undilemmatic, especially as they pertain to matters of health and illness. As Radley and Billig 
further point out, “Any shortfall in health has important implications for other areas of one’s life (e.g. 
work, personal relationships), in terms of which people feel that they are evaluated. Accounts of health 
and illness are, therefore, more than descriptions of one’s physical conditions…They also articulate a 
person’s situation in the world, and indeed, articulate that world, in which the individual will be held 
accountable to others” (p. 221).  
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more abstract level, the ways that these accounts are temporalized shape understandings of 
agency and possibility as they pertain to the disorder’s recollected onset in the past and 
anticipated trajectory in the future.  
The relationship between temporality and illness has been a topic of interest across the 
social sciences and humanities, with a particular emphasis on the experiences of individuals with 
chronic illnesses, as well as their caretakers, who often construct new time structures and 
perspectives in the event of diagnosis and the subsequent trajectory of illness.46 Though they 
may seem somewhat abstract, temporal perspectives often have practical aims and concrete 
effects in practice: they are constructed to respond to the daily challenges—physical, social, 
rhetorical, etc.—that often crop up in the wake of chronic illness. Charmaz (1992), for example, 
describes how people with chronic illnesses often immerse themselves deeply within the 
immediate present, constricting their views of time in an effort to exist within a temporal 
framework that she terms “living one day at a time.”  
“Living one day at a time” has some practical advantages. For some, putting on temporal 
blinders seems to ameliorate the general sense of overwhelmedness that often accompanies long 
views of a future replete with appointments stacked upon appointments, continual recalibration 
of medications, batteries of tests and so forth. Living one day at a time also divides the various 
forms of ongoing labor that many chronic illnesses necessitate into more manageable, discrete 
chunks. This immersion in the present, according to Charmaz (1992), often has the ultimate 
effect of conferring control in the face of the profound destabilization and uncertainty that 
chronic illness so often presents. This chapter will return to this particular temporal 
46 Though related, time “structures” and “perspectives” have slightly different meanings within sociology 
literature; the former has to do with the practical management of time as it pertains to daily activities, the 
latter has more to do with the ways in which people reflect upon and broadly conceptualize the past, 
present, and future.  
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perspective—“living one day at a time”—because it provides a stark counterexample to the sorts 
of temporal perspectives constructed in the online accounts of dysthymia studied here.  
In addition to having practical effects on, for example, the management of medication 
regimens or juggling of appointments, ways of thinking about time guide the construction of 
illness accounts. And how these illness accounts are temporalized configure and convey a 
narrator’s ideas about agency and responsibility as they pertain to health and illness. As Bulow 
and Hyden (2003) argue, the temporalizing of illness accounts, and the punctuation of events 
therein, shape understandings of constraint and possibility:  
Every suffering and illness has a history—a past, a present, and a future. Thus 
suffering and illnesses raise questions associated with temporality: were the past 
events necessary and unavoidable, could anything else have happened, and what 
will happen next?...The construction of the order and the relationship between 
events involves asking questions about factors including the result of one’s own 
action or lack of action, about necessity and externally-originating constraints, 
about what might have been possible but never occurred (p. 71-74). 
As the authors suggest above, the temporal aspects of illness accounts engage the thorny and 
rhetorically malleable matter of should be regarded as the most salient contributing factor to 
one’s current state of health/illness: externally-originating constraints or internally-motivated 
action (or lack thereof). Such determinations—or more precisely, the processes by which such 
determinations are made—were at the heart of Burke’s interest when he crafted the dialectical 
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pairing of symbolic action and nonsymbolic motion, an important concept from the previous 
chapter.  
After synthesizing several bodies of literature to establish the relationship between 
temporality and subjective accounts of illness, this chapter probes the temporalizing of 
dysthymia accounts in online health communities. First, it explores the general characteristics of 
the temporal perspectives commonly established within the context of the online health 
communities studied here, perspectives that are dubbed “panoramic.” Briefly summarized, 
panoramic temporal perspectives are characterized by temporal expansion (rather than the 
contraction that has been observed within accounts of chronic physical illness) and are marked 
by a declared sense of detachment from the present rather than an immersion within it. Next, the 
chapter focuses on a communicative aim that these expansive temporal perspectives ostensibly 
help accomplish, and which might be particularly salient in an age of online health: a practice 
that this chapter terms “retrospective identification.” Retrospective identification is a practice 
through which aspects of the self previously understood as part of one’s “personality” come to be 
understood as symptoms of dysthymia, the clinical diagnosis of which requires (minimally) two 
years’ worth of mood recollection on the part of the patient. Lastly, this chapter points to the 
ways in which panoramic temporal perspectives shape seem to perceptions of the future, 
including the anticipated trajectory of the disorder.   
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3.1  THE OBJECTIVITY AND SUBJECTIVITY OF TEMPORALITY 
The central focus of this chapter is the subject of time in online health accounts of dysthymia, or 
more specifically, the subject of temporality. First, it bears mentioning that “time” and 
“temporality” are related concepts but not equivalent: temporality generally refers to the 
experience of lived time. The role that time plays in terms of shaping both the broad rhythms of 
collective life and the finer details of individual experience has made it a topic of interest across 
many fields, an interest that is perhaps especially keen for phenomenologists, psychologists, and 
sociologists. Often quoted in literature reviews of time is sociologist Emile Durkheim, who 
regarded time as the ultimate engine of social order, without which “society” as we know it 
would be unthinkable.  
The so-called “macrosocial” view of time—that is, viewing time as a sort of social glue 
or engine of collective order—is useful for explaining societal rhythms and flows, but sheds dim 
light on the subjective experience of time, and does not account for the ways in which 
individuals can have widely variable experiences of time even when said experiences are 
unfolding in the same given context (Flahtery, 1999). A two-hour lecture, for example, might 
pass rapidly for the lecturer, while the same two hours might pass agonizingly slowly for a 
particular audience member.47  Phenomenologists have taken up the question of what accounts 
for this variability, operating from the premise that temporality is, on its most basic level, a 
fundamental layer of subjectivity. Part of what makes the subjective experience of time 
47 Flahtery (2000) has suggested that one’s perception of time is especially likely to expand based on very 
high or very low levels of activity. An experience that seems packed with activity, such as a car accident 
for example, can seem to stretch on forever, as can a period of time characterized by low levels of 
activity, such as waiting on the phone for customer service.  
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compelling is the fact that we can go about our lives often completely unaware of the role 
temporality plays in shaping the emotional character of our experiences, while at other times we 
are acutely aware of time’s passage and the various emotional impacts it has on us, including, for 
example, frustration, (it has been said that boredom is simply an awareness of time passing), 
sadness, nostalgia, etc.48  
Temporality can be difficult to theorize because it arguably rests somewhere between the 
objective and subjective, or perhaps, as has been suggested, it arises from the interplay between 
the two (Flahtery, 2000). There is clearly an objective dimension to time, captured in the various 
metrics that have been constructed to coordinate our social rhythms: clocks, timers, calendars, 
etc. These technologies may objectively mark time, but as media studies scholar Nowotny (2015) 
has remarked, they can never subjectively make time.49 The only thing that “makes time” is a 
human subject, and this occurs by fusing together the heterogeneous, discrete moments of lived 
experience into a “coherent sense of persistence” (Flahtery, 2000, p. 1).   
The transformation by which discrete moment-to-moment experiences gel into a coherent 
thread of perception is generally referred to in time-oriented literature as the phenomenon of 
“duration.” The essence of duration, according to Edmund Husserl, who wrote prolifically on the 
nature of time consciousness, is the continual interplay between memory and experience. 
Without memory of the discrete moments in time that elapsed prior to the unfolding present, 
there would be no building blocks from which to fuse together a sense of duration; likewise, the 
recollection of past experience produces future-focused expectations that shape one’s experience 
48 While nostalgia is often theorized spatially—as a desire to return to a particular place—Boym (2001) 
argues that it is perhaps more often a longing for immersion in a different kind of time, “the time of our 
childhood, the slower rhythms of our dreams” or perhaps “time out of time, not encumbered by 
appointment books” (p. 8).   
49 Nowotny (2015) writes, “technologies alone can never manufacture time, any more than clocks” (p. 
39).  
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in the present.50 Minkowski (1933) famously called the experience of duration “lived time” and 
for this reason suggests that time is, “a synonym for life in the broadest sense of the word” 
(p.13). This is a claim that bears resemblance to Aristotle’s formulation of time in Physics, in 
which he proposes that time could be considered the sum total of change or movement within the 
world. 
3.2  BEYOND LINEAR VIEWS OF TIME 
George Herbert Mead, perhaps the main authorizing figure in symbolic interactionist theories of 
time, proclaimed that the self is, fundamentally, a “temporal process” (1932, p. 13). As 
participants in the temporal process by which selves are constituted, Mead argued that 
individuals do not merely respond to their physical and social realities, they actively construct 
the meanings of these realities through their interactions with the various people and things 
within them, and also in interaction with themselves as they continually reconstruct the past, 
envision the future, and act in the present according to these reconstructions and envisionings. 
Viewing time as a dynamic, constructive process rather than a static, objective metric pushes 
back against “liner” views of time in which time is conceived as a fixed straight line that reaches 
back into the past, traces its way into the present, and trudges forward into the future. 
Interactionist theories, by contrast, do not follow this traditional linear past-present-future 
progression. They instead tend to use the present as a point of departure, and consider how 
50 The experience of duration is considered so central to the production of meaning in human life that 
diseases that preclude or impinge upon the ability to experience duration—notably, for example 
Alzheimer’s disease—are regarded as agents that rob life of the possibility of meaning. See for example, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/17/magazine/the-last-day-of-her-life.html.  
  111 
people are constantly using the present to reinterpret the past and project into the future on the 
basis of emergent events (Barken, 2014). These reinterpretations and projections in turn shape 
how one perceives and acts within the present.  
 Mead, focused on the extent to which reconstructions of the past and projections into the 
future color one’s experience of the present, formulated the concept of the “specious present.” 
For him, the present is “specious” because the borders that separate the past, present, and future 
from one another are not stationary or inflexible, but dynamic and porous.51 In Philosophy of the 
Act (1933), he remarks that he specious present is assembled of “the imagery of past and future 
experiences taken out of their place…It is a real duration, but this duration has no relation to the 
completion of these act. These experiences belong to the reconstruction to which a later response 
will take place. They belong to the beginning of a later act. As such they are in a present” (p. 
221). As summarized by Natanson (1973), this means that the present is not specious in the sense 
that it is somehow false, but because it “has at its active borders the content of the past and 
expectations of the future” (p. 75). These active borders mark a time span “extending back to 
memories of the past and forward to anticipations of the future” (Barken, 2014, p. 697). The 
                                                 
51 Interestingly, the past decade has seen the emergence of a movement whose central aim is to make the 
“specious present” decidedly less specious: the “mindfulness movement,” which has so far been couched 
in a vocabulary of mental health and wellbeing. The movement, whose general principles have been 
derived from Buddhist contemplative traditions, touts the health benefits of habituating oneself to become 
more fully immersed in the so-called “present moment.” One of the commonest strategies taught within 
the movement is paying very close attention to the details and character of one’s present experience, to in 
essence dissolve the “active borders” between the past, present, and future and to locate oneself firmly 
within the discrete present moment. Within the discourses that have sprung up around the movement, it is 
often hinted at and sometimes explicitly claimed that reconstructions of the past and projections into the 
future are in some ways intrinsically opposed to wellbeing and psychological health. While criticisms of 
the mindfulness movement exist and are likely to multiply, the movement is of interest because it is 
perhaps poised to popularize the notion of a causal linkage between mental health and ways of thinking 
about and experiencing time. 
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“present” then, is a more multifaceted and expansive phenomenon than everyday usage of the 
term typically suggests. 
3.3 THE TEMPORALIZING OF ILLNESS NARRATIVES 
To the extent that the temporal dimensions of health and illness have been theorized, the focus 
has been largely on the relationship between temporality and narrative. This attention to narrative 
likely stems at least in part from the so-called “narrative turn” in the humanities and social 
sciences, a shift that has called for a renewed focus on storytelling as a fundamental aspect of 
human experience, one that operates both as a mode of reasoning about our experiences and a 
means for representing those experiences to others (Bruner, 2001). In addition to academia’s 
narrative turn, structural changes in medicine have converged to center patient narratives, the 
study of which has since burgeoned into its own subfield called “narrative medicine.” For some, 
this shift is evidence that that the Western paradigm of biomedical authority has been punctured, 
paving the way for the question of subjective patient experience to (re)assert itself (Morris, 
2002).52
Another development that has likely played a role in the re-centering of patient 
experience originated not necessarily within the confines of medicine proper, but more so from 
public sphere outside it: specifically, the digital age and the proliferation of health-related 
52 In Morris’ (2000) estimation, the “grand narrative” of Western biomedicine has withered in much the 
same way that other planes of authority from which so-called “grand narratives” derive, have weakened, 
allowing for the proliferation of the fragmented micro-narratives that Lyotard famously (1979) claimed 
are characteristic of the postmodern condition.  
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information and communication forums that it has brought with it. This digital communication 
climate has meant that patients have a more diverse range of knowledge to draw upon when 
fashioning narratives, and importantly, a greater number of forums in which to share such 
narratives with the possibility of an audience.53 As Bury (2001) describes the professional and 
social dynamics of this shift:   
Where once the bio-medical paradigm held sway (and where doctors jealously 
guarded its secrets), now lay people have access to an increasing range of 
information and ideas about the origins, courses, and outcomes of illness and its 
treatment. This too fuels the reduction medical authority as the fountain of all 
official knowledge about illness, and expands the range of culturally available 
narratives that can be articulated. Though these, admittedly are often drawn from 
alternative professionally-crafted knowledge, for example, via self-help groups 
focusing on specific chronic disease or “mediated ideas’ taken from multifarious 
public discourses, their scope provides people with much greater opportunity to 
fashion personal narratives that connect the private sphere with public forms of 
knowledge (p. 268). 
Another structural change implicated in the re-centering of patient experience has to do 
with what is perhaps one of biomedicine’s greatest crowning achievements, an achievement that 
is decidedly temporal in its essence: the transformation of many acute (i.e., catastrophic and 
53 As Jurecic (2012) has suggested, how people narrativize their experiences of health and illness is only 
ever one half of the question; the other side of the question concerns who will listen to such narratives, 
and, what will they hear when they are told?  
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generally short-lived) illnesses into chronic illnesses. Management of chronic illnesses tends to 
enjoin patients (and their caretakers) to assume a more active role in the management of their 
own medical care, making the question of the subjective patient view both more visible and more 
pressing as the “contingencies of everyday life reassert themselves” (Bury, 2001, p. 267). 54  
Type 1 Diabetes is often pointed to as a paradigmatic example of the acute-chronic 
transformation that has called for greater patient participation. Before the development of insulin 
therapy in 1922, a diagnosis of diabetes was nothing short of a terminal diagnosis. Since then, it 
has come to mean a lifetime of carefully dispensed insulin, meticulously monitored blood 
glucose, and closely regulated eating habits, at least for the so-deemed “compliant” diabetic.55 
These efforts are generally spearheaded by the patient, and importantly, their effects are 
temporal in nature. Maines (1983), for example, stresses the centrality of temporality in the 
subjective diabetic experience, arguing that “it is the temporal dimension that unites the diabetic 
experience, in terms of its other dimensions: physiological, emotional, social, interpersonal, 
technological, organizational, institutional and personal arenas” (p. 103-104).  Maines points out 
54 Just as the mindfulness movement, as discussed in an earlier footnote, is co-optable by the forces of 
neoliberalism, so too is the patient empowerment movement, which Crawford (2004) points out has, for 
example, created a favorable rhetorical climate in which employers feel “empowered” to shift a greater 
portion of insurance costs to their employees.  
55 The notion of patient “compliance,” though still in wide usage in medical literature, is now regarded as 
fraught by the field of bioethics and humanities disciplines. Like Maines (1983), Martins (2005) also sets 
his sights on type 1 diabetes, showing how concepts of “compliance” and its cousin term “adherence” 
gained their relevance thanks to biotechnological advancements. These achievements have ostensibly 
bolstered patient agency but the model of agency often implied by compliance research presupposes “that 
agency can be transferred from one individual to another through an exchange of certified knowledge, 
skills, or technologies” (p. 61). This way of thinking about compliance and agency, Martins argues, fails 
to attend to the ways in which biotechnologies have altered the meanings of the agency and compliance, 
not to mention of the meanings of the body itself. Segal (2007), meanwhile, attends to the moves 
underway to replace the patient “compliance” terminological framework —the tone of which now 
registers to some as overly paternalistic—with models that stress shared decision making between expert 
and patient, most notably “concordance.”  Unpacking the “concordance” paradigm from a rhetorical 
perspective, Segal finds that it is simply “compliance” dressed in more egalitarian clothing, and argues for 
critical attention the ways in which this seemingly neutral model serves the interests of the 
pharmaceutical industry generally and commercialized healthcare more broadly. 
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that for some diabetics, in particular so-deemed “compliant” diabetics, there is often a sense that 
time is compressing, that the borders between tenses are shifting and blurring to the point that 
they are “almost too close to one another to present meaningful distinctions” (p. 112). For the 
less compliant diabetics, those who resist the biopsychiatric fact of their diabetes by adopting an 
attitude that “whatever happens, happens,” time might not compress but expand, becoming 
amorphous and unfocused, “lacking the sharp edges of time consciousness” (p. 112).  
In addition to foregrounding the ins and outs of daily patient life, chronic illnesses are 
thought to significantly destabilize ongoing life narratives, calling for substantive revision to  
help integrate the illness into one’s biographical identity. Through the interdisciplinary body of 
literature on illness narratives runs a distinct thread that thematizes the onset of chronic illness as 
disruption or interruption, in the sense that illness can wrench loose previously entrenched 
aspects of one’s biographical identity (Bury, 1982; Frank, 1995; Radley & Billig, 1996; Hyde, 
2016). The notion of illness as biographical disruption has been of particular interest for 
sociologists, given the sociological premise that it is possible to “learn a good deal about day-to-
day in routine settings from analyzing circumstances in which those settings are radically 
disturbed” (Giddens, 1979, p. 123). Thus, we stand to learn something about the everyday by 
looking at exactly the opposite: events that are seen as somehow extraordinary, those that upend 
the patterns and rhythms of the everyday. Put another way, the exceptional has potential to 
illuminate its opposite, the mundane. In the same way, sociologists have contended that learning 
about the experience of dramatic illness sheds light on supposedly undilemmatic experiences of 
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health or non-illness, and thus, looking at instances of what might be considered “disrupted” 
biographies can reveal something about the nature of not-yet-disrupted biographies.56   
An intersubjective dimension emerges when theorizing chronic illness as disruption: 
chronic illnesses “disrupt” not only the life of the afflicted individual, these disruptions are prone 
to ripple outward into the lives of others. Thus, for the person with a chronic illness, there may 
be complicated rhetorical work involved in negotiating these disruptions, especially vis-à-vis 
requesting the care, assistance, and “entitlements” (certainly a loaded term) that many chronic 
illnesses require, including government assistance programs, the labor of caregivers, the 
flexibility of employers and so on. Given the intersubjective dimensions of these “disruptions,” it 
has been claimed that people with chronic illness often put a great deal of communicative work 
into providing an “account” of their illness, and the various forms of disruption that their 
illnesses may come to entail (Radley and Billig, 1996).  
Distancing oneself from illness—assiduously maintaining a space between one’s self-
concept and one’s illness—is one way of accounting for one’s illness and the potential 
disruptions entailed by it. It is worth noticing that “disruption” is a term that carries an implicitly 
negative valence. This implicit negative valence has perhaps fueled the notion that people with 
chronic illnesses are enjoined to do some kind of rhetorical work to separate themselves from 
their illnesses, in order to preserve certain aspects of their previously stable biography. In other 
words, there is an assumption that people often feel compelled to disidentify from their illness. 
People disidentifying from their illness “try to keep illness at the margins of their lives and 
56 Conceptualizing the onset of chronic illness as ‘biographical disruption’ has significant temporal 
implications, because “disruption” suggests a clean line of separation that divides life into “normal 
befores” and “disrupted afters.” This makes most sense within a linear temporal framework, where time is 
thought of as a straight arrow from the past into the present and from the present into the future, however 
uncertain that future may be. 
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outside the boundaries of their self-concepts. Though sometimes people can do that, at other time 
they must struggle to do so, and at times they cannot” (Charmaz, 1992, p. 4). Implicated in this 
rhetorical move is the enduring question of agency (and responsibility) that emerges time and 
again in discussions of illness specifically and embodiment generally. As Bury (2001) 
summarizes it, “To be able to hold the disease ‘at a distance’ as it were, assists the claim that one 
is victim of external forces. To do anything less is to accept fully the burden of responsibility” 
(p. 173).  Also, because of this negative valence, conceptualizing illness as disruption often 
comes packaged with an assumption that people with chronic illnesses are [or should be] seeking 
some sort of restoration to a former state of affairs.57  
 Despite the negative valence of “disruption”, a rhetorical perspective might invite 
consideration of the ways in which identifying with an illness can likewise serve important 
functions in a given context; the choice to do so likely depends as much on the type of illness as 
the individual’s sense of identity and present life circumstances. For example, sufferers of 
historically contested illnesses sometimes strongly identify with their illness, finding ways to 
fuse the diagnostically fuzzy entity with their sense of identity, which seems to be part of a larger 
strategy to legitimate the ontology of the contested illness itself (Segal, 2005; Graham, 2009).   
 The question of whether and how to identify with or disidentify from one’s illness is 
perhaps especially complicated as it applies to mental illnesses, given that they root in the 
mind/brain—the mysterious entity that often operates as a metonym for selfhood. Journalist 
Tracy Thompson, who has been treated for Major Depressive Disorder, has written about the 
dilemma in ways that Dumit (2003) seizes upon to illuminate the tricky rhetorical dynamics 
                                                 
57 In his path breaking typology of the narratives people develop after health-jeopardizing events, Frank 
(1996) pointed to the “restitution” narrative as one of the commonest in the West: this narrative is 
characterized by dogged belief in the restorability of a former state of health. The restitution narrative, as 
Frank points out, typically entails a conceptual dissociation of self from body.  
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involved in identifying with or separating oneself from illnesses thought to originate in the brain, 
the so-called seat consciousness. Thompson (1990) articulates the dilemma as follows (as quoted 
by Dumit [2003], p. 42).   
I could say, There is something wrong with my brain. That was a different thing 
from saying, There is something wrong with me. The second was self-pitying; the 
first was a simple, factual statement. It was a subtle nuance, easy to miss. But as I 
grasped the difference—and it was slippery, I kept losing it at first—other doors 
began to open in my mind: Depression is an illness. I am sick. I need to be here 
[in this mental institution] because I’m defective, not because I’m a moral leper, 
not because I’ve fallen from grace or turned my back on God, but for one simple 
reason: because I am sick. But there my thinking stalled. So I was sick. But this 
was my brain I was talking about, not my gallbladder or kidneys. It had some 
mysterious property called “consciousness.” It produced behavior, the sum total 
of which was somehow me. If I wanted to say that my brain was sick, I could stop 
there and disavow responsibility for that sickness—but if I did that, I would be 
giving up my idea of autonomy in the world. I would be simply a product of some 
chemical abnormality in a lumpy gray organ between my ears (p. 189-190, 
original italics).  
Thompson’s dilemma, as Dumit (2003) formulates it, concerns whether, and how, she can 
disidentify with her depression without disavowing her self in the process. As Dumit unpacks the 
dilemma, “She is a depressed person because she has a depressed brain. The too-simple cultural 
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alternatives of either being responsible for her sickness, or not being her brain are complicated. 
She is her brain against her brain: she is now a person with depression fighting that 
depression…She comes to see herself, and she becomes, a particular kind of person, a kind she 
shares with others who also have depression and who are people with depression” (p. 42).  
Dumit’s reading of Thompson’s memoir echoes one of the main arguments from the 
previous chapter: when issues of etiology are foregrounded in discourses about depression, they 
are often framed in the vocabulary of Burke’s nonsymbolic motion (i.e,. biopsychiatric processes 
that are deemed outside the scope of symbolic remediation), and when issues of treatment 
emerge, the tend to be framed as matters of symbolic action (i.e., matters amenable to agentive 
forms of symbolic intervention).  In the forthcoming exploration of discussions in online health 
communities, notions responsibility and agency surface once more, but this time with a focus on 
the issue of temporality and with an interest in how different ways of temporalizing illness shape 
perceptions of agency and responsibility.  
An observation that runs through the sociology of health and illness, articulated by 
Charmaz (1992), is that “being ill gives rise to ways—often new ways—of experiencing time” 
(p. 4). In an age of so-called healthism, a term coined by sociologist Robert Crawford to describe 
the “striking moralization” of contemporary health discourses and practices, the need to attend to 
the temporalizing of illness and concomitant conceptualizations of agency/responsibility is a 
pressing one. As Bulow and Hyden (2003) note, people who are in the position of narrativizing 
their illness experiences (which one would imagine to be a position that many, if not most, would 
be put in when acute or chronic illness presents) “use time to create a narrative based on a 
balancing act between personal responsibility and liability, between hope and despair, between 
the possible and the actual” (p. 72).  
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It is important, then, to attend to the various forms of temporality that emerge in accounts 
of illness and how these temporalities link up with notions of responsibility and agency. Morson 
(1994), a literary theorist, explains the importance of attending to temporality in narratives, 
stating, “Over the centuries, concepts essential to our sense of being human, such as blame, hope, 
guilt, and regret, have been closely linked with beliefs about the nature of time. Whether events 
are fated, on the one hand, or something indeterministic and fundamentally contingent, on the 
other, affects how we think about ourselves and our lives” (p. 2). Such questions become 
particularly salient when applied to the slippery terrain of mental disorders given the degree to 
which notions of the mind/brain are imbricated with notions of selfhood.  
3.4  PANORAMIC TEMPORAL PERSPECTIVES 
In The Noonday Demon: An Atlas of Depression (2001), Andrew Solomon considers the 
differences between mild and major depression at the level of individual experience. About mild 
depression, Solomon has this to say: “[I]t is miserable not so much because it is intolerable in the 
moment as because it is intolerable to have known it in the moments gone and to look forward 
only to knowing it in the moments to come. The present tense of mild depression envisages no 
alleviation because it feels like knowledge” (p. 16). While one might think that the primary 
distinction between “mild” and “major” depression would be the severity of symptoms (with 
mild depression being a sort of watered down version of major depression), Solomon here has 
homed in on the issue of temporality. Perhaps this should not be surprising, given that dysthymia 
(or as he colloquially refers to it, mild depression) is an illness defined explicitly in terms of the 
relationship between mood and temporality. That is to say, the difference between “normal” 
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periods of sadness and the sadness that characterizes dysthymia is not to be found in the specific 
qualities or overall character of the sadness but in its persistence (that is, its temporality).  
While analyzing interactions in online health communities, the claim that Solomon 
advances—that the intolerability of mild depression stems not so much from its moment-to-
moment subjective character as from “having known it in the moments gone by and to look 
forward only to knowing it in the moments to come” —repeatedly struck me anew. Or perhaps 
more precisely, the implication of this claim continually occurred to me:  the subjective 
experience of dysthymia might not be regarded as particularly unpleasant in the present tense, 
but it becomes unpleasant when viewed through the lens of the distant past (which is often 
described in online health accounts of dysthymia as having been “wasted” or “tainted” by the 
blanketing effects of the disorder) and with an eye toward the future (in which, it is typically 
predicted, the problems of the past will continue to reassert themselves).  
The subjective experience of depression—ostensibly in all its various subtypes—has been 
said to elude literal description, and so it is no surprise that metaphors are often crafted to capture 
something of its experiential character (Ratcliffe, 2015). In one of the online health communities 
examined here, a repeatedly deployed metaphor is particularly striking in terms of how smoothly 
it maps onto Solomon’s claim above. This metaphor is weather-based in nature, and so one 
might assume that it would be predominantly spatial in terms of its orientation, but I view it 
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instead as deeply rooted in time.58 That is, the temporal dimension of this particular metaphor 
seems to have a stronger resonance than the spatial dimension. Weather-based metaphors are 
repeatedly deployed by one of the “group leaders” in the MDJunction.com community, often for 
the purpose of advising newer members as they work to formulate expectations regarding the 
likely trajectory of illness. 59 Below are two iterations of the metaphor: 
58 Weather-based metaphors intended to capture something about the experience of depression are 
certainly not confined to online health communities. William Styron, in his autobiography of depression, 
Darkness Visible (1990), which is considered a path breaking memoir, has the following to say about his 
depression in one of the book’s most widely quoted lines: “Beginning at about three o’clock…I’d feel the 
horror, like some poisonous fogbank, roll in upon my mind, forcing me to bed (p. 58). Here, the weather 
(a “fogbank” rolling in) has specific temporal orientation, it begins at about three o’clock in the afternoon. 
For another example of metaphors linking together time and weather, consider the following from 
Andrew Solomon, in which he delineates the experience of major from mild depression: “It is not 
pleasant to experience decay, to find yourself exposed to the ravages of an almost daily rain, and to know 
that you are turning into something feeble, that more and more of you will blow off the first strong wind, 
making you less and less. Some people can accumulate more emotional rust than others. Depression starts 
out insipid, fogs the days into a dull color, weakens ordinary actions until their clear shapes are obscured 
by the effort they require, leaves you tired and bored and self-obsessed—but you can get through all that. 
Not happily, perhaps, but you can get through. No one has ever been able to define the collapse point that 
marks major depression, but when you get there, there’s not much mistaking it…Depression exists in 
time. A patient may say that he has spent certain months suffering depression, but this is a way of 
imposing a measurement on the immeasurable. All that one can really say for certain is that one has 
known major depression, and that one does or does not have it at any given present moment.” (p. 17, 
italics added). Interestingly, Solomon appears to delineate mild from major depression to the extent that 
the former does not render the experience of time practically incoherent, while the latter does.  
59 According to MDJunction.com, role of online health community “group leader” consists primarily of 
welcoming new members, maintaining conversations when activity slows, ensuring that new threads do 
not go unanswered, monitoring posts for inappropriate content, and banning members if deemed 
necessary. 
(2014, November 11). Re: Ahh Dysthymia. Message posted to 
http://MDJunction.com/dysthymia. 
I like to think of it as every day being the 10th day in a row where it rains. You 
get so tired of it being lousy, but there isn't a thing that will actually fix it. You 
can take meds like you use an umbrella-- it's fine in a mist, but not so great in a 
heavy downpour. Really all you can do is learn to accept the rain. That's my 
Dysthymia metaphor for the day! 
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In the first usage of the weather metaphor, an isolated instance of poor weather is not described 
as problematic in and of itself. Rainy weather on a particular day—“the 10th day”—is 
transformed into something unpleasant, even intolerable, when it is placed within the broader 
context of the previous nine days, each of which was characterized by similarly dreary weather. 
Put another way, the tenth day of rain is not the problem. The tenth rainy day only becomes 
problematic in the context of nine preceding days of similar weather. As a result, the group 
leader counsels, the only pragmatic course of action is to anticipate future rainy weather and 
acclimate to that prospect. Thus, it is claimed that the present manifestation of dysthymia is not 
intolerable. However, it becomes difficult to tolerate when placed within the context of an 
undesirable past, which then leads to anticipations of a similarly unfulfilling future.     
That experiences of chronic illness often involve shifts in ways of thinking about time has 
been noted across fields, including, especially, medical sociology.  As mentioned earlier, 
Charmaz (1992) has detailed how individuals with chronic illnesses often describe a sense of 
being yanked into the immediate present, especially when symptoms are severe or escalating in 
nature. The intensity of symptoms, and their disruptive effects, she posits, often pulls people 
toward adopting a temporal framework summed up by the in vivo code, “living one day at a 
time.” 60 As she defines it, living one day at a time means “dealing with illness on a day-to-day 
basis, holding future plans and even ordinary activities in abeyance while the person, and, often, 
others deal with the illness” (Charmaz, 2014, p. 180). This temporal framework is not simply an 
60 The Latin phrase “in vivo,” translates as “within the living.” Grounded theory methodology encourages 
researchers to identify and unpack “in vivo codes,” which are phrases or buzz words with meanings so 
taken-for-granted that they are rarely stated explicitly. For example, an in vivo code that recurs 
throughout the online health communities studied here is “snap out of it”—it is most frequently used 
when participants discuss the (im)possibility of “snapping out of” their dysthymia.   
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effect of illness, it is an active strategy for contending with it on a practical level, in terms of 
managing daily activities, and on a perspectival level, in terms of constructing the meanings of 
illness. Perhaps most importantly, Charmaz notes that immersion in the immediate present often 
seems to have the effect of conferring a sense of control in the face of uncertain illness 
trajectories.  
While people with chronic illnesses frequently describe a sense of immersion in the 
present moment—whether that immersion is perceived as voluntary or involuntary—accounts of 
dysthymia in online health communities are organized within a temporal framework that could 
plausibly be regarded as the inverse of living one day at a time. That is, people often provide 
accounts of dysthymia describe a sense of detachment from the present tense of their lives and 
immersion in a sprawling temporal landscape that stretches from the remote past into the distant 
future. They do not prune their views of time in order to lodge themselves more deeply within 
the present. Instead, in their accounts, they describe a sense of being whisked out of the present 
tense of their lives and immersed (or, perhaps more apropos, “stuck”) in an expansive temporal 
terrain that this chapter terms “panoramic” temporality.  
Panorama is a term that refers to space, not time. Perhaps most commonly the term is 
used in reference to photography. In photography, a panorama can be a type of perspective, 
specifically a broad, uninterrupted view of the area that surrounds the observer. It can also refer 
to a type of image that provides a wide, horizontally elongated view of its subject matter.  Both 
senses of the term are appropriate to describe the temporal perspectives frequently drawn upon 
narrate the accounts of dysthymia examined here. People authoring the online health accounts 
examined here often describe their experience with dysthymia in broad temporal terms, briefly 
locating their sense of the present somewhere within the sprawl. They seem to describe their 
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experiences using in the voice of a passive, distant observer—a spectator of the photograph 
rather than the photographer. An example follows:  
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(2013, July 7). How am I Supposed to Make a Marriage Work? Message 
posted to http://experienceproject.com/dysthymia. 
Well I guess it all started for me- with what is actually one of my earliest 
memories. My Parents fighting over who should have custody of me after they 
had decided to divorce.  
I guess as [a] five year old it seemed much more dramatic ot me than it 
actually was. Looking back at that memory, I literally feel like one was tugging 
on one arm whilst the other was tugging on the opposite one like some sort of 
rag doll.  
All though my childhood, people were very caring and thoughtful, always 
making sure to take me to one side and ask me in that very nice but somehow 
condescending way “are you alright?” and “How do you feel?” Honest answer 
– I don’t know! I didn’t feel like I had a right to be upset, I felt like if I voiced
my opinion my parents would divorce me & I would be on my own.
From then on, I think I felt something akin to joy at times, but it wasn’t really 
happiness. It was the echo of what I should be feeling & me displaying an 
outward sign of that to get people off my back.  
It wasn’t until three years ago, that my fiancée finally got me to go see a 
psychiatrist and I was diagnosed with this thing that I had never heard of – 
dysthymia- and put me on medication. Then it all came flooding back. Actual 
happiness existed within me- that’s great, right?  
Well for about a week it was there. Then I realized that I had spent 25 years of 
my life never feeling good about myself, my surroundings, my loved ones – it 
was all a lie! Instead of getting better, I got much, much worse. I spiraled into a 
depression, slowly cutting off from everyone.  
I developed an increased sense of social anxiety that had always been there, 
but which started to take over my life. I stopped talking to my fiancée, I find it 
more difficult than ever to open up to her about my feeling, thought and 
opinions.  
We are getting married in 4 days and we seem to be arguing more than ever 
because I don’t tell her the smallest bits of information regarding what I am 
doing, thinking or feeling.  
About the only emotion I am sure about is that I lover more than life itself, but 
I don’t think that she can see that. I don’t think that she can see that I care 
about her any more or that I value her 
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This account of dysthymia exemplifies what this chapter calls a “panoramic” temporal 
perspective. The temporal bounds of this account are stretched and expansive, starting with a 
recounting of a memory identified as one of the author’s earliest: parental tension over custody. 
The account later ends with a focus on a future event, the author’s upcoming nuptials and 
concomitant concerns about how to “make a marriage work” in a relational context that will 
presumably be colored by the symptoms of a chronic mood disorder. Unlike Charmaz’ “living 
one day at a time,” which involves narrowing one’s temporal perspective in order to making the 
present moment more livable, panoramic temporal perspectives broaden temporality rather than 
contracting it. This perspective produces a broadly stretched view of one’s life in light of 
disorder, often starting with distant past experiences considered “milestones” in the development 
of dysthymia (usually a specific childhood event or relationship) and progressing to a meditation 
on the future, which, it is assumed, will continue to be impeded upon by the wide-ranging effects 
of the disorder. 
 Accounts of dysthymia assembled via panoramic temporal perspectives often evoke a 
sense of time gone by, of large segments of elapsed time tainted, stolen, or wasted by the effects 
of the disorder. Some, like the author above, describe feeling much worse in the face of 
diagnosis when they come to believe that a significant portion of time has been “wasted” because 
of a disorder, as though the problem of “wasted time” would be more tolerable were it 
attributable to something other than a mood disorder. The act of naming a clearly experienced 
but ill-defined problem is often regarded as one with rhetorical and pragmatic significance—
whether that problem is social, political, biological, etc. in nature. This is because naming 
defines, delimits, and demystifies that which was previously amorphous or opaque, which in turn 
helps to render the newly defined problem actionable. Some posts include a description of 
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feeling empowered in the wake of formal diagnosis, since the problem “finally has a name” and 
“the enemy” has been identified. At the same time, other posts, such as the one above, describe 
the opposite; that is, a description of feeling disempowered upon formal diagnosis, of feeling 
worse after the longstanding, previously unnamed problem has been linguistically defined.   
(2015, May 1). I Have Dysthymia. Message posted to 
http://experienceproject.com/dysthymia. 
[Context: Most likely caused by the death of my mother when I was three and 
an authoritarian and emotionally unavailable father] It went undetected 
because it isn’t THAT bad, as most dysthymics will tell you, things are just 
very rarely great. I’ve dealt with a lot of meaningless sadness, if you realy 
want to get a feel for what it’s like to have dysthymia, watch Annie Hally by 
Woody Allen, there’s a great line in there that succinctly sums up being 
dysthymic, [I’m paraphrasing] “I think there’s two camps in life, there’s the 
miserable and the horrible, the horrible I could never imagine being part of the 
horrible, you know, starving children, terminal cases so I’m grateful to be part 
of the miserable.” In short, at least in my case with early-onset dysthymia there 
was never much happiness to go around. I remember from my earliest 
experiences of metacognition and before, I was never really excited about a lot, 
and when I was it was one of those things that caused a feeling of electricity to 
run through me that quickly petered out. In fact I remember having a very toxic 
pessimistic outlook and thought process fro very early on, even as an 8-year 
old at Chuck E. Cheese I’d wander muttering how ****** things were to 
myself. It was around the same time my grades took an absolute nosedive 
although I’d been designated as gifted, 9 years later and a few days before I’ 
set to begin psychotherapy and taking medication they still haven’t recovered, 
which has been a really big source of problems and the only reason I even 
sought help that’s how under-the-radar a chronic low-level depression can be. 
For a long time I lived with a sense of optimistic sadness that I enjoyed 
tremendously, “yeah things always turn out alright, but so what?” I can 
probably attribute a premature maturity to depression, nothing else crushes 
your idealism and goals so efficiently. I take refuge in books, politics, finance 
and social situations paradoxically invigorate me. But apart from that, it’s just 
a rainless cloud that lingers, blocking you from even imagining the other side 
and achieving this mystical “potential” everybody talks about. Overall, I’m 
grateful to be part of the miserable. 
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A panoramic temporal perspective provides the narrative framework established in post above, 
which incorporates aspects of the psychoanalytic explanation of dysthymia (i.e., an explanation 
that emphasizes the indelible impact of early childhood events and formative relationships with 
caregivers). This post begins with an explication of the contextual factors that the author places 
in a causal relationship to the onset of dysthymia, then subcategorizes the author’s dysthymia as 
“early onset,” a label applied to dysthymia when diagnosed before age 21. From the author’s 
present perspective, the symptoms of dysthymia manifested at an early age, as young as 8 years 
old. While the past features quite prominently in this post, the author concludes with a 
contemplation of the future: dysthymia is metaphorized as a “rainless cloud that lingers,” 
blocking one “from even imagining the other side and achieving this mystical “potential” that 
everyone talks about.” This particular usage brings to light another element of weather-based 
metaphors. Such metaphors not only describe the perceived all-encompassing effects of 
dysthymia, in that these effects thoroughly color one’s affective atmosphere, they also emphasize 
temporality: weather not only shapes experiences in the present, it also guides ideas about future 
possibilities: the weather is forecast, which may influence decisions and actions within the 
present.  
In the post above, the author only briefly mentions details from the present, including the 
fact that s/he is set to begin psychotherapy and medication in a few day’s time. This post is one 
of several in which the author mentions plans to begin formal interventions (counseling, therapy, 
medication, etc.) in the coming days. It seems possible, then, that these sorts of posts can 
sometimes function as a sort of “practice run” prior to the first therapy session: an opportunity to 
“set one’s story straight” so that the past can be harnessed as an explanatory resource in the 
therapeutic settings that one expects to enter into in the near future. Thus, one way to think about 
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the function of online mental health communities is as practice sites, not only in the sense that 
Baym (2000) and other media studies scholars have defined—that is, that online “communities” 
constituted by their communicative practices—but also because they offer a sort of rhetorical 
rehearsal space for those who will be transporting their stories to other audiences, such as, in this 
case, therapists or other practitioners.  
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In the above post, the author considers that dysthymia has colored the totality of their lived 
experience up to this point.  In this expansive temporal terrain, positive emotions such as 
(2014, March 5). How do I start? Message posted to 
http://psychforums.com/dysthymia. 
I reckon I have suffered from depression all my life- or at least for the majority 
of it – if that’s possible? In the past I have taken Prozac, had therapy 
(psychotherapist and psychologist) and read widely on the subject.  
I have now self diagnosed myself with dysthymia and a large dose of 
associated anxiety induced apathy. The weird thing is no one else really knows 
– or at least they pretend not to. Outwardly I function relatively normally. I
work part time and earn reasonable money but I do absolutely NOTHING
other than that which I absolutely have to do (ie look after my children, go to
work, shop and cook).
I can remember feeling happy but it seems so long ago, in another world that I 
once lived in a long time ago. I look at other people’s lives and I wonder what 
on earth it is that they are doing, caring about this and that and the other 
because nothing has any point to it so what is the point in doing anything? 
Nothing really matters does it? Nothing I do or say or am or try to be really 
matters. The thing is though, I HATE LOATHE and DESPISE feeling like 
this. I have read every self-help website and book that there is and I still can’t 
find my starting point. Nowadays I have even stopped trying to try if that 
makes sense, because I know the outcome will be negative, that it won’t make 
any difference. I feel as if I have run out of options and that I don’t want to live 
anymore because there is no point in living. I am not suicidal (I have children) 
but if I didn’t have them I would have checked out by now because life is 
simply too bloody difficult to do and to be honest I cant be bothered to fight it 
anymore.  
I constantly image myself in a life at some point in the future where I am 
completely sorted and living a life that brings me reward. But it seems 
impossible to reach that point. I can’t find my first step. I search and search 
and search for a point of change. I keep planning and thinking that tomorrow 
or next week I will change and be able to do SOMETHING to change how I 
live but every single day I wake up knowing that the day will be the same as 
the last one and the one before that and so on and so on.  
Does anyone have a similar experience that they can tell me about? What 
worked for you? What made you ‘snap out of it’ or is that wishful thinking? 
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happiness are described as existing very far from the present, so far away as to “constitute 
another world.” The author imagines that most people are generally unaware of scope of 
dysthymia’s wide-reaching effects, because “outwardly” the author “functions relatively 
normally.” (The rhetorical conundrum posed by being perceived as a “high-functioning” person 
is commonly discussed throughout these online health communities, and is a theme that will be 
explored in the following chapter.) Adopting this broad view of time has ostensibly aided in the 
author’s self-diagnosis of dysthymia, a diagnosed further refined by reference to “anxiety 
induced apathy.” As opposed to a sole or predominant focus on the past and a thorough 
description of how it has been affected by dysthymia, this author focuses more on contemplating 
the future, anticipating the extent to which it will affected by dysthymia.  
As is typical of panoramically structured posts, here too the present is not described as 
particularly problematic in and of itself. The problem with the present is identified (or perhaps 
even produced) through recollections of the past and anticipations of the future. The author 
states that they “wake up knowing that the day will be the same as the last one and the one before 
and so on and so on.” This sentiment bears similarity to the weather-based metaphor mentioned 
earlier in the chapter, a metaphor that likens the present tense of dysthymia to the tenth day in a 
row of rain; the tenth day of rain becomes problematic only within the context of recollecting the 
nine preceding days of rain. This sentiment is also similar to Solomon’s (2001) claim that “the 
present tense of dysthymia envisages no alleviation because it feels like knowledge” (p. 16, italics 
added). The author here does not simply anticipate that the present day will be the “same as the 
last one and so on and so on” but rather “wakes up knowing” that this will be the case. Across the 
online health communities studied here, a commonly posed question concerns whether 
dysthymia is something that one can “snap out of,” with the typical response being that this is not 
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possible. The frequency of such questions about the possibility of “snapping out of” dysthymia, 
and uniformity of responses emphasizing the impossibility of doing so, makes sense if one 
considers the experience of dysthymia tantamount to knowledge: while people might describe 
“snapping out of” attitudes or moods, it would seem that knowledge is not something one can 
“snap out of” easily.  
3.4.1  Retrospective Identification 
Dysthymia is a mental disorder with a definition that hinges on temporality, which is to say that 
it is very much a temporally-defined condition. One reason for this is that the moods that 
characterize its symptoms are not defined as abnormal in terms of their qualities; rather they 
become abnormal through their persistence. Furthermore, it is a temporally-defined condition in 
that can only be diagnosed looking backwards: the presence of symptoms over the course of at 
least two years’ time is a prerequisite for a diagnosis of dysthymia.61 The panoramic temporal 
perspectives described in the previous section enable an important process in dysthymia online 
health communities: retrospective identification. (I use the term identification, rather than 
diagnosis, because it can be used in two different senses, summed up by different prepositions: 
identification of (the illness itself) and identification with (a community of individuals who share 
61 This strong emphasis on the past is unsurprising given dysthymia’s psychoanalytic roots—roots that 
have historically stressed the importance of searching for etiology via predominantly discursive 
interrogation of the patient’s past. Such interrogation is considered necessary because, in the 
psychoanalytic view, mental disorder does not represent a departure from a previous state of mental 
health but is seen as “logically continuous” with the person’s past experiences and relationships (Greco, 
1993). Bipsychiatry, historically, has not aggressively pursued the etiology of mental disorders, it has 
instead focused on the classification of outward symptoms. Psychoanalytic theory and practice, however, 
have been very much entangled with questions of etiology, by providing historically coherent 
explanations for a given patient’s feelings, thoughts, behaviors, etc.  
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the diagnosis and entailed experiences). Retrospective identification involves identifying the 
initial onset of dysthymia and its related contextual factors; it also has to do with identifying 
oneself as belonging in a particular category with others, it means coming to understand oneself 
as a certain kind of person.  
Taking the sort of social interactionist perspective articulated by Mead earlier in the 
chapter, one could argue that retrospective identification of dysthymia is rhetorical practice 
through which new understandings of the self are actively produced; it is not a passive or 
undilemmatic discovery made when, for example, an advertisement “translates” one’s experience 
into a psychiatric vocabulary, as it sometimes portrayed to be in public discourses on the dangers 
of self-diagnosis in a digital age (Segal, 2005). Such self-understandings are actively produced 
rather than discovered that occurs, as Kuhn (2002) has concisely remarked, one “cannot access 
the past in any unmediated form” (p. 155). Memory is not a stable repository of past experiences 
that can be neutrally accessed, and neither are the technologies to which we outsource the task of 
recording and recalling these memories, whether a diary, a self-diagnostic checklist, a camera, a 
museum, or a post in an online health community.62 While the non-neutrality of memory in 
general makes the recollection of any kind of past experience a potentially error-prone exercise, 
the recollections of past moods can be considered a particularly slippery endeavor since moods 
62 Online health communities are not only spaces in which people pose questions, solicit feedback, and 
share information. They are, in some sense, dynamic repositories of memory, places thriving with pieces 
and parts of autobiographies. They are repositories of memory because authors can revisit previous post 
in the days, months or years after they post them, but at a more fundamental level, they are memory 
repositories because in the act of formulating accounts of illness, memory is being exercised, carving a 
path for future understandings and accounts of illness. And unlike a diary, there is the possibility of 
audience. (Although it could be argued that a diary is in a sense written for an imagined audience, 
whether that imagined audience consists of a future self or potential interlopers.)  
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in the present are thought to color recollections of one’s moods in the past, a phenomenon 
referred to in psychology literature as “mood congruent” recall bias.63   
Retrospective identification can occur before or after formal diagnosis, and is typically 
performed by the author of a given post, though sometimes the ostensible point of a post is to 
retrospectively identify the illness of another person—typically, the author’s partner or spouse—
along with a request for advice on how to handle the delicate act of relaying this so-called 
“other-led diagnosis” to the presumed-to-be affected person (Giles & Newbold, 2011). As 
mentioned earlier, people describe different emotional responses in the wake of retrospective 
identification, many having to do with changing conceptions of self. Some people describe a 
sense of epiphany and relief in the wake of retrospective identification, of relishing the 
demystification that occurs after ‘having a name for it.’ Others describe a deepening of their 
feelings of depression in the aftermath of retrospective identification, for reasons often related to 
the past (such as the lament that the past has been “wasted” for no good reason, given that the 
problem was clinically actionable) or the future (“does ‘chronic’ mean ‘forever?’” some ask) 
Below are some instances of retrospective identification as it unfolds in these communities.  
63 Psychology literature terms this problem “mood congruent bias” or “mood congruent memory” and 
suggests that it casts a problematic light on the mood inventories that are often used in the process of 
formally diagnosing mood disorders. These  ‘recall’ biases refer to a phenomenon in which people more 
rapidly or more efficiently retrieve memories that are congruent with their present mood state. If a person 
takes an online questionnaire while in a depressed mood and the questionnaire asks the person to report 
their mood states over the past two weeks, the theory of mood congruent bias would suggest that the 
person will be more likely to recall negative experiences that occurred over the two week period as 
opposed to positive experiences, given that such experiences are more “congruent” with the person’s 
present mood.  
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(Posted August 27, 2013). Ahh Dysthymia… Message posted to 
http://MDJunction.com/dysthymia. 
Well, it turns out (recently diagnosed) that I have had dysthymia for probably 
20 years. Not just “oh he’s just that way” or “He’s just introverted” or (insert 
dysthymia misunderstanding here).  
Anyway, I do recognize that I have had a mild depression for years, and I once 
chalked it up to that “Quirkalone” idea that seemed popular a few years ago 
and still lingers today.  
This is not to say that I haven’t led what most would call a “full life” – I have 
two Masters and a PhD, I’ve lived abroad and been skydiving, worked at the 
Pentagon, and a lot of other fulfilling things I wont bore you with here. I think 
that, for me, this condition hasn’t been paralyzingly bad, in that I haven’t been 
able to do anything with my life. I’ve had many relationships, and I think been 
otherwise fairly “normal.”  
There was a long time, about 6 years, though, where I turned to wine (in 
excess) to alleviate my mood at night and that turned into a major problem. I 
wish I’d known about dysth earlier, and that might have been avoided. Sober 5 
years now, and that’s not an issue anymore.  
The last six months, though, I find I have no interests. No ambition. No drive. 
No reason to do anything but just waste my days away and wait for night when 
I can sleep and not be awake for this I’ve never been suicidal, though I have 
thought about it. But that option’s not for me.  
I’ve tried SSRI’s, etc., and they have all either not worked or inflicted terrible 
side effects, so those aren’t for me. The only “fixes” I have ever found have 
been exercise (usually it takes quite a bit to make a difference – im guessing 
due to the need to release endorphins), proper diet (especially juicing)  
and…no, that’s really it…(con’t)  
I also had issues with anxiety for a time, but that seems to have dissipated, 
other than my social anxiety, which has been with me since I was a child. That, 
like dysth, I think will just be with me forever.  
Going to psychotherapy again, though I’ve also never found that to truly help. 
Anyway, just wanted to introduce myself and share my experiences. Maybe 
they will help someone feel not so alone. Because in truth, most of us truly 
aren’t “alone”  - we just (because of our depression) avoid social situations and 
just (speaking for myself again) the last thing I want is someone to hang out 
with and just discuss things that aren’t, ultimately, important to me. Actually, 
few things are. Nothing excites me, nothing interests me. I am just…here.  
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As the post above illustrates, the retrospective identification of dysthymia can recontextualize an 
individual’s understanding of the past in sweeping, potent ways. In the post above, the author, 
having been recently (ostensibly formally) diagnosed now considers the past twenty years to 
have been shaped by dysthymia. This upends the author’s former self-definitions that fall outside 
the vocabulary of mood disorder, such as “introverted,” “solitary,” and an adherent to the 
“Quirkyalone” movement.64 After retrospective identification, the author considers introversion 
and solitary tendencies to be previously mislabeled manifestations of something that is a more 
accurate self-label, dysthymia.  
In a study of online mental health communities, Giles and Newbold (2011) contextualize 
self-diagnosis as a form of identity work that grows out of the categories in the DSM and often 
operates as a rhetorical resource deployed to mitigate the culturally ingrained tendency to 
attribute negative outcomes or behaviors to the individual.65  They state that, “part of the DSM-
category appeal lies in its apparent explanatory power for behaviors that otherwise leave 
individuals open to blame and accountability” (p. 421). Thus, they posit that the categories of the 
DSM serve to transform what could be regarded as negative or socially undesirable behaviors 
into the unfortunate byproducts of mental disorder and might thus be regarded as largely outside 
the locus of an individual’s control. However, as this post suggests, it seems an inverse process 
of attribution can also occur after retrospective identification. That is, positive behaviors or 
64 The “quirkyalone movement” was popularized largely on the Internet in the early 2000s. It generally 
refers to people who eschew dating and intimate relationships in favor of solitude.  
65 Beech (2008) defines “identity work” as a “a set of active processes (such as forming, strengthening 
and revising) which serve to construct a sense of identity.” Following the insights of Goffman (1961), 
these active processes are thought to be deeply performative, interactive, and contextual. Identity work is 
also multiple and thus something of a balancing act, given that individuals are engaged in “a mélange of 
different identity projects, co-present within the self but distinct and potentially conflicting” (p. 52).  
There is also an important temporal component to identity work, because each discrete enactment of 
identity contains “the shadow of encounters past and the foreshadow of encounters yet to come” (p. 52).  
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accomplishments come to be represented and possibly regarded as doubly impressive. While 
“negative or socially undesirable behaviors” might be thought to occur because of mental 
disorder, positive outcomes or socially desirable behaviors might be thought to occur in spite of 
mental disorder, thus making them especially commendable, agent-driven achievements. While 
attaining advanced degrees (in the author’s case, two Master’s degrees and a Doctorate) might 
already be generally regarded as accomplishments in many contexts, it could be argued that such 
achievements take on an additionally impressive quality in light of the fact that they are now 
thought to have been accomplished in spite of the challenges that mental disorders often pose. 
However, stressing one’s accomplishments in this context is potentially fraught. As mentioned 
earlier in discussion of the rhetorical conundrum of borderline mental disorders, the appearance 
of normalcy and what would seem a high level of function are potentially discrediting for people 
laying claim to mental illness identities. This conundrum of so-called “borderline” or “high-
functioning” mental disorders will be discussed in the subsequent chapter.  
139 
Retrospectively identifying someone else’s dysthymia would seem to be a complex and 
rhetorically delicate process for all parties involved. It is unclear exactly how the author above 
arrived at the  conclusion that his wife has suffered “most of her life” from undiagnosed 
dysthymia; it is likewise unclear whether she herself concurs with the author about the 
appropriateness of the diagnosis. What is clear is that retrospective identification of dysthymia is 
(2015, March 18). My Wife has Dysthymia…how can I help? Message posted 
to http://MDJunction.com/dysthymia. 
I’ve been married for almost 20 years to a woman who has suffered 
(undiagnosed) for most of her life (42 years old). Things have not been easy to 
say that least.  
Right now things are rough, I’ve done everything I can over the years to help 
and hang on. This diagnosis may change everything, but it will not be easy!  
Someone here must have some advice for me, I’ve taken the approach that her 
well being comes before our relationship while still supporting the relationship. 
Without her getting help there is no us. But what do I do? It’s like a mine field, 
you never know when the next explosion is going to take place.  
We have 3 kids, they have asked point blank why I continue to stay in the 
relationship. It’s a hard thing to hear when you think you’ve put on a brave 
face for all the years trying to shield them from the fallout of a bad day or a 
bad week or in this case a bad year/s.  
I understand that this disease is at least partially genetic, my father in law 
suffers from some form of depression, his brother committed suicide, my 
wife’s Grand Mother had depression issues, and now I’m suspecting our 15 
year old daughter may be experiencing some of the same symptoms.  
We have access to counseling, and any other resource that may be required. 
I’ve spent 20 years supporting this relationship and have committed to 
continue until there is nothing else I can possibly do. I can see my wife for who 
she really is and not for what this disease has turned her into, however she has 
suffered for so long that she feels this is who she actually is.  
Again, I need your advice. Thanks in advance 
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a powerful tool for recontextualizing the past, and that, in this case, these recontextualizations 
have built hopeful projections into the future: as the author of this post states, the diagnosis of 
dysthymia “may change everything.”  
The retrospective identification of dysthymia appears to have heightened the author’s 
sense of ethical obligation to his wife so that the two can, as the title of his post says, “make [the] 
marriage work.” Without the diagnosis, the author might simply consider himself a person stuck 
in an unsatisfying or unworkable marriage. By retrospectively identifying his wife’s dysthymia, 
the author becomes not just a person enduring a bad marriage, but a person enduring challenges 
for the purpose of preserving a marriage in spite of the havoc wrought by a mood disorder, and 
also for the purpose of supporting a spouse who has long suffered from an undiagnosed mood 
disorder. Rather than expressing ambivalence or a desire to terminate his marriage, the author 
expresses a sense of duty to maintain his marriage and support his spouse until “there is nothing 
left” that can possibly be done. 
This sense of obligation becomes especially powerful given that the author can “see my 
wife for who she really is” rather than “what this disease has turned her into.” His wife, 
meanwhile, “has suffered for so long that she feels this is who she actually is.” This ambiguity—
the slippage between mood disorder and some more essential, core aspect of self—is a common 
topic in public discourses about mental health and illness in general, but is said to be particularly 
murky as it pertains to dysthymia due to the subtlety and chronicity of its symptoms. Recall 
Hellerstein’s (2016) remarks, quoted earlier, about the underdiagnosis of dysthymia: “Part of the 
problem is that many people mistake the symptoms for their personality. They may assume that 
they’re just pessimistic or self-conscious or moody. After struggling for so many years, people 
come to view the fog of depression as their normal functioning” (Tartakovsky, 2016).  
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Retrospective identification, then, is one process by which this distinction—between a merely 
pessimistic or self-conscious or moody” and a person suffering from dysthymia—emerges and 
reshapes previous understandings of self and/or others. Stressing the “at least partly genetic” 
roots of dysthymia seems to help the author of this post distinguish between who his wife “really 
is” and “what this disease has turned her into.” Interestingly, in scholarly and public discourses, 
it was anticipated that research into the genetic basis of mental disorders would obviate the need 
for people grapple with such distinctions by finally clarifying the hazy line between mental 
disorder and personhood. That is, if a disorder is thought of as genetic, then the symptoms 
arising out of that disorder are not considered part of one’s personality (Barr & Rose, 2008). But 
as Dumit (2003) suggests, in an age of enthusiasm for genetic discourse, genes “can become a 
synecdoche for one’s identity” and so, rather than reconciling this ambiguity, the public uptake 
of genomic rhetorics might well have the effect of further entrenching it (p. 44).  
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In this post, the author explicitly states that a diagnosis of dysthymia has been arrived at via self-
diagnosis. While self-diagnosing dysthymia was not the author’s initial motivation for visiting 
the online health community, the author describes feeling hailed by the description of dysthymia, 
and is now able to see “the root of what’s really going on.” As a result of “matching the 
(2006, August 19). I diagnosed myself. Please read. Message posted to 
http://psychforums.com/dysthymia. 
I have been reading a lot on my own depression symptoms and other 
depression disorders. When I came across dysthymia I knew it hit what I had 
all my life right on.  
Reading the symptoms of dysthymia and reading some of the posts on this 
forum, I knew it was exactly what I have. I haven’t been evaluated by any 
psych therapists or anyone. I made the diagnosis myself just for matching the 
symptoms 100 percent.  
Now, I am not sure where to go for here. I initially came to this site for support 
for working on self-esteem issues and how its affecting my marital and 
domestic problem but I can now see the root of what’s really “going on with 
me.” I have been feeling depressed continually for all I can remember. I can 
never enjoy life, I can never recall a time when I was happy, hopelessness, 
pessimism, poor appetite, poor sleep…etc. 
I had a really traumatic childhood, so I knew it started early with me. My life 
was black and gloomy everyday. I cant love, or work like other people. I have 
a very hard time making social interactions, or making decisions. I always 
thought this was just my personality. I always though I am just a person who is 
“unable” to carry out normal functions of life. But now it’s making total sense.  
I diagnosed myself, but obviously I can’t treat myself. So what do I do now? I 
want to get better for my children. I want to be able to enjoy life and stop being 
so inactive and isolated and negative. I am tired of being depressed every darn 
day. I want to stop worrying. I want to stop thinking that the future is hopeless 
and that there is nothing that can make things better (I thought that’s how life 
was)  
Please help. Where do I go from here? What should I do? Are there other ways 
besides meds? Anyone who has this, please help. I would appreciate your 
insights. Thank you.  
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symptoms 100 percent” the author “knew [dysthymia] hit what I had all my life right on.” 
Childhood, which the author describes as traumatic, is identified as the context of dysthymia’s 
onset, after which point the author was not “like other people.”  
Here, as in other instances of retrospective identification, the author recontexutalizes the 
past in ways that destabilize previous notions of self, paving the way for a distinction to emerge 
between dysthymia and what the author “always thought was…just my personality.” The author 
previously regarded gloominess, trouble making decisions, and an inability to carry out “normal 
functions of life” as mere “personality” traits rather than evidence of an underlying mental 
disorder. As in the previous post, the author requests advice from others regarding how to 
address the present and future now that the past has been recontextualized as a by-product of 
dysthymia. Specifically, this author requests advice on whether it is possible to treat dysthymia 
without medication. This is not uncommon; many online health community members state a 
preference to abstain from medication regimens. The stated reasons vary; some fear the 
possibility of side effects, others state that medication feels like a form of “cheating,” a sentiment 
that hints at the sort of ambivalence sociologists have claimed is widespread with regard to 
psychopharmacological interventions in general, and antidepressants in particular.66 
66 Barr & Rose (2008) summarize the character of patient ambivalence toward antidepressants: “On the 
one hand, people wanted to continue taking antidepressants if it kept their symptoms away and yet 
simultaneously felt that they were ‘weaker’ for needing to stay on drugs and desired to ‘sort themselves 
out’ without recourse to medicine…Feelings of ambivalence were also heightened by the fact that patients 
could not fathom staying on antidepressants indefinitely, even when they were effective” (p. 953).   
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3.4.2 Forecasting the Future 
The problem with dysthymia, as it is formulated and conveyed in many of these accounts, cannot 
be reduced to its (retrospectively-identified) role in shaping the past. That is, the problem is not 
simply that one had a traumatic childhood, or that one can recall a turning point after which 
everyday tasks seemed pointless, or that it is difficult to recollect a period of time during which 
one felt “genuinely” happy. A significant part of the problem is described as the knowledge that 
so much time has elapsed in one’s short lifespan, time not well spent, and, importantly, this 
knowledge dims the sense that a more fulfilling future might be possible. This squares with 
Solomon’s (2001) formulation of mild depression as a subjective experience that is constituted in 
large part by an “acute awareness of transience and limitation” (p. 17).  Such temporal 
preoccupation—the keen awareness of time’s ceaseless forward movement and its connection to 
diminished possibility —seems to permeate many accounts of dysthymia, including this brief 
one below that succinctly summarizes this sentiment:    
Another community member chimes in, who also represents the stark fact of time’s passing—
and what this passing means for future possibilities—as crucial to the development and 
perpetuation of their dysthymic experience.  
(2015, February 19). How to let go of things that can’t be. Message posted to 
http://MDJunction.com/dysthymia. 
At my age and stage of life, there are some things that might have happened 
and didn’t and now probably won’t.  
This brings me down hugely. 
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In the post above, the quantitative and qualitative aspects of time blur together. 67 That is to say, 
a sharp focus on the quantitative dimension of time—the sheer, stubborn fact that one’s lifespan 
is finite and elapsing, measurable in days, weeks, years—impinges upon perceptions of time’s 
qualitative aspects, of what is deemed possible or likely to unfold in the time that remains in 
one’s lifespan. The following post expresses similar sentiments.   
67 While it may be commonplace to think of time as an exclusively quantitative measure, the ancient 
Greeks had two terms for time, one to denote its quantitative dimensions and another for its qualitative 
components. Chronos, with its familiar “chron” prefix, refers to time as an objective measurement with a 
direct connection to other forms of measurement: ages, lengths, rates, etc. Kairos, on the other hand, 
refers to the curious, qualitative aspects of time, or perhaps more accurately, timing. In rhetorical 
scholarship, the concept of kairos refers to the “right” moment in time for a particular discourse to take 
shape.   
(2015, February 20). Re: How to let go of things that can’t be. Message posted to 
http://MDJunction.com/dysthymia. 
I can definitely relate to the feeling of loss, though I try hard not to dwell on it. 
I’m 60 and didn’t learn I had Dysthymia until 3 years ago, so I spent probably 40 
years of my life thinking I was the problem that I was just a miserable person with 
a attitude that sucked and I couldn’t conquer it no matter what I tried. What’s past 
is past of course and no one should live there; that is obvious. I try to stay focused 
on the fact that now I know the truth and there are things (meds/therapy) that can 
help me accept myself and feel more fulfilled in my life.  
When I was first diagnosed, I made the mistake of thinking: Oh now that I know 
what the problem is I can see about fixing it, as if it was as easy as taking 
ibuprofen for a headache. As anyone reading this will know, it was a rude 
awakening finding out that was not the case cause a whole new realm of struggle 
was opened up. I do continually remind myself that I’m blessed to even know, as 
many people never find out and remain in their current state for their while life. 
Had it not been for a very intuitive family doctor, I would still be there.  
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In this post, the author places “searching,” “planning,” and  “thinking” about the future at odds 
with knowledge of the present: knowing that every “today” will be the same as so many 
preceding yesterdays. (Recall Solomon’s (2001) claim that the “present tense of dysthymia 
envisages no alleviation because it feels like knowledge (p. 16).) Thus the awareness of time’s 
passage is difficult to shake, specifically time that is (retrospectively) thought to have consisted 
mainly of empty days sliding one another, each one feeling more or less the same as the day 
before. This awareness dulls the sense that it may be possible to locate an opportune kairotic 
moment, or a “point of change” from which to disrupt the forgoing gloomy monotony of the 
present and construct a vision of the future in which satisfying experiences are possible. As been 
pointed out, the view of illness as disruption generally implies that restoration to a previous state 
of health is being sought (Bury, 2001; Frank, 1995). Dysthymia, however, does not appear to be 
considered as a disruption in one’s life course, but an enduring aspect of one’s biographical 
identity. And so, authors such as the one above might not be thinking of their aspiration as 
restoration to a former state of affiairs but rather reinvention—a perhaps markedly taller order.  
(2014, March 5). How do I start? Message posted to 
http://psychforums.com/dysthymia. 
I constantly imagine myself in a life at some point in the future where I am 
completely sorted and living a life that brings me reward. But it seems 
impossible to reach that point. I can't find my first step. I search and search and 
search for a point of change. I keep planning and thinking that tomorrow or next 
week I will change and be able to do SOMETHING to change how I live but 
every single day I wake up knowing that the day will be the same as the last one 
and the one before that and so on and so on. 
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About to turn thirty years old, the author of the post meditates upon experiences that are 
desirable, but, in her/his estimation, not likely to occur, such as the traditional adulthood markers 
of marriage, children, etc. The author describes a feeling of having been “robbed” of the sort of 
future that had previously been envisioned. The previous section on retrospective identification 
suggested that the subjective experience of the immediate present was not often represented as 
problematic; much more effort was devoted to reconstructing the problematic features of one’s 
past. Here, dysthymia is not described as dilemmatic so much in its present manifestation as 
(2011, May 11). I have Dysthymia. Message posted to  
http://experienceproject.com/dysthymia. 
First I was told that I have depression, then a personality disorder now 
Dysthymia. I really done like that name. I feel really unmotivated and feel that 
there is no future for me. I am 29 and want to be married and have children but 
I don’t think that I can do these things. Dysthymia makes me feel like I cant do 
anything, makes me really not talk to anyone. I used to teach but now feel like 
I don’t have the skills. I talk less and feel like my co-ordination, memory, 
enjoyment from anything is gone. I think it has been a slow progression. I have 
forced myself to be happy at times and can no longer put up a front. I feel aged 
and cant see the point of trying new things as I feel low afterward. I have two 
degrees and have had a happy life- but slowly my happiness has gone. 
Sometimes I resent my family who are happy going about their normal day of 
work, socializing, etc. I used to like those things too but now constantly have 
to watch my behavior so no one suspects there might be something wrong with 
me . I have been seeing a counselor for about a year and am on Citalopram to 
help give me good feelings. I have been through a lot in my mind thinking 
random thoughts about people, life for the past three years. Sometimes when 
Im trying to tell people how I feel I have got angry. Like my mother, because 
she cant understand it. Shes like well just get a job and youll be right, or join a 
group. I used to want to do these things but don’t really now. I feel robbed of a 
future and wish I wasn’t like this. It seems to get worse with age or something, 
as I remember throughout high school I woud withdraw myself from peers for 
a short period of time, then it got worse. Like others my age I would love to be 
married and living with normal thoughts of how we are going to pay the bills, 
etc, when should we have children, to have a companion. I feel I would have 
nothing to offer as I don’t have anything to offer myself let alone someone 
else. I feel robbed.  
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much as for what it foretells about the future. Projections of a bleak future, one devoid of 
possibility, one unlike that which was hoped for in earlier, more optimistic times, is described as 
an integral part of producing the subjective experience of dysthymia in the present.  
3.5  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Having explored the temporal dimensions of online health accounts of dysthymia, this chapter 
contributes to the body of literature that examines the relationship between temporality and 
illness. To date, this literature has focused mainly on how the onset of chronic physical illness 
often leads to temporal readjustments, both for those diagnosed with illness and those involved 
in their care. It has shown that these temporal adaptations can have practical utility for managing 
the activities of daily living by helping people, for example, stay on top off their medication 
regimens, juggle appointments, coordinate in-home care, and so on. On a more abstract level, 
though, reshaped temporal perspectives—new ways of thinking about time—link up with 
reshaped ideas about control, about possibility, about agency. Charmaz (1992), for example, has 
sketched the details of a temporal perspective often adopted by individuals with chronic physical 
illnesses that she calls “living one day at a time.” Living one day at a time entails a deep 
immersion within the present, accompanied by sharply circumscribed views of time, and halted 
projections into the future. This absorption into the present is regarded as an active coping 
mechanism, given that it seems to confer a sense of control in the face of chronic illness 
diagnosis and management.   
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The temporal perspectives defined and elaborated upon in this chapter—that is, those that 
frequently structure accounts of dysthymia in online health communities—have been termed 
“panoramic,” and they provide a stark counter-perspective to “living one day at a time.” The 
chapter contended that panoramic temporal perspectives are drawn upon when people describe a 
sense of being whisked out of the immediate present and positioned within an expansive 
temporal terrain that often begins with a reconstruction of events from the (bleak) distant past 
and concludes with a contemplation of dimmed future expectations. Within this temporal 
landscape, the problem of dysthymia is not described as existing solely or even primarily within 
the immediate present: the present becomes problematic when perceived through the lens of the 
remote past and envisioned future, with empty days seeming to slide into one another to form 
bridge between the two. I was surprised to find, upon editing a draft of this chapter, the following 
description of dysthymia from David J. Hellerstein, an American psychiatrist: “Experts refer to 
dysthymia as a paradoxical condition because it appears mild day to day but becomes brutal 
long-term,” (Tartakovsky, 2016). While living one day at a time often seems to have the effect of 
imbuing individuals with a sense of control, the accounts examined in this chapter wondered 
whether panoramic temporal perspectives might do something akin to the opposite; that is, they 
might have the side effect of attenuating one’s felt sense of control over the emotional character 
of one’s life.    
Panoramic temporal perspectives have practical utility in an age of online mental health, 
wherein self-diagnosis is taking on new forms and new impetus. In the case of chronic mood 
disorders such as dysthymia, stretched-out panoramic temporal perspectives furnish the user with 
a workable framework for retrospectively identifying the onset of illness. The chapter defined 
“retrospective identification” as a process through which the onset of disorder and contextual 
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features related to its onset are identified.68  Through retrospective identification, the distinction 
between mere “gloominess” and chronic depression emerges: what one previously considered 
“just part of my personality” comes to be regarded as evidence of chronic mood disorder. This 
transformation of gloominess into mood disorder transforms understandings of various other 
aspects of one’s life related to relationships, related to employment, related to broader notions of 
agency. Interestingly, some described feelings of deepened depression upon formal diagnosis of 
dysthymia; they articulated the sense that, since the previously unnamed “problem” is in fact a 
clinically defined and therapeutically manageable entity, the “problem” could have potentially 
been intervened upon earlier, and perhaps there were other directions life could have taken, had 
earlier intervention occurred. Implicit in such an articulation is the sense that if the problem had 
been “just their personality” (and thus, not necessarily clinically actionable) the past was not 
“wasted” since there was no other direction life could have taken: their unhappiness was more or 
less determined.  
Where time is concerned, notions of agency and possibility seem often to lurk in the 
conceptual background. The sorts of transformations that spring up in the wake of retrospective 
diagnosis point to a paradox as it pertains to temporality and agency: that the past both can and 
cannot be changed. In the words of Barken (2014), the past is both “revocable and irrevocable” 
68 It is worth noting the ways in which the visual structure and technological affordances of the online 
health communities observed here support the temporal perspectives deployed therein. In these online 
health communities, there are no “tags” for authors to select from to specify the topic or purpose of their 
post (e.g. “medication question,” “symptom discussion,” “therapy resources,” etc.) if there were, temporal 
circumscription might be the result. When authors begin a new post, visually speaking they are met with a 
large open box into which to type, and there is no word limit. And so, this might aid or encourage the 
tendency to assemble lengthy narrative accounts of illness, those that have a beginning (most typically in 
the contextual features of one’s childhood), a middle, and an end (often a look into the future). These 
technological affordances, coupled with the fact that a chronic mood disorder share a murky boundary 
with a broader concept of “personality,” likely contribute to the communicative norm of lengthy self-
introductory posts that narrativize dysthymia in temporally expansive terms.  
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(p. 4). That is, events of the past cannot be returned to and modified; but since every act of 
recollection is a remediation arising in the present, it is perhaps possible to exercise these 
recollections differently, to frame them differently, and therefore to experience them differently.  
Perhaps this is what American novelist Tom Robbins had in mind when he had the protagonist of 
a novel suggest that, “it’s never too late to have a happy childhood”—a quotation that has since 
become the subject of many an inspirational meme floating around digital culture.   
The chapter went on to contend that retrospective identification not only reformulates 
ideas about agency pertaining to the past (i.e., wondering how things might have gone 
differently) but also ideas about possibility in the future. Here, the weather-based metaphor 
circulating in online health communities and analyzed in the chapter, becomes relevant. This 
metaphor likens the subjective experience of dysthymia to waking up on the “tenth day of rainy 
weather,” knowing that each day in the future will be similarly rainy. When this metaphor was 
invoked, the author suggested that the only act of agency that one can call upon to contend with 
this knowledge is to “accept the rain.” This description portrays the subjective experience of 
dysthymia as miserable not so much because of how it manifests in the present (which contrasts 
with how many people describe the moment-to-moment unpleasantness of MDD) but, in 
Solomon’s (2001) words, this unpleasantness stems from “from knowing it in the moments gone 
by and to look forward only to knowing it in the moments to come” (p. 16). Because the present 
tense of dysthymia—a present tense that is shaped by reconstructions of the remote past and 
projections into the distant future—“feels like knowledge,” it becomes difficult to imagine, as 
one author calls it, “a point of change” from which to initiate some kind of process of 
reinvention. Thus, ways of thinking about time might play an important, though 
underacknowledged, role in describing the subjective experience of dysthymia. While 
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scholarship, especially from the fields of health communication and medical sociology, has 
begun to explore the ways in which temporality is configured in accounts of chronic physical 
illnesses, this chapter suggests that the ways in which temporality is configured in accounts of 
chronic mental illnesses also merit sustained attention.  
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4.0 THE TROUBLE WITH “MILD” DEPRESSION AND THE CONTRACTION 
OF “NORMAL” 
We are especially concerned with classifications that, when known by people or 
those around them, and put to work in institutions, change the ways in which 
individuals experience themselves—and may even lead people to evolve their 
feelings and behavior in part because they are so classified. 
—Ian Hacking, The Social Construction of What? 
In a seminal 1971 study, “Being sane in insane places,” psychologist David Rosenhan marveled 
at what he considered the stickiness of psychodiagnostic labels. He noted that, once applied by 
an authority figure to patients in the study (who happened to be students of his, feigning 
schizophrenia symptoms for the purposes of the study), psychodiagnostic labels adhered to their 
recipients, even after the total dissipation of symptoms. (The patients were discharged with a 
diagnosis of “schizophrenia in remission.”) And yet, in addition to their stickiness, 
psychodiagnostic labels are also remarkable for their ephemerality, as each new edition of the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders marks the birth of newly crafted 
diagnostic categories, the carving and polishing of preexisting categories, and the death of 
abolished categories. And, of course, some of these label deaths apply to categories with which 
people have come to closely identify. While more attention has been paid to the ethics of 
applying labels rather than removing them, label removal is a fraught phenomenon with the 
potential to throw established illness identities into disarray, in turn prompting questions that are 
arguably ontological in nature. New categories create, as Hacking puts it, “new ways for people 
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to be.”69 If new categories create new ways for people to be, then the abolishment of categories 
raises the inverse question of whether label removal eliminates “ways for people to be.”  
As we have transitioned from a medical age of “professional dominance” (Freidson, 
1970) and “doctor’s orders,” into an era of commercialized healthcare, the stickiness of 
psychodiagnostic labels has once again come under scrutiny, but with a focus on a different set 
of actors. As Charland (2004) describes the new milieu of labeling: “psychiatric paternalism and 
the definition and deployment of psychiatric labels was once the exclusive prerogative of the 
psychiatric profession. Neither patients nor their patient groups were consulted when psychiatric 
labels were applied and removed. Today, psychiatric labeling is a much more complex process, 
subject to numerous social, political, and economic interests” (p. 342).  In contrast to Rosenhan’s 
brand of label stickiness—a stickiness generated primarily “from above,” (i.e. the experts in his 
study who discharged asymptomatic patients with the label “schizophrenia in remission”)—
contemporary label stickiness can be maintained “from below,” by the labeled themselves, who 
have come to identify, sometimes very strongly, with a particular psychodiagnostic label.  
Of course, the reaction of the labeled to news of impending label death varies, and can 
range from acceptance, to indifference, to what Charland (2004) calls “label death refusal.” The 
defining feature of the latter is “a refusal by some psychiatric patients to relinquish their 
iatrogenic identity provided by their medical diagnostic labels” (p. 335). As tempting as it may 
be to view label death refusal as a completely novel phenomenon that has emerged in a 
contemporary medical zeitgeist that privileges patient autonomy, Charland cautions against this 
69 In Historical Ontology, Hacking (2004) deconstructs Davidson’s (2001) claim that there existed no 
“perverts” prior to the second half of the nineteenth century, as “pervert” was not yet a way for a person 
to be. In doing so, Hacking coins a concept he calls “dynamic nominalism, which refers to the process by 
which new classifications construct new “kinds” of people and these new “kinds” in turn change their 
behavior, which leads to changes in the classification.  
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view, explaining that, “In one way there is nothing new about the existence of refusals of this 
type; they probably go back to the dawn of psychiatry. But there is another way in which the 
refusals we are concerned with are novel. This is the medium in which they take place, namely, 
the Internet” (p. 335-336). At this time, few studies of internet-mediated reactions to “label 
death” exist. Those that do tend to focus on instances in which patients strongly oppose, or 
simply refuse, label death. In these instances, people have come to closely identify with a given 
psychiatric label, and ardently oppose the American Psychological Association’s attempts to 
revise or abolish the label, sometimes keeping the label alive by refusing to disband or rename 
the online health communities that have sprung up around the label.  
And yet, internet-mediated responses to label death that are characterized largely by 
either indifference or acceptance—as opposed to resistance or rejection—are at least equally as 
interesting from a rhetorical point of view, and perhaps, in certain cases, even more so. In the 
case of dysthymia, which was removed from the DSM-5 (2013) and replaced with “Persistent 
Depressive Disorder” (PDD), the online health community response was decidedly sparse, and 
decidedly warm. There are few posts pertaining to the topic, and the few posts that do exist 
regard the label death of dysthymia as a generally positive development for those labeled by it. 
Though posts on the topic were quite limited, there is reason to suggest that these few positive 
posts are likely to be at least somewhat representative of broader community sentiments, given 
the widespread and fairly intense dissatisfaction that users often expressed when discussing the 
label of dysthymia itself.  
This chapter explores community reactions to dysthymia’s replacement wit Persistent 
Depressive Disorder, which requires unpacking users’ expressed dissatisfaction with the label of 
dysthymia. First, it provides some detail regarding the DSM-5 revision process that resulted in 
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dysthymia’s replacement by PDD. Next, it unpacks community members’ dissatisfaction with 
dysthymia, much of which centers upon notions that the disorder is a “mild” complement to its 
nosological cousin, Major Depressive Disorder (MDD). In doing so, it suggests that psychiatric 
labels defined as “mild” can present a rhetorical conundrum of sorts for those so labeled. This 
chapter identifies and describes online health community members’ strategies for contending 
with this conundrum. Of particular interest here is how the meaning of “normality” is 
constructed (or more accurately, contracted) such that it becomes more cleanly distinguishable 
from the subjective experience of dysthymia.  
4.1  DSM-5: AN “INTERACTIVE” REVISION PROCESS 
When philosopher of medicine Louis Charland wrote in 2004 that, “At no time in the history of 
psychiatry have members of the public exercised so much power over the psychiatric 
establishment that serves them,” he likely would not have been surprised to learn that, in 2010, 
the American Psychological Association (APA) would directly solicit the “general public” to 
participate in the DSM-5 revision process (p. 342). Three years prior to the debut of DSM-5, the 
APA launched a website—www.dsm5.org—that included information about the revision 
process, and perhaps more importantly, drafts of proposed diagnostic criteria for various 
disorders. The “general public,” for the first time in the history of the APA, was thus invited to 
peruse and provide commentary on the drafted criteria. This being the case, one could plausibly 
advance the claim that the public was invited to participate in shaping the professional 
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knowledge found within the pages of the DSM-5. However, not all would agree with such a 
claim.  
The APA’s positing of a given, preexistent “general public” does not escape the scrutiny 
of rhetoricians. Operating from the perspective that rhetorical address works to constitute the 
subject positions of its audience, Kelly (2014) argues that “the DSM-5 draft diagnostic criteria 
establish possible identity positions for audience members to inhabit, and, in doing so, provide 
“narratized” subject positions for the locus of experience and action” (p. 172).70 Of particular 
interest from a rhetorical view is the inclusion of draft criteria that takes the form of  “patient-
reported speech.” “Reported speech” is a blended genre (and rhetorical resource) in which an 
individual (or group of individuals) recontextualizes and reports the speech of another individual 
(or group of individuals).71  
In the context of the DSM-5 public website, patient-reported speech was found in the 
form of first-person utterances that were employed to clarify and contextualize diagnostic criteria 
in the form of “everyday” language, the kinds of statements a layperson with a diagnosis might 
use to describe their experience of living under that diagnosis. For example, one DSM-5 draft 
criterion for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder included “persistent or exaggerated expectations 
about self, others, or the world.” Placed in parentheses next to the criterion were instances of 
patient-reported speech meant to exemplify the symptom in everyday lingo: “I am bad,” “No one 
70 Here, Kelly is operating from a “constitutive” rhetorical perspective. Such a perspective encourages 
rhetoricians to note how, in the very act of rhetorical address, rhetors establish possible identity positions 
for its audience. In this way, the act of rhetorical address “constitutes” its own audience members; 
audience members did not exist as such prior to being addressed as such. According to Charland (1987), 
such a move has ideological implications “not merely because they provide individuals with narratives to 
inhabit as subjects and motives to experience, but because they insert “narratized” subjects-as-agents into 
the world” (p. 143).    
71 Psychiatric discourses have long been known to blend genres, including, of course, Freud, who 
famously blended nosology and narrative (McCarthy & Gerring, 1994).  
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can be trusted,” “The world is completely dangerous.” Alternately, this might be expressed as, 
e.g. “I’ve lost my soul forever,” or “My whole nervous system is permanently ruined.” (As 
quoted by Kelly, 2014, p. 178). From a constitutive rhetorical perspective, these instances of 
“reported speech” provided “narratized subject positions” for members of general public to 
inhabit, with the possible side effect of increasing the cultural portability of the “common 
language” of psychiatry. As Kelly explains,  
 
 The presence of stereotypical patient “voice” on the draft diagnostic criteria, 
 detached from local context, provides an opportunity for readers to identify with 
 and inhabit the unidentified, ambiguous, anonymous “voice” or persona 
 represented in the discourse  fragments, and thus reported speech facilitates the 
 cultural portability of the “common  language”…The speech reports become a 
 kind of disembodied, transmissible sound bite—decontextualized and detached 
 from an individual speaking subject yet paradoxically representative of 
 psychiatric knowledge. (p. 180).  
 
By hailing the public as co-participants in the process of producing psychiatric knowledge, the 
APA invited members of the general public to regard themselves as “exemplary speakers” of a 
professional discourse. Here, two things are worth nothing. First, each revision of the DSM 
threatens to undermine its own aims; dramatic revisions of the text could be regarded as 
attenuating the perceived reliability of knowledge in the previous text, which in turn threatens 
undermine the field’s claim to scientifically principled and reliable knowledge. Second, it is 
worth noting how increasing the cultural portability of a professional discourse is a fairly unusual 
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aim among other professions (medicine, law, etc.), as many often appear to be invested in 
maintaining both the precision and exclusionary qualities of their disciplinary-specific 
(jargonistic, some might say) forms of language.72  
A constitutive rhetorical perspective on the matter might suggest that the APA was not so 
much discovering the public’s feedback, but, in a sense, actively creating it by crafting the 
possible subject positions from which the public could voice “their” perspectives. This raises the 
question: was the APA’s solicitation of public feedback an essentially empty gesture, or did the 
public meaningfully contribute to the revision process? While a constitutive rhetorical 
perspective would likely favor the former, viewing the situation through the lens of Hacking’s 
(1999) concept of interactivity might render the question more or less moot. Specifically, 
Hacking’s work on the interactivity of mental disorder classifications could be drawn upon to 
argue that the “public”—or at least, members of the public to whom the DSM diagnoses are 
applied—had already been playing a non-trivial role in the rearchitecture of the DSM’s 
diagnoses, prior to the APA’s solicitation of public feedback. This is because of the intrinsically 
interactive, looping nature of the classifications that populate the pages of the DSM.  
Hacking, aiming to bypass debate over which social science classifications are “socially 
constructed” and which are “real,” reframes the question by offering a distinction between 
“interactive” and “indifferent” kinds of classifications. While both kinds of classifications are 
subject to change over time, interactive classifications involve a recursive relationship between a 
classification and those so classified by it. As Hacking sees it, those classified by a label alter 
72 It is not only professions such as law and medicine that appear invested in maintaining the 
exclusionary, jargonistic features of their professional languages. In the 1990s, the humanities came under 
scrutiny for what was deemed jargonistic, unnecessarily complicated prose. Butler (1999) defended the 
use of such language on ideological grounds. Her basic argument is that counterhegemonic ideas require 
the use of a specialized language that stands outside “common language,” even if such language is less 
comprehensible to a general audience.  
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their behavior—in ways sometimes subtle, sometimes substantial—in accordance with the 
knowledge of how they are classified. Collectively, over time, these changes render the label ill-
fitting and in need of recalibration. Thus, there is a process of co-evolution, in which the 
classification and the classified each have a role to play in the molding and remolding of the 
other. Hacking (1999) describes this process of joint evolution as such:  
We are especially concerned with classifications that, when known by people or 
those around them, and put to work in institutions, change the ways in which 
individuals experience themselves—and may even lead people to evolve their 
feelings and behavior in part because they are so classified. Such kinds (of people 
and their behavior) are interactive kinds. This ugly phrase has the merit of 
recalling actors, agency, and action. The inter may suggest the way in which the 
classification and the individual classified may interact, the way in which the 
actors may become self-aware as being of a kind, if only because of being treated 
or institutionalized as of that kind, and so experience themselves that way (p. 104). 
Knowledge of how one is classified—the requisite feature of Hacking’s interactivity—
comes in different forms, as there are different types of knowledge and different ways of coming 
to know things. For example, definitional knowledge of the details of a given classification has a 
character that is distinct from the experiential knowledge that comes with living under that 
classification. For Hacking, knowledge of one’s classification is possible even in cases where the 
classified would seem, by virtue of their particular classification, to be necessarily unaware of 
how they are classified. He gives the example of severely autistic children, explaining that, 
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“Autism may seem problematic for my idea of interactive kinds. So how can the classification 
interact with the children? Part of the answer is that they are in their own ways aware, conscious, 
reflective, and in the experience of those who work with autistic children, very good at 
manipulating other people, despite their problems of lack of affect and rapport” (p. 115).  
It could be argued that psychiatric classifications present the possibility for particularly 
potent forms of interaction between classification and classified. Unlike other interactive 
classifications that are nebulous and do not fall squarely within the province of any one 
particular institution, profession, or body of knowledge—for example, classifications such as 
“child” or “victim” or “American” that have different, sometimes contradictory, meanings in 
different contexts—psychiatric classifications are codified in the form of an institutional text (the 
DSM) whose categories circulate far and wide, with rhetorical salience that has steadily spread 
across multiple domains of public life.   
Hacking’s interactivity is one that grants some degree of agency to the classified, even to 
those whose classifications would seem to preclude the exercise of meaningful agency, such as 
the example of children living with severe forms of autism spectrum disorders. In this 
formulation, agency becomes a property exercised in concert with other agentive beings or 
bodies. While Hacking’s notion of interactivity takes as given the agency of the classified, 
Charland (2004) believes that it does not go far enough, because it does not fully account for the 
role of consumer autonomy in an era of commercialized healthcare. As he puts it, Hacking’s 
concept of interactivity,  
fails to mention one central aspect of the manufacture of iatrogenic identity, 
namely the role of autonomy. Compared to previous ages where paternalism was 
the dominant ethical and political ideology, we now live in an age where the right 
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to self-determination of the individual is paramount. Autonomy is enshrined in 
both law and ethics in the doctrine of informed consent. It is also manifest in the 
openness to pluralism and diversity so prevalent today. Autonomy [has] economic 
dimensions and is reflected in the important place of consumer culture. These 
combined social manifestations of autonomy have had dramatic consequences for 
the practice of psychiatry and the “manufacture” of psychiatric labels (p. 342).  
Thus, according to Charland (2004), a philosophical study of psychiatric classification, including 
the death of psychiatric classification, needs to attend to the increasingly central role that 
consumers are (sometimes) now able to play in the labeling process, a role that is made possible, 
in no small part, by our contemporary digital communication climate.  
4.2  LABEL DEATH IN ONLINE HEALTH COMMUNITIES 
If the increased legal, ethical, and cultural salience of autonomy has given the patients a louder 
voice in the recursive process of label interactivity, one could speculate that our contemporary 
digital communication climate plays a role here too, by clearing a shorter, more direct path for 
interaction between classifiers and classified. The post-2000 years have seen an explosion of 
online health resources with the potential to facilitate interaction: communities, fora, symptom 
checkers, blogs, quizzes, clickbait, and so forth. These resources run the gamut from those that 
are fully “user-led” (i.e., no corporate or organizational sponsorship of any kind) to those that are 
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entirely under the management of a professional organization, patient advocacy group, or 
corporation.  
 As it pertains the to the revision and/or death of psychiatric classifications, online health 
communities offer spaces in which information about impending changes can circulate and 
reactions can be formulated; these reactions are archived and can then accessed by community 
“outsiders” including, theoretically at least, members of the APA themselves, should they be 
motivated to go searching for such information. Online community reaction to label revision and 
death is, at present, relatively unexplored terrain despite being a phenomenon with relevance to 
numerous academic disciplines (for example, bioethics, health communication, and digital media 
studies just to name a few).  
 When attention is paid to the shifts engendered by the new nosological arrangements in 
the DSM, it tends to come from within what might be called the “medicalization critique” 
framework, and so that (critical) attention tends to center upon the creation of new disorders, not 
the death of existing disorders. 73  But, as Giles (2014) points out, “Just as psychiatry has the 
power to bestow “illness” upon individual citizens, it also has the ability to deny or remove it, 
against the will of those individuals who—for whatever reason—desire to own their diagnosis, a 
genuine ethical concern” (p. 180). Of particular ethical concern for Giles (2014) is the way that 
revision of the DSM, and the deletion of certain disorders, can create identity dilemmas for those 
whose labels have been abolished. As Charland puts it, people sometimes “react to a change in 
labeling as though it invalidates their experiences living under that label” (p. 337).  
                                                 
73 One possible reason for this lack of attention may be that label death is a phenomenon whose frequency 
is starkly overshadowed by its opposite phenomenon: label birth. A quick glance at the relevant numbers 
reveals the following: the first (1952) edition of the DSM listed 128 categories, the second edition (1968) 
included 193, the third edition (1980) contained 228, the fourth (1994) offered 383, and the fifth (2013) 
had swelled to 541.  
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Interestingly, the most controversial update of the DSM-5 did not involve the addition of 
new categories, and as such, did not engender the standard medicalization critique about how the 
latest edition of the DSM pathologizes everyday experience and stigmatizes “mere eccentricities” 
(Giles, 2014, p. 180). Instead, the most controversial aspect of the DSM-5 involved not label 
creation but label death: specifically, the death of the short-lived but culturally significant (and 
rhetorically generative) Asperger’s disorder. Only nineteen years old at the time of its label 
death, Asperger’s disorder had already found its way into mainstream public culture during its 
short lifespan, thanks in part to numerous film and television representations, as well as a 
handful of prominent public figures with the diagnosis.  
At the time of its label death, individuals diagnosed with Asperger’s disorder had 
cultivated a vibrant online presence in the form of several prominent, highly active online 
communities organized around the disorder.74 It is from within these online communities that the 
constructed identity of the “Aspie” emerged in the early 2000s, and it was within these 
communities that news of the impending DSM abolishment of Asperger’s disorder circulated in 
the years leading up to the 2013 publication of the DSM-5. Many were displeased with the 
APA’s plan to abolish the disorder and subsume it into the broader autism disorder spectrum. 
This displeasure took several forms, one form, according to Giles (2014), one of which was sheer 
defiance: people suggested that “there was little the DSM could do to damage the AD community 
itself” because AD “has ‘achieved’ too much over the last two decades, spawning an entire 
culture (including the major websites) for it to be washed away simply by changing diagnostic 
criteria” (p. 189). Individuals espousing such sentiments seemed, according to Giles (2014), 
74 In fact, it has been suggested that the correlation between the rise in Internet use in the United States 
and the rise in autism diagnoses is not a coincidence, given that those with communication hindrances are 
often attracted to asynchronous forms of communication (John, 2010).  
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quite confident that the diagnosis of AD would remain a viable disorder outside the walls of 
recognition built by the APA, the DSM, and the professional discourses of mental disorder.75 
A major source on controversy in the “aspie” communities studied by Giles (2014) was 
the APA’s proposal not just to do away with AD, but to incorporate it into the broader autism 
spectrum of disorders. This incorporation is consistent with the DSM-5’s general shift away from 
a strictly categorical model of classification and toward the logic of dimensional (i.e. spectral) 
classification. Categorical diagnosis focuses on matching a patient to an appropriate category on 
the basis of the presence of symptoms, whereas dimensional diagnosis places a patient on a 
spectrum and assesses the degree of symptom severity.  
As the APA put out in a statement leading up the publication of the DSM-5: “The 
upcoming fifth edition of the [DSM-5] introduces an integration of a dimensional approach to 
diagnosis and classification with the current categorical approach. Previous editions of the DSM 
used a strictly categorical model requiring a clinician to determine that a disorder was present or 
absent. The dimensional approach, which allows a clinician more latitude to assess the severity 
of a condition and does not imply a concrete threshold between “normality” and disorder, is 
now incorporated via select diagnoses” (American Psychiatric Association, 2013, italics added). 
For some in the “aspie” communities studied by Giles, the shift from categorical to a 
75 Defiance was one six reactions typologized by Giles (2014) in his study of “aspie” communities’ 
reaction to the proposed abolishment of AD. These reactions include: acceptance (many suggested that 
the death of AD would pave the way for deeper identification among people on the spectrum rather than 
maintaining an “elitist” categorical classification system), fear (involving concerns about diagnostic 
criteria being tightened and thus, the possibility that many with AD would be pushed off the spectrum 
altogether and would be unable to access services), rejection (these individuals tended to operate from a 
critical psychiatry position, and thus, rejected the DSM’s claims to validity), defiance (those who 
expressed intent to keep their label alive after publication of the DSM-5), suspicion (including those who 
suggest the APA was simply buckling to public pressure to reign in the so-called “autism epidemic” by 
tightening the diagnostic criteria) and reassurance (those who aimed to smooth tensions among 
community members and alleviate concerns about underdiagnosis).  
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dimensional system not only induced concerns about diagnostic precision, but also led to 
concerns about the possibility of being diagnostically lumped in with the broader autism disorder 
spectrum, which for some evoked, “bygone childhood experiences where a diagnosis of autism 
condemned them to the company of very low-functioning playmates” (Giles, 2014, p. 192).  
Dysthymia, like Asperger’s disorder underwent a label death in the DSM-5, but a much 
quieter death and one that was, in the communities studied here, positively regarded when it was 
discussed, which was not often. While label death can be resisted defiantly as in the case of AD, 
label death can also be resisted nonchalantly, simply as a matter of convenience. Rather than 
establishing new communities, members maintain the old label and in a way, keep the old label 
alive in order to avoid any serious overhauling of the online health communities. Data collection 
for this dissertation began in late 2014, a little over a year after the label death of dysthymia, and 
the label birth of PDD. At that time, no online communities existed that were organized around 
Persistent Depressive Disorder. Thus, there can be a lag of sorts between professional and public 
terminologies. This lag is not confined to members of the “public” but also clinicians themselves, 
some of whom admit to deploying terminology consistent with the DSM-IV, because it is what 
they themselves, as well as their patients, are more familiar with and are thus more comfortable 
using.76  
 The question of how people react to the DSM death of a label with which they currently 
identify is not an uncomplicated rhetorical matter: these labels are connected with material 
repercussions (such as, for example, access to services), they often buttress a sense of identity for 
the labeled, and they form the basis of communities, such as the ones studied here. What does it 
76 See, for example, this informational YouTube video on the subject, created by a licensed therapist, who 
states that she prefers to use the term “dysthymia” rather than PDD, because that is the terminology that 
she was taught while in school: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mOwOwQB4kvg.  
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mean to presently identify with a given label, but simultaneously advocate the abolishment of 
that same label? Below is one of the few threads identified in this chapter that pertain to the 
DSM-5 abolishment of dysthymia and to the establishment of a new label, PDD. In the short 
thread that appears below, posters seem quite receptive to the DSM-5 changes to their 
classification, and respond to them positively.  
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While the above thread was among the few explicitly addressed the replacement of dysthymia 
with PDD, dissatisfaction with certain aspects of dysthymia as a diagnostic label was 
widespread, so much so in fact, that the rest of the chapter is dedicated to unpacking this label 
(2015, April 9). Persistent depressive disorder. Posted to 
http://MDJunction.com/dysthymia. 
is dsthymia's newest name. I guess they somehow decided there is a purprose 
to renaming it.  
(2015, April 9). Re: Persistent depressive disorder. Posted to 
http://MDJunction.com/dysthymia. 
oh great...... 
Dysthymia is an old latin name. 
Why the Fuck can't they fix it ???? 
(2015, April 10).  Re: Persistent depressive disorder. Posted to 
http://MDJunction.com/dysthymia.  
Believe it or not-- I'm actually OK with that. It acknowledges that this is 
persistent depression and gets rid of the notion that it's "mild", like we have a 
papercut or something. Dysthymia is anything but "mild" chronic depression  
(2015, April 11). Re: Persistent depressive disorder. Posted to 
http://MDJunction.com/dysthymia. 
Yeah, I have to agree. Despair is a common emotion I feel with this illness, 
and I would never use the word "mild" to describe that feeling.  
(2015, April 15). Re: Persistent depressive disorder. Posted to 
http://MDJunction.com/dysthymia. 
So very much agreed, but there' something that happens when a name 
changes...like Idk I feel connected to the word dysthymia...I'll continue to use 
it despite PDD which also has a ring to it. In with the old and in with the new. 
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dissatisfaction and identifying the strategies community members use to contend with this 
dissatisfaction. This dissatisfaction hinges, as can be seen above, on the notion that dysthymia is 
a “mild” mood disorder. Indeed, “dysthymia” and “mild depression” seemed to be used almost 
interchangeably in public discourse when this dissertation project began. Given that dysthymia 
and mild depression as treated as synonyms, community members deploy certain strategies to 
disentangle the two terms. In the forthcoming section, I will explain three such strategies. First, 
community members articulate their perceived “functionality” as a quality of their lives that is 
maintained not despite dysthymia, but because of it. In this way, that which could be perceived 
as potentially discrediting one’s claim to illness is repurposed as evidence of illness. Second, 
community members point to dysthymia’s peculiar liminality to argue against the notion that the 
disorder is mild or relatively bearable. Lastly, community members define “normality” in a way 
that arguably contracts its meaning (compared to its more typical usage), which in turn serves to 
increase the conceptual distance between the experience of dysthymia disorder and “normal” 
experience.  
4.3  THE TROUBLE WITH “MILD” DEPRESSION 
“Mild depression,” if picked apart, is a curious pair of words. This pairing could even be viewed 
as a contradiction in terms: to call something “mild” is generally meant to convey a sense of 
triviality, possibly gentleness; depression, meanwhile, tends to be described as a nontrivial 
experience. Take, for example, famous literary descriptions of what it means to be depressed at 
the level of subjective experience. In Infinite Jest (1996), for example, David Foster Wallace 
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describes depression as “a sense of poisoning that pervades the self at the self’s most elementary 
levels” rendering the depressed unable “to perceive any other person or thing as independent of 
the universal pain that is digesting her cell by cell” (p. 693-694). Or take the first sentence of the 
Centers for Disease Control’s online depression “fact sheet” in which it is stated that, depression 
is “a serious medical illness and important public health issue.” The World Health 
Organization’s online “fact sheet” emphasizes that depression is “the leading cause of disability 
worldwide.” None of these descriptions seem particularly compatible with a qualifier such as 
“mild.”  
To identify with a psychodiagnostic label, and simultaneously support the label’s 
abolishment would seem to entail some degree of ambivalence. Though it may be used 
synonymously with ambiguity—a central concept in Chapter 1 of this dissertation—ambivalence 
is a distinct linguistic and experiential phenomenon. Psychological conceptions of ambivalence 
refer to a state of being in which one is of “mixed minds” about someone or something. The term 
is often attributed to German psychiatrist Eugen Blueler, but was later seized upon and 
popularized by Freud to explain the contradictory forces that structure mental life. For example, 
Freud noted the commonplace phenomenon in which a person harbors seemingly equal doses of 
love and hate, simultaneously, toward the same object. Freud suggested that in order to 
“reconcile” this ambivalence, there is a repression of one of the two conflicting emotions (with 
hatred often getting the short end of the stick) (Bleger, 2013).  
While the psychological conception of ambivalence stems from the notion that people 
have conflicting inner forces brewing within the psyche, sociological conceptions of 
ambivalence focus less on interior dimensions of human life, and more on its exterior, 
intersubjective dimensions. Robert K. Merton, for example, traced the contours of a phenomenon 
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he calls “sociological ambivalence.” According to Merton (1967), this concept was developed as 
a complement to psychological ambivalence, and directs attention to the ways in which 
“ambivalence comes to be built into the structure of social statuses and roles. It directs us to 
examine the processes in the social structure that affect the probability of ambivalence turning 
into particular kinds of role-relations” (p. 5). To illustrate, Merton highlights the meanings 
attached to the role of “good doctor.” Being a good doctor, he suggests, does not only mean 
exhibiting competence, but simultaneously exhibiting care and friendliness. To appear to be a 
“good doctor” means to simultaneously appear to be a “good friend.” Thus, Merton concluded, 
being efficient at doctoring is not sufficient criteria for being a ‘good doctor’; there are 
extraoccupational duties involved, and this includes being a ‘friend.’  
The sociological ambivalence entailed by the role of “good doctor” can be extended to 
the role of “good patient,” as Radley and Billig (1996) have demonstrated. Though there are 
instances in which the sociological ambivalence of patienthood may be less applicable (for 
example, the unconscious patient or the newborn infant), being a “good patient” means more 
than being a sick person in need of care. As Radley and Billig argue, “The patient must appear to 
be more than a patient; a display of healthiness, or normality, is also required, for the ill person 
to be appear worthy of receiving the entitlements. If the ill person is only an ill person they will 
fail to warrant their special claims, as they will do so if they appear to be healthy. In this respect, 
the ill person is both more and less than a physically functioning body” (p. 222). This 
ambivalence highlights the rhetorical demands placed on patients to be both sufficiently healthy 
and ill simultaneously, and to perform both health and illness in a balanced way. To 
overemphasize or overperform one’s healthiness it to risk being perceived as a “malingerer” or 
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“whiner,” while to overemphasize or overperform one’s sickness puts one at risk of otherizing 
oneself, and/or discrediting oneself as a reliable narrator of one’s own experience.  
If the social structure of certain statuses and roles can affect, in Merton’s words, “the 
probability of ambivalence,” is it possible that the discursive structure of certain 
psychodiagnostic labels can likewise affect the probability of ambivalence turning up? And if so, 
what kinds of labels should be considered the most likely candidates for this ambivalence? It 
seems reasonable to suggest that “borderline” or “subthreshold” psychodiagnostic labels, such as 
dysthymia, provide ample reasons for ambivalence on the part of the labeled. The sort of 
ambivalence might be a useful framework for understanding how one could identify with a label 
and simultaneously advocate for its abolishment.  
Dissatisfaction with the label of dysthymia is a consistent theme of discussions in the 
online health communities studied here. The trend of voicing dissatisfaction with the label of 
dysthymia was evident in the communities for years leading up the publication of DSM-5, which 
has abolished the label and offered a new one in its place—PDD. (Interestingly, PDD is a label 
that appears, whether through coincidence or due in part to the sorts of interactive processes that 
Hacking describes, calibrated to ameliorate some of the reasons for this dissatisfaction, given 
that the classification focuses on chronicity rather than symptom severity.) Most of this 
dissatisfaction hinges upon the description of dysthymia as a “mild” version of depression. 
Community members employ various strategies to discredit the notion that dysthymia is “mild” 
mental disorder; I describe three of these strategies in the following section. The first strategy 
involves redefining “functionality” as that which is achieved because of, not despite, the 
disorder. The second focuses on elucidating the peculiar liminality experienced by those 
occupying a dysthymia diagnosis, which makes the experience of the disorder worse than it is 
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often perceived, because it limits opportunities for understanding and support from others. The 
third strategy involves defining “normality” narrowly, in ways that make it incompatible with the 
experience of dysthymia.   
4.3.1  Problematizing “Mild” 
Hagop Akiskal, a prominent American psychiatrist, has said that dysthymics “occupy a position 
between normality and major affective disorder” (2001, p. 28). During the era of inpatient 
psychiatric care, there were no diagnostic classifications to account for those occupying what 
was seen as this murky middle-ground position. Before outpatient psychiatric care became 
routine, Kraepelin—credited with initiating Western psychiatry’s pivot toward the biomedical 
model of mental illness—noticed “milder mood disturbances” among the family members of 
those receiving inpatient care, usually those hospitalized for major affective disorders such as 
major depression and bipolar disorder (Akiskal, 2001). Eventually, diagnostic classifications 
were created to house those individuals residing in the poorly lit territory that exists between 
normality and major affective pathology.77 
Despite the fact that diagnostic space was eventually cleared for those occupying “middle 
positions” between normality and major affective disorder, individuals in online health 
communities voiced frustration with the sense that their disorder is still perceived—whether by 
themselves or by others—as occupying a conceptually murky space in between normality and 
major affective disorder. These users often articulated the sense that they diagnostic space they 
occupy is characterized not just by ambiguity, but also by liminality. “Liminal” derives from the 
77 A notable example of one such diagnostic classification is cyclothymia, which (like dysthymia) is 
regarded as a less severe, but more chronic form of Bipolar Disorder.   
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Latin “limin,” a term often translated as “threshold,”—a space through which one crosses on 
their way to someplace else. Liminality notably appeared in the work of anthropologist Van 
Gennep (1960), in his ethnographic studies of ritual societies. In his work, liminality refers to a 
stage in the process of social transformation; during this process, one disidentifies with a 
previous classification, entering into a temporary state during which there is a dissolution of the 
social order, followed by the individual’s reclassification and reincorporation back into the social 
order. Thus, an essential quality of liminal states, objects, or beings is their mutability: they are 
prone to transformation. The next widely cited scholarly usage of liminality comes from 
sociologist Victor Turner (1969) who studied non-ritual societies, and who used the term less 
with regard to an in-between stage in a transformative process, and more with regard to a general 
sense or state of in-betweenness, particularly where opposites are at play. For Turner, a liminal 
entity is “neither this nor that and yet it is both” (p. 99). Paying attention to liminal entities and 
their treatment within a social group, Turner thought, could yield broader insight into social 
ordering practices.  
In literary studies, liminality is often deployed as a concept to describe a murkily defined 
space—symbolic or physical—that is sandwiched in between other, more clearly defined spaces. 
(This can apply to the conceptual space in between categories.) By virtue of existing close to, but 
ultimately outside of, better-established categories, it is often suggested that liminal entities 
threaten the structural integrity of these adjacent categories, and are thus stigmatized. The stigma 
surrounding the phenomenon of intersexedness is sometimes referenced to illustrate how 
categories that are ‘both yet neither’ threaten the structural integrity of adjacent categories 
(Sytsma, 2006).  
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On the topic of stigma and liminality, Jackson (2005) asks why it is that physical pain—
an invisible and universal experience—becomes stigmatized only in its chronic forms. Jackson 
concludes that it has to do with the fact that chronic pain is a liminal phenomenon, and like other 
liminal entities, it threatens established boundaries of other entities. As Jackson puts it, 
“ambiguous beings and objects, being neither one thing nor the other, are disturbing and 
threatening” and that such ambiguity “turns sufferers into quintessentially liminal figures, 
vulnerable to the stigmatization such figures so often provoke because the sufferer transgresses 
several crucial boundaries that people find essential for understanding, ordering, and evaluating 
experience” (p. 346). In particular, chronic physical pain clouds the lines of demarcation that 
exist between mind and body, between the wholly agentive and the fully involuntary, and, more 
generally, between the categories of health and illness themselves.  
Dysthymia, characterized not by chronic physical pain but chronic low mood, could be 
thought of as a liminal diagnostic entity, perhaps in the sense of being a temporally defined stage 
in a process (as dysthymia sufferers are thought to commonly lapse into the more clearly 
pathological MDD), but more so in the sense of being positioned in-between more clearly 
defined categorical spaces. Dysthymia used to be considered a “subthreshold” disorder (recall 
that “limin” is often translated as “threshold”) and it was thought that oftentimes, people 
diagnosed with dysthymia eventually develop major depression (Akiskal, 2001). In this way, 
dysthymia was considered as in-between stage in the process during which one goes from 
“normal” moods to a ‘subthreshold’ disorder (not quite normal yet not quite fully sick) to full-
blown major affective disorder. Thus, the sort of mutability that Van Gennep (1960) refers to is 
relevant to early understandings of dysthymia. More broadly, however, dysthymia is a category 
that is described as being sandwiched between “normality” and more observably disabling 
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mental disorders, such as MDD. As such, one could say that dysthymia—despite having a DSM 
category all its own—occupies a liminal diagnostic space in between more clearly defined 
spaces, somewhere between “normal” and “major affective disorder.”   
In online health communities, members sometimes described this sense of liminality as a 
significant source of frustration, and something that actually adds to the disabling effects of the 
disorder itself. For this members, being diagnosed with what is considered a “mild” mood 
disorder is accompanied by an unsettling sense that one occupies a space that is not well 
understood by others: it not well understood by people who have “normal” moods, and it is not 
well understood by people diagnosed with major affective disorders. An example of this sense of 
liminality follows below.  
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(2014, March 11). I feel like I have a lot of disabilities but all mild. Message 
posted to http://MDJunction.com/dysthymia. 
It feels like mine are all so mild that no one understands. People with a severe 
problem would love to have it mild and people without it have no idea what it 
feels like. 
Dysthymia-not as severe as it could be. Yes there are times of severe depression-
mostly from hormonal changes. 
Suspected BP-type 2. Depression is mild but it is like my moods and thoughts 
don't match. Mixed state? And  
the  
higher moods are too rare and mild for me to understand those who have it worse 
but at the same time those without any BP symptoms have no idea what it is like. 
And people with it worse have no idea what it is like to have anything mild and 
would love to have it as mild as I do. I would too in their state. 
Epilepsy-almost controlled. 
Asperger's Syndrome, again milder than others have it. 
Fibromyalgia-same. Not in as much pain as most in the fibro groups and I have 
more energy than them. 
learning disability-NOS. No one understands what it is like. I think mine is more 
severe than others think. Most don't even know because it isn't a 'visible 
disability'. 
Personality disorder-again not severe as others have it. So they can't understand 
that it is still frustrating and I can't understand them. And those without it can't 
understand either of us. I tell very few people about it. I usually just blame it all 
on Asperger's since I am ok with talking about that. 
Ugh. Still frustrating and I feel very misunderstood. No with any of the 
disabilities that have it severe can understand me because they would love to have 
it as mild as I do. And no one without it can understand because they don't know 
what it is like to have it at all. 
Every one of those listed above is very frustrating and having them all is hard. I 
can't go to the groups for each because they all have it worse. Many assume that 
what I say is as frequent as theirs because that is their experience. I probably 
would too.  
I'm glad I don't have these things worse. But I'm still wondering what to do. 
Can't get help because I can work some. I work about 3 hours a day and 5 days a 
week. (13.5 hours a week, with the fewest hours on Wednesdays). I can socialize 
in activities that are around people but not interacting. Like at the library's 
computer lab. People are there but you don't have to interact. I get food stamps 
and live in subsidized housing but apparently things have to be severe to be 
counted as a disability by the government and by people in general. 
Ok, enough venting. 
Have a good day everyone. And knowing me, I will be ok by later this afternoon. 
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This post articulates the frustration that can accompany being diagnosed with a liminal 
diagnostic entity; that is, a diagnostic entity considered “mild” when compared to other, more 
disabling mood disorders, and yet this diagnostic entity disqualifies people from being 
considered, by themselves or others, as “normal.” This liminality, it is argued, actually adds to 
the difficulty of dysthymia itself because it restricts possibilities for understanding from people 
who reside within the better-established categories that sandwich dysthymia—namely, normality 
and major affective disorders. The author of this post argues that people with dysthymia are 
straddling a boundary between normality and more severe pathology, and that people with firm 
footing in either one of these more clearly established categories are incapable or unwilling to 
extend understanding and/or support to people with “mild” disorders.  
As the author puts it, “People with a severe problem would love to have it mild and 
people without it have no idea what it feels like…No [one] with any of the disabilities that have 
it severe can understand me because they would love to have it as mild as I do. And no one 
without it can understand because they don’t know what it is like to have it at all.” This not only 
limits the opportunities to be understood by others, but also limits the person’s access to social 
support. The author mentions not feeling comfortable enough to frequent support groups, 
because most participants in those groups “have it worse” and, because the effects of these 
“mild” disorders are not disabling enough to prevent one from working, thus disqualifying one 
from entitlements because “apparently things have to be severe to be counted as a disability by 
the government and people in general.” In this way, this post cites the “mildness” of dysthymia 
as a quality that actually adds to the problematic nature of the disorder. Put another way, its “not-
so-badness” actually makes it worse.  
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It is possible that being wedged into the awkward diagnostic space between normality 
and major affective disorder could intensify the sort of ambivalence that Radley and Billig 
(1996) describe in their elaboration of what it means to be a “good patient.” They suggest that 
one cannot appear too sick, lest they undermine their own credibility as a rhetor. This is 
particularly true in the case of mental illnesses, since as Pryal (2010) points out, people with 
MDD have long been excluded from rhetorical participation since often they come to be seen as 
unreliable narrators, even on the topic of their own experiences. At the same time that one cannot 
appear overly incapacitated, one can also not appear overly healthy, for to do so could jeopardize 
one’s claims to an illness identity which in turn puts one at risk of being perceived as a 
“malingerer”—a label that Akiskal (1997) suggests clinicians have historically misapplied to 
dysthymics, chiefly because of their observed tendency to offer “hyperbolic descriptions of 
suffering” that “contrast so strongly with the relative absence of objectively ascertainable 
depression” (p. 12). There were posts in the communities studied here wherein authors seemed to 
be grappling with precisely this sort of rhetorical dilemma. In particular, some authors appeared 
to feel the need to account for their outward appearance of healthiness and/or functionality. For 
example, this post:  
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This post addresses the rhetorical dilemma that comes with having a mood disorder that is 
considered a “less severe” variant of another disorder (namely, MDD, in this case). This author 
in particular has zeroed in on the notion of “functionality” and laments that their outward 
appearance of functionality “invalidates the enormous struggle I go through just to get up in the 
morning.” Interestingly, this author has harnessed the very thing that threatens to undermine the 
claims to a disabling disorder—functionality—and has repurposed it as evidence of the disorder 
itself: the author has managed to maintain a high level of function not despite dysthymia, but 
because of dysthymia. The author posits that the severity of symptoms associated with dysthymia 
motivated them to invest effort into education “to take my mind off the fact that I hated myself.” 
This seems to be one way to manage the rhetorical dilemma of being a “high functioning” person 
diagnosed with an outwardly invisible mood disorder: employing a logic that recontextualizes 
“functionality” as a capacity that one maintains not despite the presence of a mental disorder, but 
because of the mental disorder itself. Within this framework, success or achievements, which 
(2010, July 30). Dysthymia - less severe? Message posted to 
http://psychforums.com/dysthymia. 
I think I got lumped into a dysthymic diagnosis because I am high functioning 
and have been depressed for FOREVER (since at least the time I was about 7). 
But I read the wikipedia article and it makes it sound as if dysthymia is less 
severe than major depressive disorder. It just hasn't been my experience. 
I was always good at school because studying gave me something to do that 
would take my mind off of the fact that I hated myself. That in turn translates 
into "successful."  
Avoidant personality disorder seems to describe me pretty well, plus long term 
depression and long term being suicidal. Oh, and I fit the criteria for body 
dysmorphic disorder, EXCEPT for the fact that I'm not delusional about it (I'm 
just being realistic!) and I don't obsess over trying to fix the defects. I just wear 
baggy clothes and try not to go out much.  
How do you guys feel about being classified as "less severe" just because you've 
managed to slog through life thus far? I feel like it invalidates the enormous 
struggle I go through just to get up in the morning.  
dailyalice  
181 
might otherwise weaken one’s claims to “legitimate”, suffering, are harnessed as evidence of the 
presence of disorder. Interestingly, the suggestion that dysthymics might be productive not 
despite but because of the disorder has precedent in the psychiatry literature. Akiskal (2001) 
notes that, “Dysthymic individuals at best invest whatever energy they have in work” (p. 19).  
The degree of dsythymics’ investment in work has been considered an overcompensation for the 
disorganization that depression often brings with it (Tellenbach, 1980). 
Authors also seize upon dysthymia’s chronicity to argue against the notion that the 
disorder is mild. Specifically, it is argued that, over time, dysthymia’s sheer persistence 
gradually transforms one’s symptoms from mild or bearable into a much more serious problem 
that encompasses all aspects of a person’s life. Again, this evokes the notion of dysthymia as a 
liminal state: it is a “threshold” entity that is in the process of becoming something else, 
something more serious, more encompassing. See the posts below:  
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(2012, October 18). It Isn't Mild. Message posted to 
http://experienceproject.com/dysthymia. 
I've been diagnosed with Dysthymia. Recently I've gotten curious as to 
whether all the therapy, medication, and "positive thinking" that I've been 
trying to do is worth it so I did a little research. Whenever I find a site that 
describes dysthymia it is called a "mild" form of depression but I'm sick of that 
phrase. For me, at least, the "mildness" has culminated into something that's 
becoming unbearable. I'm not suicidal. Not in the classic sense, at least. I don't 
look at a bottle of pills and serious think about taking them all. I've 
safeguarded myself from the real chance of it happening. But every night when 
I go to sleep I silently pray to whatever is out there that I don't wake up. I hate 
being around. I hate that everything is so grey and that I can't make emotional 
connections. Nothing is unaffected. My concentration is abysmal which means 
that I do more poorly in classes than I would like. I can't make emotional 
connections so my relationships are shallow which means that I feel isolated 
and misunderstood. Food doesn't taste good enough to lift my mood, emotions 
are fleeting, and all of my hobbies create only the briefest reprieve. What's 
worse is that in all my research I have never come across anybody with a story 
of how after a few years of fighting they finally managed to say goodbye to 
this constant life of grey. I don't see the point in me sticking around and every 
time somebody tries to convince me it only makes things worse. I live in a 
religious group. My family is religious, my school is intensely religious, and 
the state I'm in is probably one of the most religious in the country. Religion 
makes no impact with me but sometimes I find myself hoping there's a god so 
that when I pray for everything to just end somebody will listen and take pity 
on me. Even if religion isn't real then if I wasn't here anymore I wouldn't exist 
which would be far more preferable. I hate this life. Dysthymia isn't mild for 
me, it's something that has permeated every facet of my life. I hate it and I just 
want it to go away.  
(2013, July 2015). Re: It Isn’t Mild. Message posted to 
http://experienceproject.com/dysthymia. 
m sick of people calling dysthymia "mild" too. I once had someone say that 
dysthymia was just a case of the blues. In a book by someone who had "major 
depression" the author called dysthymia just "mildly annoying." It's not 
"mildly" annoying and it's not a case of the blues. 
I think dysthymia is even more difficult to cope with than so called major 
depression because at least the person with major depression can remember a 
time when they were happy. Dysthymics often can't remember the last time 
they didn't feel the way they did.  
183 
In this post, the author seeks to explicitly decouple dysthymia from its oft-accompanied qualifier 
“mild.” The argument in favor of this decoupling is rooted in dysthymia’s chronicity. The author 
suggests that the chronic symptoms of dysthymia have “culminated into something that’s 
becoming unbearable” and which has “permeated every facet of life.” This description echoes 
Solomon’s (2001) delineation of the experiential differences between dysthymia and MDD. 
While MDD is described as the total collapse of the structure of one’s life, dysthymia’s 
symptoms undermine a person in a cumulative and more insidious way; he describes dysthymia 
as “a gradual and sometimes permanent thing that undermines people the way rust weakens iron” 
(p. 16). These claims suggest that “mild” is not an appropriate term to describe the subjective 
experience of depression because the chronicity of dysthymia gradually transforms “mild” 
symptoms into “unbearable” symptoms. Put another way, it is over time that mild symptoms 
come to be regarded as intolerable.  
In the reply post above, the respondent also points to dysthymia’s chronicity to challenge 
the notion that dysthymia is a “mild” disorder. To do so, the symptoms of dysthymia are 
contrasted against its nosological neighbor, MDD. Reasons are offered as to why dysthymia 
might even be considered more problematic than MDD. Specifically, it is suggested that because 
dysthymia is chronic rather than episodic (as MDD is episodic), dysthymics, in contrast to people 
with MDD, are not even able to recall periods during which they were asymptomatic. As the 
author puts it, “I think dysthymia is even more difficult to cope with than so called major 
depression because at least the person with major depression can remember a time they were 
happy.” The author suggests that a short time period characterized by “severe” symptoms would 
be preferable to “years of joylessness and hopelessness.”  
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All of these posts contend with the rhetorical dilemma of being wedged into the awkward 
diagnostic space that Akiskal (2001) describes as “between normality and major affective 
disorder” (p. 28). The strategy drawn upon to contend with this dilemma is to increase the 
conceptual contrast between dysthymia and normality by emphasizing the particularly 
problematic nature of chronic symptoms that, over time, transform into intolerable symptoms. 
These posts emphasize the ways in which “mild” is not an apt qualifier for dysthymia. Another 
strategy to contend with the sense of “in-betweenness” is to construct the meaning of “normal” 
such that it contrasts more starkly with the subjective experience of dysthymia. In other words, 
the strategy is not to focus on defining the meaning of dysthymia (in ways that render it 
incompatible with normality), but to focus on defining the meaning of normality (in ways that 
render it incompatible with the dysthymia). This strategy forms the focus of the following 
section.  
4.4  CONSTRUCTING (AND CONTRACTING) NORMALITY 
When the unfixed nature of the line that separates psychological normality from psychological 
disorder comes under critique, generally the discussion centers on how definitions of pathology 
have expanded in recent decades (Conrad, 2005; White & Horvitz, 2007. This is particularly true 
of medicalization critiques more generally; such critiques tend to trace the ways in which things 
that used to be considered nonmedical (i.e., nonpathological or “normal”) problems, conditions, 
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or experiences come to be defined as medical problems with medical solutions.78 Working from 
a medicalization framework thus encourages scrutiny of the means by which what “pathology” 
expands, which, in turn, arguably takes the focus away from scrutiny of the means by which the 
corollary concept—“normality”—contracts. Scrutinizing how “normal” is discursively 
contracted might not seem as intriguing as scrutinizing how “pathology” is discursively 
expanded, but doing so may lend insight into how people (or, at least, people in online health 
communities for dysthymia) contend with the rhetorical dilemmas occasioned by being 
diagnosed with a “mild” or “high-functioning” mental disorder. Such insight perhaps becomes 
especially valuable given the common concern, articulated in both public and professional 
discourses, that dysthymics are especially vulnerable to being misclassed as “normal.”  
 To express concern over the pathologizing of “normal” problems of living risks implying 
that “normal” is a sturdy given, rather than a temporally and contextually shifting construct. 
Take, for example, psychologist Nick Haslam’s (2016) much-discussed article on the notion of 
“concept creep,” which he defines as a relatively contemporary phenomenon in which 
psychological concepts with negative valence undergo definitional expansion. Specifically, he 
explores the expanding concepts of abuse, bullying, trauma, mental disorder, addiction and 
prejudice.79 Haslam cautions that, “Expanding the concept of mental disorder can pathologize 
normal experiences…and engender a sense of diminished agency” (p. 14). 80 Take, as another 
example, DSM-IV architect Allen Frances’ (2013) book, Saving Normal, in which it is suggested 
                                                 
78 As Conrad (2005) points out in the Medicalization of Society, the verb “medicalize” is typically used 
prescriptively, to mean “overmedicalize.”   
79 In this paper, Haslam distinguishes between two forms of so-called concept creep: “vertical” and 
“horizontal.” The former refers to a form of conceptual expansion wherein the concept grows in order to 
accommodate “milder” but qualitatively similar versions of the phenomena at hand. The latter occurs 
when a concept begins to encompass qualitatively dissimilar phenomena.  
80 Haslam notes that the conceptual expansion of mental disorder receives much more scrutiny than the 
conceptual expansion of abuse, bullying, trauma, addiction, or prejudice.  
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that “way too much treatment is given to the normal “worried well” who are harmed by it; far too 
little help is available for those who are really ill... “Normal” badly needs saving; sick people 
desperately require treatment” (p. xv). However, what constitutes Haslam’s “normal experience,” 
increasingly subject to pathologization, and Frances’ “normal” that calls for preservation, is 
neither obvious nor static.81  
Inclusivity—an increasingly evoked aspirational value across domains of contemporary 
public life— has found its way into discussions of the DSM-5, and has implications for 
understanding the possible shrinkage in conceptions of normality. The push toward an 
“inclusive” edition of the DSM has taken the form of lowering the diagnostic threshold for 
certain disorders, and by emphasizing a dimensional (i.e., spectrum-based) rather than 
categorical approach to the classification and diagnosis of mental disorders (Pickersgill, 2012). 
This push toward inclusivity arguably acknowledges the power of diagnosis: diagnoses are a 
gateway to treatment, social services, and, perhaps above all, meaning-making. Among others, 
one side effect of this more “inclusive system of diagnosis” is that the “pool of ‘normality’ 
shrinks to a mere puddle” (Wykes & Callard, 2010, p. 302).  
The line between the normality and pathology in general is already said to be difficult 
enough to distinguish (clinically, socially, philosophically) likely due in no small part to its 
shifting nature. When it comes to identifying a “mild” mood disorder such as dysthymia, the 
difficulty only increases, supposedly. Thus, there are oft-cited concerns about dysthymic people 
(or now, people with PDD) going undiagnosed, having been mistakenly categorized as 
81 Frances (2013) himself acknowledges that “normal” is a particularly problematic concept to define, in 
part because it exists in a tautological semantic relationship to “abnormal.” He notes, “The dictionary 
definitions of normal are all entirely and beguilingly tautological. To know what is normal you have to 
know what is abnormal” (p. 4). And abnormal is defined as “those things that are not normal or regular or 
natural or typical or usual or conforming to a norm…[T]here is no real definition of either, and no 
meaningful definitional line between them.” (p. 4).  
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“normal.”82 The users of dysthymia online health communities voice such concerns, knowing 
that they do not readily come across as “disordered” and so, they are at risk of being perceived 
(by clinicians, employers, friends, family, etc.) as “normal” people with a mere tendency toward 
gloominess and pessimism, or an inability to handle life’s difficulties. While it is possible that 
people with more discernably disabling or stigmatizing disorders might desire to be mistaken for 
“normal” in everyday life, dysthymia’s definitional proximity to normality induces, for some, 
heightened concerns that they will be mistaken for “normal.”83 Thus, in some accounts, there 
appears to be an investment in discursively increasing the conceptual space between dysthymia 
and normality, and there are two basic ways in which one could do this. The first is to bring into 
sharper focus the uniquely problematic features of dysthymia, such as its liminality and 
chronicity. The second is to construct a restricted notion of normality, one that stands in starker 
contrast to the subjective experience of dysthymia. Below, I describe some of the ways that 
normality is constructed in the online health communities studied here.  
When the concept of normality is invoked in online health communication discussions, it 
is often with regard to a moment of disidentification. That is, individuals who previously 
identified with the concept of “normal” describe a moment or period of time during which they 
came to disidentify with it, no longer considering it an appropriate label to describe their moods, 
82 My sense from perusing psychiatry literature is that concerns about underdiagnosis and misdiagnosis 
far outweigh concerns about overdiagnosis.  
83 Segal’s (2007) rhetorical reading of dominant breast cancer narratives provides a compelling 
counterexample to this section of the chapter. Segal claims that breast cancer narratives expand, rather 
than contract, conceptions of normality. She states “The most publicly circulating breast cancer narratives 
invite women to see themselves as, if not completely well, then at least completely normal…in many of 
those stories, women with breast cancer seek not to find common ground with other people who are ill or 
weak; rather they seek to claim the space of a new normal.” She further claims that in these standard 
breast cancer narratives, authors seek to distance themselves from strong imputations of illness or 
disability, instead seeking the ideal of normal, glossing over the fact that, “the category of normal has 
been expanded, to include women who may be bald and breastless, but are still walking and running and 
shopping” (p. 9).  
188 
behaviors, or interior mental life. The practice of recounting a self-conceptual shift of this sort is 
certainly not unique to dysthymia, or to the narratives circulating in online health communities. 
So-called “mood memoirs”—a growing genre of autobiographies produced by people with 
MDD—are typified by a generic convention that Pryal (2010) terms the “moment of 
awakening.” In this moment of awakening, the author recounts a pivotal event or moment in time 
after which they came to accept a diagnosis of MDD. This moment of awakening typically 
constitutes “both the turning point in the author’s life and the impetus for the narrative” (p. 490). 
In the mood memoirs that Pryal analyzes, the moment of awakening is typically rendered fairly 
dramatically: it is a moment in which one’s symptoms have become sufficiently disruptive that 
the individual comes to accept a diagnosis.84  
Dysthymia does not have “severe” symptoms that stand in stark contrast to “normality.” 
Its symptoms are, by definition, mild, and so do not contrast sharply with one’s “usual mood.” 
This makes it difficult to draw a distinction between “symptoms of disorder” and one’s “habitual 
self” (Akiskal, 2001). Lacking a dramatic, pivotal moment of awakening, some users of 
dysthymia online health communities recount subtler moments of recognition.  In contrast to the 
MDD memoirs that Pryal analyzes, the authors of these online accounts do not recount a moment 
of identifying with a disorder, as much as they come to disidentify with the label of “normal.” In 
these accounts of recognition, the authors describe prior modes of self-classification, such as, for 
84 Pryal (2010) notes that the moment of awakening in mood memoirs is somewhat of a rhetorical 
paradox. As she describes the paradox, “The mood memoirist’s awakening is unique among similar 
genres in that the narrator is recounting the awareness of a mental illness, an illness which, in a 
paradoxical fashion, does not impede the author’s self awareness. This apparent paradox renders the 
awakening moment as particularly rhetorically powerful: the precision of descriptions of awakening 
establishes the author’s reliability as narrator, despite the author’s mood memoir. By describing the 
awakening with ostensible clarity, precision, honesty, and self awareness, the memoirist tacitly invites the 
audience to trust her narration of events. In short, although the mood memoir is a study of mental illness, 
the awakening implies that the illness does not impede the narrator’s ability to tell the story” (p. 490).  
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example, “I always assumed the way I felt was normal” or “I was surprised to learn that people 
felt differently from me.” In short, these authors recount a moment in time or process by which 
they cease to believe that “normal” is an accurate descriptor for their experience. In doing so, 
these authors often construct the meaning of “normal” in ways that place the concept at odds 
with their experience. Generally, this involves defining “normal” in a restricted sense. Below 
follows an example.  
In the post above, the author states, “All my life, I thought that everybody was the same as me. I 
thought the way I felt and looked at life was normal.” In this author’s formulation, “normal” 
refers not to externally observable behaviors, nor does it pertain explicitly to impeded function—
a typical demarcation criteria for the diagnosis of mental disorders. Instead, in this account, 
“normality,” or a lack thereof, is something that is ascertained subjectively; it is a quality 
(2013, September 6). Re: Ahh Dysthymia. Message posted to 
http://MDJunction.com/dysthymia. 
I can relate. I too have had a pretty good life. Been off and on medication for 
years. I get feeling better and then I quit taking meds. It takes about six months to 
go down the dysthymia hill and then I am back to square one. The problem is that 
the medication doesn't work when I restart it. I just found out that this is what I 
have. So now I am waiting to get another prescription, but this time I know that I 
will have to take medication, even if I feel that I don't need it. I get so frustrated. I 
know what I am capable of and yet I just can't get going. No enjoyment in 
anything, just doing what I have to do to get through the day. There is a the weird 
thing that I found out through this diagnosis. All my life, I thought that everybody 
was the same as me. I thought the way I felt and looked at life was normal. Low 
self esteem, insomnia, no follow through, constant down feeling, overly critical, 
negative, judgemental. Always start things, exercise, diet and never follow 
through. If I didn't have to do it to survive or for my family or someone else, I 
didn't do it. I became a saviour. That way I could just go by logic without 
emotion. Everyone thought I was great, but they didn't know what I was dealing 
with on a daily basis.  
Okay, enough about me. Hope everyone is okay and the sun will rise every day, 
even if you can't see it. 
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attached primarily to feelings and perspectives, described by the author as “the way I felt and 
looked at the world.” The author goes on to specify the types of feelings and perspectives that, 
following diagnosis, are now (presumably) interpreted correctly as disordered rather than 
normal. These feelings and perspectives include low self-esteem, persistent “down” feeling, 
being “overly critical, negative and judgmental.”  
“Normal” people, by contrast of this formulation, would have robust self esteem, upbeat 
moods, a sense of optimism, and would avoid being overly critical, negative, or judgmental—an 
arguably quite narrow definition of normality. Because these qualities of “normality” are 
attached to the interiority of one’s mental life, and not externally manifested signs of disorder, an 
incongruity between one’s interior experience and external presentation is possible. This sort of 
dissonance is described by the author as such: ‘Everyone thought I was great, but they didn’t 
know what I was dealing with on a daily basis.” It is possible, then, for one to exhibit external 
markers of normality (whatever such markers might be thought to consist of) but to subjectively 
assess their inner life as abnormal or disordered.  
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The post above echoes an earlier theme, specifically, that notion that dysthymia is a disorder 
whose gradual culmination “wears you down” over time. This description comports with 
Solomon’s  (2001) claim that the symptoms of dysthymia are not debilitating in their initial 
onset; over time, however, their effects accumulate until they are capable of undermining an 
individual in the way that, as he says, “rust weakens iron.” (p. 16). Thus, dysthymia is again 
conceived as a shape-shifting entity, prone to transformation over time. Like the author of the 
previous post, this author also defines normality as a quality that manifests chiefly in one’s 
interior mental life: “normal” describes the way that the author “wanted to feel” rather than, for 
instance, how the author wishes to be perceived by others. The author grants that they may never 
be “an upbeat, perky chick” but credits therapy and medication with enabling them to “function 
(2012, March 26). Spiral. Message posted to 
http://experienceproject.com/dysthymia. 
I have been depressed since my teenage years and was finally diagnosed with 
Dysthymia a few years ago. I am the single mother of 2 boys with a full-time job. 
If it weren't for therapy and meds I would still be spending my life asleep with an 
occasional burst of energy. I hit rock bottom when my husband and I separated 6 
years ago and I finally got some help. Even with the meds, my energy level is 
low most of the time, but I suppose it's worth it to not hate everyone at the very 
least. I have held down a full-time job for 5 and a half years now, something I 
used to think was simply not possible. I always thought it was just me being lazy 
and worthless, but a good therapist informed me otherwise. 
It amazes me that dysthymia is described as "mild" depression. It can destroy all 
quality of life and wear you down with its never-ending tunnel of hopelessness. 
Even after I was diagnosed, it took years for the novelty to sink in- I just couldn't 
convince myself that I wasn't just useless and spoiled, that I should be able to get 
up in the morning and care about things. I was told to find God and told to eat 
right and told to suck it up and do what needed to be done to make myself a 
better mother and successful person. But I couldn't seem to ever see the light at 
the end of the tunnel. Everything was pointless, so why bother when dreams are 
so much more pleasant? I never wanted pity for my depression, I just wanted it to 
GO AWAY. I wanted to feel normal and content but I didn't know how for years. 
I may never be an upbeat, perky chick, but I am so glad I got help when I did. 
Now I can function and even do things for others simply because I want to.  
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and do things for others simply because I want to.” While dysthymia is generally considered to 
be less function-impeding than MDD, this author has implied that “normal” functioning is not 
simply a matter of one’s behaviors, but a matter of what motivates those behaviors—for instance, 
genuine desire rather than a vague sense of obligation.  
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(2010. April 22). Didn’t Know What I Felt Wasn’t Normal. Message posted to 
http://experienceproject.com/dysthymia. 
Hi everyone, 
I am a 54 year old mom of 3 grown kids. Divorced after 22 years of marriage (not 
by my choice). 
I never realized until recently that how I felt emotionally on a daily basis was not 
the norm!! I thought everyone had the same kinds of thought patterns that I have. 
I have always been a "negative thinker", socially quiet and shy, always seeing the 
glass as half empty. I think the grass looks greener on the other side of the fence, 
but then when I do get there its no better than where I came from. I have  people 
in my life who I have always thought are just so fake because they are always 
acting happy!! Maybe they really are?!?! I just never realized that was a possible 
way to feel since I have NEVER  been that way. 
Occassionally I would feel content (although not so much since my divorce 6 
years ago), but never truly what I think "happy" would feel like. The demise of 
my marriage I think was in great part due to my dysthymia. 
I see a Psychiatrist regularly and have been on many different psych meds--none 
of which have quite done the trick. I have had some momentary lifts in my mood I 
guess from the meds, but nothing lasting. There is no reason in my life 
circumstances that I should feel so "down" for as long as I can remember. My 
childhood was normal--no abuse, 2 loving parents, 5 great siblings. I'm educated, 
relatively physically healthy, upper middle class, raised 3 normal seemingly well 
adjusted intelligent children.Why can't I be happy. I have struggled with this 
question for a long time.When I was a teen and in college I remember i was 
always be looking for something, someone to make my life better, happy. That 
happy state of being remains elusive still today. 
I do thank God every day that my kids seem to have come through childhood 
unscathed by my mood disorder. Not so lucky with my adult relationships. I'm 
sure that adds to my dysthymic state of mind these days. 
Hope that I meet some other folks that can relate to this. Some days are so hard 
without anyone to talk with who understands. 
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This author above narrates a moment of recognition during which time they realized that “how I 
felt emotionally on a daily basis was not the norm.” As with the posts above, in this post, 
“normal” is conceptualized as a quality of thought, feeling, or worldview, not a quality of 
behavior of other outwardly noticeable characteristics. The feelings and thoughts that are 
regarded as “not the norm” include: “negative thinking,” being “socially quiet and shy” and 
“always seeing the glass as half empty.” Patterns of thoughts and feelings that, by contrast, 
would be “within the norm” might include positive thinking, social extraversion, and an 
optimistic temperament that includes a tendency toward “seeing the glass as half full.”  
4.4.1 Shifting Conceptions of Normality Elsewhere 
As noted earlier in this chapter, the typical lack of noticeably impeded functionality that 
characterizes dysthymia (and the apparent “normalcy” that such lack of impeded functionality 
might suggest) likely places rhetorical demands of those diagnosed with dysthymia. Specifically, 
the outward appearance of normalcy potentially jeopardizes their claims to a chronic illness 
identity, thus they risk being perceived as “malingerers” (Akiskal, 2001). At the same time, if 
one appears overly ill, they risk being regarded as an unreliable narrator of their own experience 
(Radley & Billig, 1996; Pryal, 2010). One way to negotiate this rhetorical conflict, as I suggest in 
the above section, is to reconstruct the meaning of dysthymia in ways that emphasize and expand 
upon dysthymia’s uniquely problematic features. For example, authors in online health 
communities have seized on the peculiar liminality of dysthymia to suggest that, in some ways, 
this condition actually induces more suffering than MDD, despite being characterized by 
symptoms that are “less severe.”  
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 A second strategy to contend with this rhetorical conflict is to reconstruct the meaning of 
“normal” in ways that render it narrow, and that provide a starker contrast to the experience of 
dysthymia. Specifically, “normal,” in these accounts refers to worldviews, motivations, and 
feelings. Users often suggest something along the lines of “I didn’t know that what I felt wasn’t 
normal” or “I thought everyone felt the same as me.” Thus, users describe a moment in time, or a 
temporal process, during which they came to disidentify with the concept of “normal.” 
Following this moment, users go on to offer evidence that they do not fit within the concept of 
normal, which in turn helps to construct the very idea of what “normal” is or is not. When 
elaborated upon, users tend to suggest that so-deemed “normal” people experience high levels of 
energy, optimistic thought patterns, and that they undertake action out of “genuine desire” as 
opposed to a sense of obligation.  
 Thus, in these formulations, “normal” does not seem to refer to the absence of socially 
aberrant or undesirable feelings/behaviors/experiences (which would constitute a fairly broad 
definition of “normal” in the same way that defining “health” as the absence of illness constitutes 
a fairly broad definition of “health). Instead, the concept of normal refers to the presence of 
behaviors/feelings/experiences that are considered socially desirable or productive. This arguably 
constitutes a much more restricted notion of normality. And so, it could be argued that users 
contend with the rhetorical dilemma of having a “mild” or “high-functioning” disorder not only 
by expanding or amplifying the characteristics of dysthymia that make it uniquely miserable, but 
also by contracting the construct of “normal” in order to demonstrate that their experience does 
not fit within it.  
 Given the possible incongruity between outward signs of normality and one’s inward 
mental state, this narrow definition of “normal” might not even apply to those who appear to 
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meet all the outward benchmarks of normalcy, users suggest. Some users claim that this 
incongruity characterizes their lives, such as the user who states that, “Everyone thought I was 
great, but they didn’t know what I was dealing with on a daily basis.” Thus, the bounds of an 
already contracted concept—normality—contract yet again, in accordance with the 
acknowledgement that the outward appearance of normality can actually be an indication of 
concealed disorder.  
 The possibility of an incongruity between one’s outwardly “normal” state of function and 
inwardly depressed mental state seems an increasingly common acknowledgment in public 
discourse. Take, for example, TheMighty.com, a website that describes itself as a community for 
people facing “disease, disability, and mental illness. (Within this community, there are 376,000 
followers on the topic of “Depression.”) This site has published multiple articles in recent years 
seemingly meant to educate the public about the effects that this incongruity has on people who 
suffer from “high functioning” mental illnesses, including what it terms “high-functioning 
anxiety” and “high-functioning depression.” Writing for the site, an author listed as Dr. Margaret 
Rutherford elaborates the difference between so-called “classic depression” and so-called 
“Perfectly Hidden Depression.” She states, “People with classic depression are overwhelmed by 
loss or difficulty in their lives. They can’t function, and are lost. People with Perfectly Hidden 
Depression are overwhelmed by the idea that anyone might find out that they aren’t all they 
seem—that the backstory of their lives might be discovered. They function far too well” 
(Rutherford, 2016). With Perfectly Hidden Depression, the author explains, the goal of treatment 
is to “help someone engage with their inner self—to acknowledge and work through their denial 
of pain.” This poses an interesting question: if one functions “normally” and does not 
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acknowledge the presence of symptoms (or, in the author’s formulation, denies the existence of 
serious of pain), how is “depressed” an apt descriptor of that person’s experience?   
 Another contributor to TheMighty.com has written an article titled “19 Problems Only 
Happy People With Depression Understand.” Written from the first-person perspective, this 
author provides an numerically itemized list of misunderstandings one can expect to encounter 
living under the diagnosis of a “mild” or “high-functioning” disorder. The second item on the list 
states that “Just because it looks like I am doing well doesn’t mean I am…Usually, the better it 
seems, the harder I am working to hide something” (Alexandra, 2017). 85 Thus, the outward 
appearance of “doing well” is not evidence of a lack of disorder, in fact, it can be interpreted as 
evidence that the opposite is true. In other words, the appearance of normality can actually be 
interpreted as evidence of disorder. This echoes the suggestions of online health community 
users, as described earlier, that they function well not despite but because of disorder.  
  While nothing in this chapter can be claimed as representative of broader public (or even 
representative of the perspectives of people with dysthymia outside these communities), one can 
certainly find indications in public discourse that a narrowing in discursive constructions of 
“normality” is underway, should one go looking for such indications. For example, Scientific 
American—the oldest U.S. popular science magazine and website since 1996—recently 
published an article titled “Mental Illness Is Far More Common Than We Knew”. In the article’s 
first paragraph, the authors state that a survey of epidemiological research suggests that, 
                                                 
85 Here, the first-person perspective is worth noting. While the title suggests that the article contains a list 
of problems that will be recognizable to “Happy People With Depression,” each problem is articulated 
from the first-person perspective (i.e. “I” statements.) Though these problems are articulated from the 
author’s point of view, the title suggests that they are problems that are common to a specific group of 
people. This recalls Kelly’s (2014) suggestion that the first-person statements that are included in the 
DSM-5 draft diagnostic criteria are recontextualized instances of patient speech that, in essence, provide 
people with a portable “script” of sorts for understanding and relaying their experiences and symptoms.  
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“[M]ental illnesses are so common that almost everyone will develop at least one diagnosable 
mental disorder at some point in their life. Most of these people will never receive treatment, and 
their relationships, job performance, and life satisfaction will likely suffer” (Reuben & Shaefer, 
2017).  If “almost everyone” will meet the criteria for a diagnosable mental disorder at some 
point in their lifetime, then those who will never experience a mental disorder constitute a 
divergence from the norm. Such divergence from the norm, the authors suggest, constitutes a 
meaningful subject of inquiry. They state, “[T]he few individuals who never seem to develop a 
disorder may offer psychology a new avenue of study, allowing researchers to ask what it takes 
to be abnormally, enduringly mentally well.” (Reuben & Shaefer, 2017). Thus, the prospect of an 
enduring lack of mental disorder, the authors suggest, constitutes its own form of psychological 
abnormality. They further suggest that, given the epidemiological evidence, “[S]ociety should 
begin to view mental illnesses like bone breaks, kidney stones, and common colds—as part of 
the normal wear and tear of life.”  
 If mental illnesses are metaphorized as broken bones or common colds, then the 
experience of mental illness can no longer be considered abnormal, and the experience of mental 
health can no longer be considered normal. Here, it is not just that the definition of “normal” is 
being contracted, it is that now attaches to a phenomenon with which it used to be considered at 
odds: mental illness. Rose (2009) has suggested that, with the expansion of the concept of mental 
disorder, “[I]t now appears that a lifetime without disorder, at least in this expanded definition, 
and now mapped onto the brain, would be somewhat abnormal—or to put it another way, mental 
abnormality has become normalized—simultaneously a condition to be treated a mode of 
existence to be expected” (p. 17).  
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 There are other indications that “normal” might be losing its coherence as a concept not 
just within ‘psy’ disciplines, but in the health sciences as well. Rose (2009) explores how the 
increasing power of genomics might come to signal the end of “normality,” given that there is no 
“normal” genome, there is no “normal” genetic risk, and there is no “normal” genetic 
predisposition. In an era of genomic medicine (not to mention a broader push toward 
personalized medicine) normal might not be considered a useful, or actionable, concept.86 As 
Rose puts it, “[I]n the area of disorders of the body and mind at least, we are moving from 
dividing practices based on the binary of normality and abnormality to practices based on the 
idea that all individuals vary, and that most, if not all, carry molecular variations that can in 
particular circumstances lead to disorders of body and mind, but which, once known, are 
potentially correctible. In the human genome, “normal is rare.” Or rather, there is no normal 
genome—variation is the norm” (p. 11). Here, Rose’s emphasis on correctibility is worth noting. 
It could be suggested that what is “normal,” historically speaking, has changed in accordance 
with many factors, and one such factor is correctibility. For example, Carl Elliot (2003) has 
pointed out that shyness used to be considered a “normal” (i.e. common and non-problematic) 
character disposition, until drugs aimed at treating “social anxiety” became available. It could be 
that the more problems of “everyday” life that become correctible, the more we should expect a 
                                                 
86 The push toward “personalized” medicine, ushered in largely thanks to genomic science, dovetails with 
another trend in medicine: preventive medicine. Preventive medicine has found its way into psychiatry, 
having led to the development a relatively recent “preventive psychiatry” subfield. Preventive psychiatry 
seeks to, among other things, identify individuals “at risk” for developing a mental disorder and to initiate 
treatment prior to the disorder’s onset. This could be a good example of what Rose (2009) terms 
“governing through susceptibilities.” He states that, “What susceptibility promises, in an age of genomics, 
is more than risk assessment and risk management—more, that is to say, than intervention based on a 
correlation between factors…Susceptibility is something that can be defined at the level of the individual 
body itself—a variation within the sequence of DNA that bases in an individual’s genome that predispose 
that person the development of a particular disease or disorder” (p. 83). The calculation of susceptibility 
made possible by genomics, Rose suggests, has broken the taken-for-granted linkage between health and 
normality, since susceptibility “escapes the logic of health as normativity” (p. 84).  
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contraction of “normal.” (And of course, it goes without saying that the pharmaceutical industry 
is one party that is likely especially enthusiastic about the prospect of narrowed conceptions of 
normality.)  
 The DSM-5’s shift from categorical to dimensional classifications—a move that the APA 
claims was motivated in part by the desire to become more “inclusive”—could also be claimed 
as possible evidence that conceptions of normality are contracting. Kupfer & Kuhl (2013) state 
that concerns have been raised “about DSM-5 being too inclusive, thus stigmatizing what might 
be considered normal conditions as mental illness” (p. 88). It is possible to view the DSM-5’s 
“inclusivity” as simply another step forward in the decades of mission creep visually symbolized 
by the successively thicker spines of the DSM editions (and of course, one could speculate, 
fueled in no small part by the APA’s tight ties to both the insurance and pharmaceutical 
industries), as its organizing text eats away at the corners of “normal” and converts them into 
pathologies. While such a critique of the DSM’s “inclusivity” certainly resonates with critical 
psychiatry and antipsychiatry perspectives, one could argue that the APA is not only engaging in 
mission creep but is also being responsive to the fact that the language of mental illness, in 
Solomon’s (2001) words, “can be enormously empowering to marginal people who have no way 
to describe or understand their experiences” (p. 361). Access to the “endlessly manipulable” 
vocabulary of mental illness is not evenly spread throughout society; it is likely that “Those more 
advantaged members of a society experience their illness through that vocabulary” (p. 361). 
Thus, it is possible to see the DSM-5’s inclusivity as motivated by a concern for social justice, or 
by an interest in appearing motivated by a concern for social justice. 
 When pondering contracting conceptions of normality, broadening one’s cultural lens 
beyond psychiatry proper can draw one’s attention toward seemingly tangential factors, such as 
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the surging genre termed “pathography,” or, sometimes, “illness narratives.” Such narratives are 
championed for counterbalancing the quantitative impulses of biomedical discourse with rich 
descriptions of patient experience. For this reason, many regard the genre of pathography as 
empowering to patients: it places them back in the center of their own lived experiences. Thus, 
pathography has a decidedly epideictic flavor, according to Segal (2005), both in the sense that 
individual pathographies elevate certain virtues, and in the sense that the wholesale embrace of 
pathography genre has a prescriptive character: it establishes narrativizing as an appropriate and 
desirable response to illness. And, one might ask, does the genre itself elevate the experience of 
illness itself (i.e. suffering) to the level of a rarely questioned virtue?  
 It has been suggested that certain cultural conditions—specifically, neoliberal modes of 
thought and policy—exert pressure on individuals to formulate and share narratives of suffering. 
For example, Nair (2014), writing on the subject of sexual abuse and exploitation, has suggested 
that our contemporary public discourses produce and prioritize what she terms “the confessional 
subject” which she defines as a type of subjectivity that is produced and authenticated through 
the sharing of personal suffering narratives. She suggests that, [I]n some ways, the perfect 
neoliberal subject is becoming the traumatized subject, the subject of trauma” (Nair, 2014). This 
squares with Haslam’s (2012) designation of “trauma” as one of the six psychological concepts 
that have undergone significant conceptual expansion in recent decades. Seen through this lens, 
there may be a sense in which “normal” has perhaps begun to carry with it a dismissive 
character, to the extent that it downplays, challenges, or invalidates one’s claim to psychic 
suffering or hardships. Indeed, when frustration with the designation of dysthymia as “mild” was 
a topic of discussion in online health communities, a common argument was that this designation 
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constituted a diminishment of their emotional pain and furthermore, a devaluation of 
accomplishments achieved despite/because of the presence of disorder. 
Normativity has long had a prescriptive character; that is, “normal” is not a mere neutral 
description of what is the case, but often functions as moralized prescription for what should be 
the case, or, should not be the case. For example, a quote from actor Misha Collins that has 
circulated throughout Internet meme culture and found its way onto t-shirts, mugs, and 
notebooks proclaims: “I want to live in a world where normal is an insult.” One might be 
tempted to ponder whether, in the context of contemporary mental health discourses, the nature 
of normal’s prescriptive character has shifted: that is, one should strive not to be “normal” but to 
be a highly individuated person. At the very least, it might offer an answer to Haslam’s posed 
question about why it only tends to be psychology’s negative concepts that undergo expansion, 
while positive concepts either stay the same, or contract.  
4.5  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In the 1970s, research coming out of psychology marveled at the peculiar “stickiness” of 
psychiatric labels as they were applied to (symptom-feigning) inpatients, maintaining their 
adherence even after the total dissipation of symptoms (Rosenhan et al., 1971). Despite their 
durability, psychiatric classifications are also remarkably ephemeral; new disorders appear in 
each edition of the DSM, and previous disorders vanish—a phenomenon that philosopher of 
medicine Louis Charland (2004) has termed “label death.” For some, the phenomenon of label 
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death prompts ontological questions: for example, does the 2013 abolishment of Asperger’s 
disorder necessarily mean that people with Asperger’s disorder no longer exist? For others, label 
death generates ethical and material concerns, given that psychiatric labels are often a gateway 
for social services, and also given how tightly these labels can link to a person’s sense of 
identity. How should psychiatry go about revising its diagnostic manual, knowing that changes 
from one edition to the text are bound to destabilize at least some percentage of the currently 
labeled public? Given these sorts of concerns, it is no wonder that, when it comes to label death, 
most attention has been focused on the removal of labels that generate opposition, sometimes 
ardent, on the part of the labeled. That is, attention has been centered on the cases in which many 
people want to maintain their current label. In the relatively few studies of label death that exist, 
online health communities have been a focal point, given that they offer spaces in which news of 
impending label death can be circulated and collective responses can be formulated. Perhaps 
more importantly, online health communities are places wherein the label can be “kept alive” 
after death, through a refusal to disband or rename the community.  
 Dysthymia underwent label death in the 2013, when the DSM-5 was published. This 
chapter contributes to the scholarship on label death, in part, by exploring online health 
community responses to label death that are characterized largely by indifference or acceptance, 
as opposed to the label death opposition evident in other studies of label death. First, it 
contextualized the DSM-5 revision process, a process that was unique in that the APA, for the 
first time, created a website for the public that included drafts of diagnostic criteria, along with 
solicitations for feedback. To situate this unprecedented move within a theoretical context, the 
chapter put into conversation contrasting scholarship from the fields of rhetoric of medicine and 
philosophy of science, respectively. The former suggested that the public likely did not 
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meaningfully contribute to the revision process because the APA created the subject positions for 
the “general public” to inhabit; the latter suggests that members of the public had already been 
playing a non-trivial role in the DSM revision process, because of the looping, essentially 
interactive nature of psychiatric classifications. 
 The DSM-5 revision process ultimately resulted in dysthymia’s abolishment and 
replacement with Persistent Depressive Disorder, which is a disorder that collapses all previous 
diagnoses of dysthymia with chronic (and therefore atypical) diagnoses of MDD. Thus, the 
chronicity of symptoms, rather than severity of symptoms, is foregrounded in the diagnostic 
entity of PDD. This development was favorably regarded by members of online health 
communities because, in the words of one member, it “acknowledges that this is persistent 
depression and gets rid of the notion that it’s “mild,” like we have a papercut or something. 
Dysthymia is anything but mild depression.”  
 From here, the chapter unpacked community members’ widespread dissatisfaction with 
the classification of dysthymia, much of which centers upon the notion that it is “mild.” This 
section of the chapter contemplated how having a “mild” or “borderline” or “high-functioning” 
psychiatric disorder occasions a rhetorical conundrum of sorts: on the one hand, if individuals do 
not emphasize the severity of their symptoms, they risk being interpreted as “normal” people (i.e. 
people without a diagnosed/diagnosable mood disorder) albeit with a tendency toward 
gloominess, or an attenuated ability to handle the problems of everyday living. On the other 
hand, if they overemphasize their symptoms, they risk being interpreted by practitioners as 
“malingerers” prone to “hyperbolic descriptions” of suffering for which there is no outwardly 
discernable evidence (Akiskal, 2001); they also risk, as health-oriented scholarship has pointed 
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out, discrediting themselves on the grounds that they are too ill to be regarded as reliable 
narrators of their own experience (Radley & Billig, 1996; Pryal, 2010),   
 The chapter identified strategies that people in online health communities drew upon that 
appear to contend with the sort of rhetorical dilemma described above. The first includes 
reframing specific successes or general “functionality” as that which has been achieved because 
of, not despite, dysthymia (because success in school, work, etc., gives people a means to distract 
themselves from the symptoms of their mood disorder, as the argument goes). The second 
strategy involves pointing to the features that make dysthymia a uniquely miserable diagnosis to 
live under, in particular, its liminality: that is, its conceptual positioning between “normality” and 
“major affective disorder.” This being the case, posts in online health communities suggest that 
being grouped into this liminal diagnostic category limits possibilities for support and 
understanding, both from people who do not have a mood disorder, and from those who have a 
more “severe” mental disorder. Interestingly, there may be empirical support for this argument: 
recent social network research has suggested that, “relative to those with less severe affective 
disorders, individuals with severe diagnoses and more visible symptoms of mental illness have 
larger, more broadly functional networks, as well as more supporters who are aware of and 
sympathetic toward the illness situation” (Perry, 2011, p. 460).  
Because being miscategorized by others as “normal” appears to be a significant concern 
for some, this chapter then turned its attention to how “normality” is constructed in these 
communities. It suggested that “normality” is defined in relatively narrow ways that increase the 
conceptual space between the subjective experience of “normal” and the subjective experience of 
“dysthymia.” For example, when “normal” was evoked in online discussion, it was often with 
regard to a moment of disidentification, a point in time during which an individual realizes that 
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“how they felt” or “looked at the world” was “not normal.”  By defining normality primarily in 
terms of inwardly assessed criteria such as worldviews and motivations or lack thereof (rather 
than in terms of any outwardly observable criteria such as behavior or functionality) normality 
becomes something that can only truly be assessed subjectively. In closing, the chapter reflects 
on broader trends—in genomic science, in narrative medicine, and in public culture—that may 



















5.0  CONCLUSION 
For rhetoricians, subjects that are marked by ambiguity and paradox have been of special 
interest. Depression is a subject marked by both. While state policy, awareness-raising 
campaigns, and consumer-oriented health literature typically convey confidence that depression 
is a scientifically known entity, historical and contemporary literature on the topic—from both 
the sciences and humanities—suggests otherwise. Instead, there is longstanding and continued 
uncertainty about what depression is, what causes it, and how to best treat it. Thus, it has been 
argued that depression is a subject not simply touched by ambiguity, but characterized by it 
(Helén, 2007; Fink, 2010).  
There is also something paradoxical about the relationship between depression and 
language. On the one hand, depression has long been said to trouble the subject’s capacity for 
language, and many claims have been made about its fundamental indescribability. Yet, at the 
same time, the topic of depression generates and enormous amount of discourse, both public and 
professional. Certainly, part of this salience can be attributed to the staggering ubiquity of 
depressive diagnoses (in 2015, the World Health Organization claimed that 322 million people 
worldwide are affected by depression). In addition to diagnostic ubiquity, this dissertation has 
contemplated the possibility that the ambiguity of depression might be a part of its discursive 
generativity, as it presents openings for rhetorical engagement whereas clarity might instead 
signal closure. Thus, the ambiguity of depression could be considered a rhetorical fuel of sorts.  
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 While the prerogative of the perfectionist, philosopher, or scientist might be to reduce 
instances of ambiguity, Kenneth Burke (1945) famously articulated that rhetoricians have a 
different relationship to ambiguity: they aim not to reduce it, but to explore its usage as a 
rhetorical resource. Thus, it is not a surprise that depression has attracted attention from 
rhetoricians. One such example comes from Emmons (2010), who concluded that dominant 
discourses circulating around the topic of depression reflect our deep cultural immersion within 
the biopsychiatric paradigm. Meanwhile, Segal (2005) has suggested that the ambiguity of 
depression sets the stage for cases of mistaken identity, in which one ambiguously defined 
disorder (in her case of interest, hypochondria) can plausibly masquerade as another, depression. 
In a different vein, Johnson (2010) has argued that, despite its invisibility, depression results in a 
rhetorical disabling effect she calls “kakoethos”, and Pryal (2010) has pointed to the depression 
memoir as a socially meaningful genre that depressed rhetors have deployed to overcome the 
stigmatizing effects—or “kakoethos”—of the disorder.  
 What the above-mentioned scholarship has in common is a shared focus, whether explicit 
or implicit, on Major Depressive Disorder (MDD). This is not surprising: MDD has been called 
the “breakout star” of the DSM-III, and the “diagnostic core” of mood disorders (Shorter, 2008; 
Helén, 2011). And yet, within the category of depressive disorders, there is one subcategory that 
is especially ambiguous, due both to its low-grade severity and its chronicity—dysthymia—that 
has yet to be the sole focus of rhetorical inquiry. This dissertation sought to address this gap, and 
it did so by homing in on two so-called “areas of transformation” or spaces in which old 
meanings are turned over, giving rise to new ones (Burke, 1945). The first zone of 
transformation that this dissertation traced was arguably macro-level, and consisted of the 
revisions that ultimately culminated in dysthymia’s label birth in the DSM-III and label death in 
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the DSM-5. The second and more substantive zone of transformation this dissertation explored 
consisted of the micro-level interactions occurring in online health communities for dysthymia, 
which allow people to interact with the label of dysthymia, themselves, and one another. In the 
section that follows below, I review the contours and main claims made by each chapter.  
5.1  REVIEW OF TERRAIN 
Chapter 2 of this dissertation, titled “Ambiguity, Agency, and the Fitting Room,” was made up 
of three distinct but interrelated sections. The first section provided a brief rhetorical history that 
contextualized dysthymia as a strategically ambiguous diagnostic entity. I am not the first to 
approach depression as strategically ambiguous: Emmons (2010) explores how the definitional 
vagueness and malleability of depression’s diagnostic profile was maintained rather than 
clarified “in order to expand the potential patient population” (p. 93). Of course, this account of 
depression’s strategic ambiguity—which posits a causal alignment between definitional 
imprecision and pharmaceutical industry incentives—is plausible, but as it pertains to dysthymia 
specifically (as opposed to depressive disorders in aggregate) this chapter suggested that such a 
view is incomplete. This section of the chapter recounted the institutionally tumultuous years 
leading up to 1980 publication of the paradigm-shifting DSM-III, a period of the American 
Psychological Association’s history that was characterized by consistent tension between those 
adhering to the fading psychoanalytic paradigm, and those championing the emergent 
biopsychiatric paradigm.  
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After crafting Major Depressive Disorder—a disorder that, according to Shorter (2008) is 
considered by some to be most representative of the biopsychiatry paradigm, and which many 
psychoanalysts feared would come to supplant their often-diagnosed “neurotic depression”—the 
APA task force overseeing the DSM-III revisions constructed a loosely defined “mild” 
depressive disorder in the form of dysthymia. Importantly, dysthymia appeared to honor aspects 
of both paradigms: it functioned as a “mild” complement to MDD—the breakthrough star of the 
biopsychiatric paradigm—and was potentially treatable with antidepressants, just as MDD was. 
At the same time, it was defined as chronic (whereas all other affective disorders were defined as 
episodic), which conformed to psychoanalytic view that these patients did not merely experience 
depressive episodes; they essentially were depressives. Thus, dysthymia was nosologically 
familiar to, and diagnosable by, adherents to either paradigm. While, as a diagnostic category, 
dysthymia may not quite reach the formal definition of a “boundary object” the disorder is 
constructed in such a way that it functioned similarly to one, in that it is characterized by 
interpretive flexibility, and it may have helped to induce cooperation in the absence of consensus 
(Starr, 2010). 
After tracing the rhetorical resources afforded by ambiguity in a historical professional 
context, this chapter fixed its attention on the contemporary context of dysthymia online health 
communities, to inquire into the rhetorical resources of dysthymia’s ambiguity in online health 
interactions. While the rhetorical accounts of depression mentioned above often claim or imply 
that public discourses of depression reflect our complete saturation within the biopsychiatric 
paradigm, this chapter found that people in online health communities for dysthymia flexibly 
made use of explanatory aspects from both paradigms, the biopsychiatric and the psychoanalytic. 
In doing so, participants in online health communities resisted totalizing vocabularies that would 
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locate dysthymia as a matter of pure symbolic action (Burke’s (1977) term for phenomena that 
are considered amenable to symbolic intervention, and which thus imply the possibility of 
individual agency) or a matter of pure nonsymbolic motion (Burke’s term for the realm of 
phenomena we consider determined, which exists outside the scope of symbolic intervention and 
thus forecloses the possibility of individual agency). Perhaps counterintuitively, this chapter 
found that when participants discussed the question of dysthymia’s causality, they often relied on 
explanatory aspects from the psychoanalytic paradigm, and when doing so, they explicitly 
renounced the possibility of individual agency.  When discussion centered on the treatment of 
dysthymia, it was often couched in biopsychiatric terms, and in these discussions, the possibility 
of individual agency was reclaimed.  
The third section of the chapter focused on informal practices of self-diagnosis in online 
health communities. This section discussed what has been called the most important innovation 
of the DSM-III, the so-called “Feigner criteria,” or the clinical practice of requiring a 
combination of symptoms from itemized lists in order for a patient to “get into” diagnosis, as the 
expression apparently went. The professional language of “getting into” diagnosis was paralleled 
by a similar expression in online health communities: participants often deliberated how well 
they “fit into” the label of dysthymia, or, alternately, how well the label of dysthymia “fit” them. 
Exploring this language of “fitness,” this section of the chapter offered a metaphor for 
contextualizing self-diagnosis in these particular online health communities: the “fitting room.” 
While I had previously encountered the metaphor of the “waiting room” for online mental health 
communities (i.e., a space people inhabit while they presumably wait to be seen by a mental 
health practitioner and obtain a formal diagnosis), my sense was that these online spaces 
functioned more similarly to clothing store fitting rooms. Specifically, participants in these 
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online health communities appeared to try on the label of dysthymia, assess how well “it fit,” 
sometimes soliciting feedback from others and “trying on” other labels to see if they “fit” better. 
Importantly, participants in these online health communities also appeared to act similarly to 
patrons of clothing store fitting rooms in the sense that no one seems enthused to leave empty-
handed, without a presumed diagnosis. In an era of commercialized, consumer-oriented health-
care, the “fitting room” metaphor may be especially apt.   
In Chapter 3, titled “Coming to Terms with Temporality,” I explored the role of 
temporality in online health accounts of dysthymia. Scholarship from across fields has 
demonstrated that the onset of chronic physical illness often leads to reshaped temporal 
perspectives, or ways of thinking about and narrativizing time. One such perspective, termed 
“living one day at a time,” entails a contraction of one’s temporal boundaries such that the 
immediate present comes into sharp focus, with the distant past and remote future receding from 
view (Charmaz, 1992).  Temporal contraction, it has been suggested, serves as a strategy for 
conferring control in the face of uncertainty, and for punctuating the various forms of labor that 
chronic illness care often entails.  
This chapter identified a common temporal perspective that seemed to structure many 
online health accounts of dysthymia, which it dubbed “panoramic.” Panoramic temporal 
perspectives contrast sharply with the temporal contraction entailed by the perspective Charmaz 
(1992) calls “living one day at a time.” Panoramic temporal perspectives entail broadly stretched 
views of time that start by painting a picture of a bleak remote past (typically involving the 
context of one’s childhood), and end with an envisioning of one’s dim future prospects. Rather 
than immersing one in the present, those employing panoramic temporal perspectives to structure 
accounts of illness often described a feeling of detachment from the immediate present.  
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Within the accounts structured by panoramic temporal perspectives, dysthymia is not 
described as especially problematic in the context of the immediate present; rather, dysthymia 
becomes especially problematic through recollections of its effects on the past (which many 
described as “tainted” or “wasted” due the disorder) and through anticipations of its effects on 
the future (which many said they expected to be similarly tainted by the disorder). Interestingly, 
this aligns with the somewhat paradoxical claim, made by a prominent American psychiatrist, 
that dysthymia “appears mild day to day but becomes brutal long-term” (Tartakovsky, 2016, 
emphasis added). This sentiment is captured by a metaphor that one user consistently deployed 
to explain the subjective experience of dysthymia, especially to community newcomers. In this 
metaphor, the individual suggests that the subjective experience of dysthymia is akin to waking 
up on the tenth day of rainy weather and knowing that the rain will continue well into the future.  
This chapter suggested that panoramic temporal perspectives provide a workable 
framework for a practice it termed “retrospective identification.” As observed in the online 
health communities studied here, retrospective identification involves demarcating a moment in 
time and recontextualizing it as the onset of one’s illness. This recontextualization of the past 
leads to reshaped understandings of other aspects of one’s life, including one’s sense of self, 
one’s relationships with others, and one’s expectations for the future.  
A practice like retrospective identification highlights something paradoxical with regard 
to agency and temporality: that the past both can and cannot be changed. It is simultaneously 
“irrevocable and revocable” (Barken, 2014, p. 698). The past is irrevocable because it has 
already transpired, and its contents cannot be revisited and/or altered in accordance with our 
present wishes. And yet, every act of recollection is a remediation arising in the immediate 
present, and which affects how we experience the present. And so, there is perhaps an argument 
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to be made that we can experience the past differently by exercising our recollections differently, 
and narrativizing them different.   
When the past is recontextualized via retrospective identification, it not only colors how 
one experiences the present, but also shapes how one expects to experience the future. 
Commonly, these future expectations involve the intransigence of one’s symptoms and, 
accordingly, limited satisfaction and success across the domains of one’s life. Implicit in such an 
envisioning of the future is a felt sense of attenuated agency (because, if one felt it possible to 
exercise meaningful agency over one’s future, then envisionings of one’s future would be 
unlikely to include limited satisfaction and success in life). And so, this chapter speculated that 
panoramic temporal perspectives contrast not only with the overall structure of the temporal 
contraction entailed by “living one day at a time,” but also in terms of the possible effects: while 
temporal contraction often increases one’s felt sense of agency, the sort of temporal expansion 
seen here may tend to do precisely the opposite.  
Chapter 4, “The Trouble with “Mild” Depression and the Contraction of Normality,” 
began by providing theoretical context for the DSM-5 (2013) revision process that led to 
dysthymia’s “label death” and replacement with another label, Persistent Depressive Disorder 
(PDD). The DSM-5 revision process was unique, as the American Psychological Association, for 
the first time in its history, created a website for the so-called “general public” to review and 
comment on drafts of its diagnostic criteria. In this section, I outlined two contrasting 
perspectives on the role that the general public was thought to play during this process. The first 
was a constitutive rhetorical perspective that suggested that the public did not meaningfully 
contribute to the APA’s revision process, because the APA had created the subject positions for 
the “general public” to inhabit. Thus, this perspective suggests that the APA was not 
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“discovering” the public’s feedback; it was creating it. The second perspective came from 
philosophy of science, and it suggested that, because of the “interactive” nature of psychiatric 
classification, the public had already been participating in all of the DSM revision processes to 
date, however indirectly.  
After situating the DSM-5 revisions in this theoretical context, the chapter turned to the 
question of how online health communities reacted to the label death of dysthymia. Reactions 
were decidedly few and far between. The few discussions of dysthymia’s label death that existed 
were framed in largely positive terms: people were happy to let go of the label of dysthymia and 
ready to embrace PDD. This is perhaps not surprising: PDD collapses all cases of dysthymia 
together with chronic cases of Major Depressive Disorder, thereby foregrounding its chronicity, 
and deemphasizing its lesser symptom severity when compared to MDD.  
This chapter unpacked community members’ dissatisfaction with the label of dysthymia, 
which centered primarily upon its designation as “mild.” While one might think that a “mild” 
mood disorder would be preferable to a more severe mood disorder, this chapter contemplated 
the rhetorical difficulties occasioned by having a so-called “mild” or “borderline” mood disorder. 
This difficulty can be described as such: on the one hand, if individuals do not emphasize their 
symptoms, they risk being interpreted by others as “normal” people with an attenuated ability to 
cope with the everyday problems of living. On the other hand, if they overemphasize their 
symptoms, they risk being interpreted by others as hyperbolic in their descriptions of suffering, 
for which there is little outwardly discernable evidence.  
The chapter identified several rhetorical strategies that individuals in online health 
communities drew upon, possibly to contend with the sort of rhetorical dilemma described 
above. The first strategy involves framing success or functionality as something that individuals 
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attain due to dysthymia, rather than despite dysthymia, the logic being that success in school or 
work gives people with dysthymia something to focus on besides their symptoms. A second 
strategy was to highlight the aspects of dysthymia that make it particularly unpleasant at the level 
of subjective experience when compared to other disorders, including MDD. This strategy 
foregrounded dysthymia’s liminality, or its conceptual positioning in between “normality” and 
major affective disorders. This in-betweenness, community members argue, make dysthymia 
uniquely miserable, because people without a mood disorder cannot understand their suffering, 
and neither can people with a more severe mood disorder. Thus, their options for social support 
and understanding were described as especially limited. A third strategy was to construct the 
meaning of “normality” in particularly constrained ways that place it starkly at odds with the 
experience of dysthymia.  
5.2  CONTRIBUTIONS TO SCHOLARSHIP 
This dissertation makes contributions primarily to three overlapping fields of scholarship: the 
rhetoric of medicine, the sociology of health and illness, and narrative medicine. To date, when 
depression has been the subject of inquiry across these three fields, it has overwhelmingly been 
with an explicit or implicit focus on Major Depressive Disorder, the so-called “diagnostic core” 
of mood disorders (Helén, 2011). This is not particularly surprising, given that MDD has been 
diagnosed roughly twice as much as dysthymia/PDD to date, and also considering that most 
publicly circulated accounts of depression (memoirs, for example) come from the perspective of 
an individual living under the diagnosis of MDD. And yet, recently, scholars in the social 
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sciences and humanities have suggested that we ought to regard depression not as a unified, 
coherent condition or entity, but, in Helén’s (2007) words, as “an amalgam” made up of 
“divergent facts and definitions” (p. 150). By focusing on a lesser-known subtype of depression 
that sits near the border separating “normal sadness” from major affective disorder,  this 
dissertation contributes to the calls being made to contextualize “depression” as a heterogeneous 
category that houses an impressively divergent range of human experiences.  
This dissertation makes a contribution to the rhetoric of medicine—a field that has been 
invested in questions pertaining to the agency of patients in various contexts of health and 
illness. Work within the field has paid special attention to the contexts in which patients’ agency 
is constrained and the rhetorical strategies that patients use to overcome these constraints. For 
example, Stone (1997) examined how the rhetorics of patient “compliance” and “adherence” are 
deployed to constrain diabetic patients’ agency, thereby minimizing costs associated with 
complications. In a similar vein, Keränen (2007) analyzed “patient preferences” worksheets 
(forms that ask hospital patients and/or their caregivers to specify which treatments they would 
like to receive or decline in the context of end-of-life care) and found that, while these forms are 
ostensibly deployed in the name of patient autonomy, they ultimately constrain patient agency, 
and instead serve the needs of hospital administrators whose primary concerns relate to legal 
liability. Lastly, Graham (2009) examines medical discourse on the subject of a contested 
syndrome, fibromyalgia, and constructs an “object-centered agency narrative” in which he 
argues that PET brain scans played a genuinely agentive role in the medical legitimation of 
fibromyalgia—something patient advocacy groups had been trying to accomplish for decades. In 
each of these three cases, the focus is on instances in which patient agency is constrained and 
how it might be regained.   
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At a time when health information is more accessible than ever, and “patient 
empowerment” is a buzzword, it is no wonder that rhetoricians of medicine have focused 
primarily on the constraints placed on patient agency, and how patients negotiate those 
constraints to claim agency for themselves. This dissertation makes a small contribution to this 
field by focusing on an opposite practice—the renunciation of patient agency on the part of 
patients themselves. In chapter 1, this dissertation noted that, when matters of dysthymia’s 
etiology were foregrounded, agency was renounced, and when matters of dysthymia’s treatment 
were foregrounded, agency was reclaimed. This may be one strategy that people employ to 
negotiate excessive imputations of agency in an era of commercialized healthcare and “patient 
empowerment”: renouncing agency for the existence of one’s illness, and reclaiming agency 
when discussion shifts to the treatment of one’s illness.  
This dissertation also contributes to scholarship that examines the role of temporality in 
personal accounts of chronic illness, much of which comes from the sociology of health and 
illness and narrative medicine. This scholarship has examined how the temporal perspectives 
deployed by patients can significantly shape their experiences of chronic illness. For example, 
focusing on type 1 diabetes, Maines (1983) argues that, ultimately, temporality is the central 
node that unites all other dimensions of the diabetic experience, including its physiological, 
emotional, social, and organizational dimensions. Relatedly, Charmaz (1992) established that 
patients with chronic physical illnesses often “live one day at a time,” which entails restricting 
their temporal blinders, rooting themselves firmly in the present, and holding both the past and 
future in abeyance. This temporal perspective, Charmaz notes, appears to confer a sense of 
control to those with chronic physical illnesses. 
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Thus far, studies that link temporality and illness have focused on chronic physical 
illnesses. This dissertation makes a contribution to this existing scholarship by focusing on the 
temporalizing of a chronic mental illness. In doing so, it defined a particular temporal 
perspective, dubbed “panoramic,” that provides a stark counterexample to the sort of temporal 
contraction that sufferers of chronic physical illness often employ. Panoramic temporal 
perspectives involve temporal expansion and a concomitant sense of detachment from the 
immediate present. While it has been noted that temporal contraction appears to confer a felt 
sense of control, this dissertation observed that temporal expansion appeared to attenuate one’s 
felt sense of control. 
Lastly, this dissertation makes a contribution to the sparse but developing body of 
literature that addresses the phenomenon of “label death”—the removal or replacement of a 
recognized disorder from one edition of the DSM to the next—and explores how people living 
under a given label react to its death, whether impending or actual. So far, this body of 
scholarship has looked at online health communities as a site of particular importance, since 
these communities can function as spaces where impending label death can be reacted to, and 
where labels can be kept alive even after their death (Charland, 2004). (In fact, the online health 
communities studied here technically function in that capacity: they have not yet incorporated 
the 2013 DSM-5 label PDD; instead, they continue organize around the DSM-IV label of 
dysthymia.) For example, Giles (2014) visited online health communities for Asperger’s 
disorder, which was removed from the DSM-5, subsumed by the broader Autism disorder 
spectrum. One reaction that he identified among users was strong resistance to the label’s 
removal, as many stated their intentions to carry on without renaming the vibrant online 
communities that had helped to foster a coherent “aspie” identity.  
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Thus far, the limited scholarship on label death focuses primarily on theorizing the death 
of labels that the labeled are still very much attached to, and reluctant to give up. From a 
bioethical perspective, this makes sense: these labels provide a strong sense of identity for many, 
and they are also gateway to social services and other forms of support. Thus, label death is a 
phenomenon that has the potentially to significantly destabilize the lives of the previously 
labeled. This dissertation, however, focused on a label death that was not met with resistance, but 
with nonchalance and general acceptance. Its fourth chapter was guided by the question: what 
does it mean to identify with a given label, and yet simultaneously advocate for its abolishment? 
In doing so, it brought to light the reasons why people might react ambivalently toward labels 
that are deemed “mild” when compared to the more obvious or disabling symptoms of other 
disorders. 
5.3  DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This idea for this dissertation was sparked by Kenneth Burke’s claim that ambiguity serves as a 
major resource for rhetoric. Since my interest in part was the emergence of a discursive 
distinction between “normal sadness” and “clinical depression,” it made sense to theorize a 
disorder that arguably sits closest to the hazy, mutable boundary that separates the two. In doing 
so, this dissertation tried to shed light on the rhetorical and communicative conditions that 
individuals may encounter when their experience is labeled as only “mildly” disordered. While 
this dissertation focused only on dysthymia, there is another so-called “subthreshold” or 
“subaffective” mood disorder, with similar etymology and nosology: cyclothymia—a “milder” 
form of bipolar disorder. Cyclothymia is defined by the experience of “low intensity” moods that 
  221 
fluctuate between depressive states (that do not meet the criteria for a full-blown depressive 
episode) and manic states (that do not meet the criteria for a full-blown manic episode). One 
intriguing possibility for future research would be to integrate both disorders into the same study, 
for the purposes of illuminating the rhetorical dilemmas and strategies shared by those living 
under both labels, as well as any relevant divergences.  
Something that I noted during data analysis, but did not address in this dissertation, is the 
regularity with which people invoke the concept of “im/balance” when describing their 
experiences with dysthymia. Of course, the frequent usage of this term has something to do with 
what American psychiatrist David McDowell (2001) has called the “modern neuromythology” of 
depression. This modern neuromythology, now outmoded but still in wide circulation in public 
culture, posits depression as a single-effect illness rooted in a neurochemical “imbalance,” 
usually described as a deficit of serotonin. This etiological narrative has been favored by the 
pharmaceutical industry and popular press, and has also been taken up by practitioners who seek 
to quell patients’ concerns about starting antidepressants (Barr & Rose, 2008). The latter have 
analogized depression and antidepressants to diabetes and insulin: in both depression and 
diabetes, there is a lack of a certain chemical (serotonin and insulin, respectively) in the body, 
which throws the body into a state of disequilibrium that is correctible through ingestion of the 
lacking chemical. (While this analogy was ostensibly intended to construct depression as a 
nonstigmatizing disease entity, McMullen & Sigurdson (2014) have challenged both the aptness 
of the metaphor itself and as well as its ability to deliver on the intended effect of 
destigmatization.) And yet, while reading the exchanges in online health communities, I could 
not help but wonder whether it was possible that references to “im/balance” functioned not only 
as a description of depression’s etiology, but also as an implicit metaphor for the negotiation of 
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competing demands. In time-compressed Western cultures, we endlessly hear references to 
“work-life balance” or “work-family balance.” It could be illuminating to conduct a study that 
interrogates the various meanings at play in people’s usages of the concept of balance in contexts 
pertaining to mental health generally, and depressive disorders specifically.  
A final suggestion for further research involves a study that interrogates multiple contexts 
in which people renounce individual agency as it pertains to health and illness. As mentioned 
earlier, most communication and rhetorical scholarship on the concept of patient agency has 
focused on contexts wherein patient agency is constrained, and/or how patients claim agency for 
themselves. It is no wonder that scholars are preoccupied with these questions: Western 
biomedicine has historically been criticized for its perceived paternalism, and for, in Segal’s 
(2009) words, seeking to “deprive patients of the sense that they could look after themselves” (p. 
364). In recent decades, a number of developments have converged—for example, patient 
advocacy efforts, technological innovations that enable patients to manage their care from home, 
the proliferation of Internet-based health information—to ostensibly empower patients as never 
before. While few would champion a return to the outmoded ethos of “doctor knows best,” there 
are ways in which the foregrounding of patient agency may work against patients’ interests. For 
example, Crawford (2004) has suggested that employers have been seized on the rhetorics of 
patient agency in order to shift a greater burden of healthcare costs onto their employees. 
Hospital administrators and insurance companies likewise have interests that may be advanced 
by the enthusiastic embrace of patient agency/empowerment/autonomy, etc. Given this, it seems 
reasonable to suggest that studies that foreground the renunciation of patient agency ought to be 
pursued in addition to studies that foreground the reclamation of patient agency, as both are 
equally rhetorically significant communicative acts.  
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5.4 CLOSING THOUGHTS 
In contrast to disciplines that guard the boundaries of their expert knowledge and vocabularies, 
the psychological professions have proven themselves remarkably generous. Over the decades, 
they have been, in Rose’s (1998) words, “happy, indeed eager, to ‘give [themselves] away,’ by 
lending their language, explanations, and judgments to other professional groups and, especially, 
the broader public” (p. 33). In contemplating the enthusiastic cultural uptake of psychological 
vocabularies, and the modes of explanation therein, I could not help but be reminded of the 
words of Kenneth Burke. In Attitudes Toward History, he cautions that, “if we get involved 
enough in using words, the words in turn begin using us” (1937, p. 399). A way of restating this 
might be to say that contemporary psychological vocabularies do something for us, and 
something to us. One way to contextualize the potency of these vocabularies is to consider how 
effective they are at bringing into alignment a number of seemingly disconnected interests.  
For individuals experiencing ill-defined forms suffering, the vocabulary of the 
psychological disciplines, including but not limited to the categories in the DSM, can have 
immense sense-making capacity, in that it offers an explanatory framework for interpreting (and 
intervening upon) general dissatisfaction, relational problems, and so forth. The wide diffusion 
of this vocabulary likewise suits the professional interests of mental health practitioners, most of 
whom would ostensibly like to our therapeutic culture continue thriving. Of course, the corporate 
interests of pharmaceutical companies are very well served by the ubiquity of psychological 
vocabularies, given their potential to bolster an already-dominant psychopharmacologic industry. 
In addition, this vocabulary aligns nicely with governmental interests in ensuring a hardworking, 
employed population filled with self-improvement-seeking consumers. Lastly, one could see 
psychological vocabularies as fueling certain aspects of the so-called digital economy, in which 
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people are encouraged to volunteer what might previously have been regarded as private (and 
now, potentially quite valuable) information about themselves.    
 While this dissertation has tried to operate in a descriptive rather than prescriptive mode, 
if pressed for a closing recommendation of sorts, I would perhaps advocate for the cultivation of 
a rhetorical relationship to psychiatric categories, one that recognizes and makes flexible use of 
what psychiatric categories do for us—e.g. offer sense-making tools, access to social services—
while at the same time maintaining a certain curiosity and perhaps skepticism about what these 
categories might do to us. In practice, this might look something like the adoption of a critical 
realist account of mental disorder that sits between the dual poles of medical naturalism—the 
view that psychiatric categories represent disease entities that are real, invariant, and unshaped 
by human observation—and hard social constructionism, which considers psychiatric categories 
to represent little more than the social and discursive activities of mental health professionals 
(Pilgrim & Bentall, 1999).  
 In a critical realist account of psychiatric categories, it is not the reality of mental 
disorders that is socially constructed; rather, it is our theories about them that are socially 
constructed, and so too the methodologies by which they are constructed. As such, these theories 
and methods are shaped by social forces, including but not limited to social identity categories 
like race, gender, and class, as well as the conditions and constraints researchers experience in 
the course of their theorizing. A critical realist account of psychiatric categories might be most 
closely aligned with the needs and interests of the broader public, because it sidesteps the 
potential problems involved in reifying and rigidifying the inherently unstable categories that 
appear in the DSM, and it also avoids the forfeitures (of sense-making frameworks, social 
services gateways, etc.) that might be entailed by the broad-scale cultural uptake of a fully social 
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constructionist account of mental disorder.  It also might encourage a productive curiosity about 
the conditions under which psychiatric categories emerge.   
 Relatedly, after writing this dissertation, I might advise caution against two pieces of 
conventional wisdom regarding the discourses of depression, to which our therapeutic culture 
currently appears well subscribed. The first is the assumption that physicalizing depression—that 
is, to consistently emphasize its status as a physical illness—will lead to its destigmatization. For 
people diagnosed with dysthymia/PDD specifically, this emphasis is not particularly helpful 
because, in contrast to MDD sufferers, their symptoms are much more subjectively reported than 
externally observable. (MDD symptoms include physically observable signs such as significant 
weight loss or gain, psychomotor retardation or agitationThus, an emphasis on the physicality of 
mental disorder might not destigmatize a chronic, mild mood disorder like dysthymia, and might 
instead draw attention to dysthymia’s lack of physical signs, fueling perceptions that people 
diagnosed with it are mere malingerers or hyperbolic complainers.  Furthermore, people like 
Greco (1993) and Crawford (2004; 2006) have convincingly argued that, in an age of 
“healthism”—wherein health practices have strong symbolic value—even the most physically 
observable illnesses come freighted with moral baggage. As Greco sees it, the previous 
hegemony of psychoanalytic thought inaugurated a psychosomatic understanding of (physical) 
illness, in which the categories of health and illness became and continue to function as “vehicles 
for the self-production and exercise of subjectivities endowed with the faculties of choice and 
free will” (1993, p. 357). Within this paradigm, she argues, disease—physical or otherwise—has 
come to potentially signal a failure of both rationality and moral agency. Following this line of 
logic, if physical illnesses have already been “psychosomatized,” then there might not be much 
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of an obvious benefit in pursuing the reverse—the physicalization of mental disorders—for the 
purposes of destigmatization.  
 The second assumption about which I might advise caution has to do with the 
narrativizing of illness, in this case a chronic, mild mental disorder. Following the so-called 
“narrative turn,” there has been a renewed emphasis on, and enthusiastic embrace of, narrative 
frameworks for understanding illness (both at the individual and cultural level) and for treating 
illness. Pioneers of narrative medicine like Rita Charon (2006) have argued that the cultivation 
of “narrative competence” in physicians will not only improve the quality of physician-patient 
relationships, but also the quality of overall care. However, while illness narratives offer a 
descriptively thick complement to the comparatively thin biomedical account of illness, they are 
not transparently “true”—they are, by their very nature as narratives, selective. Something that I 
continually contemplated while writing chapter 3 was whether there is a risk of becoming overly 
attached—stuck, perhaps—to a particular way of narrativizing one’s illness. In the case of the 
online health communities studied here, I contemplated whether the accounts I observed, 
structured by what I called ‘panoramic temporal perspectives,’ might play a role in attenuating 
the narrator’s felt sense of control. If rumination—the tendency to fixate on the causes and 
consequences of one’s suffering with comparatively less focus on possibilities for amelioration 
(Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008)—is linked with depression, as much research claims, then is it 
possible that narrativizing dysthymia could, in some ways, actually exacerbate its symptoms? 
While an answer to this question stands far outside the scope of this dissertation, I could not help 
but ponder it.  
 Another reason to avoid regarding narrative as panacea is that, given enough time and 
enough circulation, illness narratives risk cohering into a “standard story” that precludes or 
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deflects from other narrative possibilities. Ehrenreich (2001) and Segal (2008) both claim that 
this has occurred with mainstream breast cancer narratives, typified as they are by the generic 
features of relentless cheerfulness, gratitude, and good humor in the face of adversity. To 
construct a narrative outside of these parameters is to risk minimizing opportunities for an 
audience, and for solidarity with other people who share the illness. In the context of online 
health communities specifically, it may be possible for a “standard story” of illness to cohere and 
rigidify at a faster rate, given that the gelling of communicative practices (for example, sharing 
stories with similar structure and thematic content) is how a sense of community is formed 
(Baym, 2000).  
  Furthermore, it bears mentioning that such narratives are not mere descriptions of what 
illness is like, they are also prescriptions for how one ought to be ill: in general, narratively, and 
individualistically. When narratives are individually-focused, which illness narratives 
overwhelmingly tend to be, they might make collectively-focused narratives harder to tell. They 
might also push other frameworks for understanding illness —those that are visual rather than 
verbal, for example—further outside public consciousness. And so, while subjective experiences 
of depression are remarkably diverse, so too should be the available cultural modes of 
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